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THE CHINESE ARMY

THE CHINESE ARMY
ITS ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY
EFFICIENCY

By
EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON
United States Marine Corps, Recently Resigned

I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES

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FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an Inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

It has been prepared by Major Evans Fordyce Carlson, United States Marine Corps, Recently Resigned.

The Study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities including the following, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision: Mr. Roger S. Greene, Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. George Atcheson, Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Faymonville.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author. The Japanese Council has not found it possible to participate in the Inquiry, and assumes, therefore, no responsibility either for its results or for its organization.

During 1938 the Inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as Chairman of the Pacific Council and in 1939 under his successor, Dr. Philip C. Jessup. Every member of the International Secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the Inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this Inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East the Institute has benefited by the counsel of the following Advisers:

Professor H. F. Angus of the University of British Columbia

Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the University of California

M. Etienne Dennery of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These Advisers have co-operated with the Chairman and the Secretary-General in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the Inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the Advisers and although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the Inquiry.

The purpose of this Inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the Institute in all countries and the members of I.P.R. Conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situa-

tion in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which produced the situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan and to the other foreign Powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies and programs of all the Powers in relation to the Far Eastern situation; and finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic and social conditions which may be expected in a post-war period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The Inquiry does not propose to "document" a specific plan for dealing with the Far Eastern situation. Its aim is to focus available information on the present crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already published in a number of languages. Attention may also be drawn to a series of studies on topics bearing on the Far Eastern situation which is being prepared by the Japanese Council. That series is being undertaken entirely independently of this Inquiry, and for its organization and publication the Japanese Council alone is responsible.

The present study, "The Chinese Army," falls within the framework of the third of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows:

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of Western Powers in the Far East; their territorial and economic interests; the effects on their Far Eastern policies of internal economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign policies vis-à-vis other parts of the world; the probable effects of the present conflict on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with respect to their future relations in that area.

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; the extent to which Japan's policy toward China has been influenced by Japan's geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formulation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in China, by the external policies of other Powers affecting Japan; the principal political, economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future developments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931-37, and steps leading toward the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political cohesion and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with foreign Powers; the principal political,

economic and social factors which may be expected in a post-war China; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure; types of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative effectiveness; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a post-war period and the most hopeful methods which might be devised to meet them; necessary adjustments by the Powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

EDWARD C. CARTER
Secretary-General

*New York,
March 15, 1940*

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THE CHINESE ARMY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION


That distinguished former Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. John Hay, once remarked: "The storm center of the World has shifted to China. Whoever understands that vast Empire has the key to the world politics for the next five centuries." This study does not presume to present a comprehensive analysis of the character of the Chinese nation, but it does attempt to reveal some of the basic characteristics of the army which is today fighting to preserve that nation.

In China the army has never held the eminent position that it does in most Western nations. The scholar stands at the top of the social ladder; the soldier is relegated to the lowest position. Consequently, in past years the army has been made up of the dregs of the country. Foreign observers have pointed to this fact, as well as to the propensity of military commanders to "sell out" to their opponents in the civil wars, as justifying their contention that China could never successfully defend herself against invasion by a modern army. It is generally admitted, however, that the Chinese possess initiative and inventive genius. They also possess a pride in race and a love of family that are unassailable. In the present conflict they have submerged their internal differences with a unanimity that has amazed even the most critical of foreign observers. Furthermore, they have devised ways and means for neutralizing the effect of the modern military equipment which their opponents possess—ways and means which perplex and confound the orthodox military mind.

In the following pages the writer has endeavored to enumerate and evaluate the various factors which have contributed to the success of China's armies in resisting the invasion of a modernly equipped and organized military force during the past two and a half years. It seems essential to begin the study with a discussion of the military geography of China, for topography is an important factor in war. A brief survey is made of

the background of the Chinese army before proceeding to the more detailed consideration of the various components of the present army. The technical branches are discussed under separate headings. The study ends with a survey of the military operations which have occurred during the current conflict with Japan.

While statements of fact have been documented where it has been possible to do so, the writer has relied in large measure on his personal knowledge of such facts as have occurred during the past twelve years. Other data have been verified by consultation with reliable Chinese officials and foreign observers. Only the foreigner who has spent some years in China can understand the difficulty of interpreting the significance of events there. While aware of his own unworthiness to do so, the writer feels that during the months when he lived and moved with the Chinese army and people, sharing their hopes, their fears, *their food and their hardships, he was privileged to enter into* their lives to a degree that is the lot of few foreigners. That experience revealed the intensely human qualities of the Chinese and showed that his responses to certain stimuli are not far removed from the response of human beings in other lands to the same stimuli. Intimate association with the Chinese soldier evoked in the writer a feeling of profound admiration and respect for this unorthodox but effective military man.



CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF CHINA

The military approach to geography contemplates a survey of the principal terrain features such as mountains, rivers, plains and coast line, a consideration of the means and methods of communication, and a knowledge of the food productivity of the country and of the language and salient characteristics of the people. In this study only provincial China will be considered, Outer Mongolia and Farther Tibet being omitted. Isolated references will be made to Manchuria, but this region is not within the scope of this study.

Topography

China is a country of vast distances. The air line from the Amur river, which bounds Manchuria on the north, to the Indo-China border is about 2,500 miles, while the breadth of the nation from Turkestan, on the west, to the Maritime province of Siberia, on the east, is about 3,000 miles. The coast line, considered as a semi-circle, is only 2,150 miles, but the configuration of the coast line amounts to nearly 5,000 miles.¹ The best harbors along the coast are located south of the Yangtze delta, the alluvial deposits of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers militating against good natural harbors in the north. An abundance of good harbors and the presence of mountain ranges a short distance inland from the southeast coast, making penetration of the interior difficult, are probably responsible for the fact that most of the competent sea-faring men of China come from the south.

The area of the twenty-eight provinces (including Manchuria) aggregates about 3,097,836 square miles, and within this area live an estimated population of 485,508,838 people. Due to the extensive mountain ranges only 11 per cent of the terrain is cultivated.² Mountain ranges extend finger-like to the east,

¹ H. G. W. Woodhead, *The China Year Book*, Shanghai, 1934.

² George B. Cressey, *China's Geographic Foundations*, New York, 1934.

northeast and southeast from the central Tibetan plateau. The Central Mountain Belt, comprising the Nan Shan, Kun Lun and Tsingling Shan, in order from west to east, probably exercises the greatest influence of any terrain feature on Chinese life and habits. North of this belt which, in the east, lies between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers, rainfall is limited. The winters are cold and the summers hot. Transportation is confined largely to two-wheeled carts and pack animals. The houses are built of mud, stone or wood. The food is mostly wheat, millet, kaoliang and beans. South of this belt rainfall is abundant. The winters are mild and the summers humid. The canal and river systems of the south provide easy avenues of communication. The water buffalo supplants the mule, the donkey and the ox as a beast of burden. The houses are built largely of bamboo, and rice is the dominant food crop. The people of the south speak a variety of dialects, especially along the coast line, while in the north the Mandarin dialect prevails throughout.³

There are branches of the Central Mountain Belt which bend to the north, and which are of military significance. West of Lanchow, in Kansu province, the Nan Shan has a branch which extends northward and encircles the Ordos desert (southern Suiyuan). Here it is known as the Holan Shan, and peaks reach to ten thousand feet. Northeast of the desert this irregular range becomes the Taching Shan, and it continues in an uncertain way to the east where it connects with the Yin Shan northwest of Peiping. Bending northeastward this range forms the Grand Khingan along the Manchurian-Outer Mongolian border, and the Little Khingan along the northeastern border of the same region. Another branch of the Central Mountain Belt, called the Taihang Shan, extends into Shansi province and joins the Yin Shan group northwest of Peiping. This mountain range gives Shansi a dominant position among the provinces of north China.

In south China that broad finger of the Tibetan plateau known as the Nan Ling spreads out to the southeast into Yunnan, east into Kweichow and Hunan. Bending northeast along the Kiangsi-Fukien border it tapers off into low hills in Chekiang. Most of south China is hilly or mountainous. Lowlands and plains are confined for the most part to river valleys and

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

deltas. The Manchurian Plain lies in the heart of that region, and resembles a huge frying pan the handle of which, eighty-five miles across, rests on the Gulf of Chihli between Chinchow and Kaiping. The body bulges to a width of 285 miles near the northern limits of the plain. It is drained by the Liao river in the south, and by the Sungari, which flows eastward into the Amur river. This broad plain, which at no point is over 1,000 feet in height, consists of productive farm land.

In China proper there are three major river systems. The northernmost of these is the Yellow River which rises in the Tibetan plateau and follows a circuitous course for 2,700 miles before spilling its waters into the Gulf of Chihli. It has an unpredictable habit of overflowing its banks during the flood season, and formerly its mouth was south of the Shantung peninsula. This great river and its tributaries dominate the Central China Plain, which extends through Hopei into Honan and Anhwei provinces. It is navigable by native craft only, and there are sections of the river, such as its southward course between Shansi and Shensi provinces, where occasional waterfalls prevent all navigation.

The Yangtze is 3,200 miles in length. This great river also rises in the Tibetan plateau, and flows generally eastward through Central China, emptying into the Yellow Sea near Shanghai. It is navigable for ocean going vessels to Hankow, for lighter steam vessels to Chungking, in Szechwan, and by native steam and other craft to Suifu, two hundred miles further west. Due to its accessibility from the sea the region of the Yangtze is more highly developed than other sections of the interior, and several of the cities on its banks are foreign treaty ports.

In the south the Si Kiang, or West river, is the most important of the river basins. It has its source in Yunnan, and flows east through Kweichow and Kwangsi. At Wuchow, in the latter province, it is joined by the Kwei Kiang from the north, while west of Wuchow it receives the waters of the Tso Kiang from the south. A short canal connects the Kwei with the Yangtze in Hunan province, and the Tso affords water communication with Indo-China. Near Canton the West river is joined by the East and North rivers, and from here to the sea the area is a vast delta. The West river is navigable by river

steamers to a point west of Wuchow, and by native craft beyond there.

There is one other topographical area, distinctive in its own way, which should be noted here because of its striking military importance at this time. This is the Red Basin of Szechwan. Geologists tell us that this basin was occupied in Tertiary times by a great lake in which were deposited red sandstones. Hemmed in on all sides by high mountain ranges the basin is practically inaccessible except by way of the Yangtze river, which passes through a deep and narrow gorge west of Ichang. A narrow mountain trail leads north from Kunming to Suifu, and another trail, recently widened into a road, enters by the mountain route from Shensi.

Four streams, tributaries of the Yangtze, flow south through the basin and provide the name of the province (Four Rivers). Their valleys comprise one of the richest agricultural districts of China. In this humid climate, where the sun seldom shines and where there is rarely winter frost, such crops as rice, wheat, corn, beans, sugar, hemp and tobacco grow. Here there are minerals and salt wells. The area contains 75,418 square miles, and supported a pre-war population of about 44,000,000 people.⁴ The influence of mountains and rivers on Chinese life is suggested by the reference to them which is incorporated in the names of towns and provinces. Thus, there is Hopei (north of the river)—Honan (south of the river)—Shansi (west of the mountains)—and Shantung (east of the mountains).

Communications

The strategic value of China's 7,500 miles of railways is equal in importance to their commercial value. There are two major north-south systems. The Tientsin-Pukow extends south from Tientsin, where it connects with the Peiping-Liaoning road, to Pukow, on the north bank of the Yangtze, opposite Nanking. In pre-war days a railway ferry carried cars across the river to connect with the Nanking-Shanghai line. This in turn is connected with a road which goes south to Hangchow and Ningpo, in Chekiang province.

The Peiping-Hankow line has its northern terminus at Peiping and terminates at Hankow on the Yangtze. Across the river at Wuchang another road extends southward to Canton.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

The Peiping-Suiyuan line stems from Peiping and penetrates the Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan as far west as Paoto. Tatung, on this line, is the northern terminus of the Tung Pu, a narrow gauge road which runs through the heart of Shansi to Fenglingtu, on the Yellow River opposite Tungkwan. At Taiyuanfu, the provincial capital, the line connects with the Cheng-Tai road, which extends east to Shih-chiachwang, on the Peiping-Hankow road. In Shantung province the Kiao-Tsi line operates between the seaport of Tsingtao and the Tientsin-Pukow road at Tsinan.

The most important of the east-west railways is the Lunghai, which extends from Haichow, on the sea south of Shantung, to Paoki, a few miles west of Sian (Shensi). It connects with the Tientsin-Pukow line at Hsuehowfu, and with the Peiping-Hankow line at Chengchow (Honan). At Tungkwan passengers and freight may ferry across the Yellow River to the Tung Pu terminus at Fenglingtu. Another east-west line, constructed in recent years, is the Hangchow-Kiangshan line. It extends southwest from Hangchow to Nanchang, and connects with the Wuchang-Canton line at Chuchow, in Hunan. There are numerous other small railways in China. They are designed, for the most part, to connect seaports with adjacent interior areas. The ones which have been described are those which are of major military importance. Freight cars have a capacity of from ten to forty tons each, the majority of goods-cars being of the thirty ton type.

The construction of motor roads in China is a comparatively recent innovation. Formerly the traditional road was little more than a footpath. Along these primitive roads commerce flowed on wheelbarrows, pack animals, or was carried by human beings via the bamboo shoulder pole method. These methods still prevail in the interior. The ancient courier roads, which usually converged on Peiping, the capital, were wider and could be used by carts and sedan chairs. Road building was conducted by provincial governments, the China Famine Relief Commission, various public works departments, and in recent years by the national government. Most of the northern provinces now have a fair system of motor roads, though many of them cannot be used in inclement weather.

South of the Yangtze there are several important trunk lines. One north-south trunk line extends from the Yangtze River

in Hunan to Kwangsi and Kwantung provinces, passing through Changsha and Hengyang. Another extends from Kiukiang, in Kiangsi, to Kwangtung, via Nanchang. The Hunan trunk line is connected with Kweichow and Yunnan provinces. In the west there is a fair highway from Kunming, terminus of the French railway to Indo-China, to Chungking (Szechwan), via Kweiyang, capital of Kweichow. In Szechwan a provincial highway connects Chungking with Chengtu, and from there extends north to Shensi. The most phenomenal road building project of recent years is the northwest road from Sian to Sinkiang, through Kansu province. This road now is in good condition, and provides the means for overland communication with Russia. Since the commencement of Sino-Japanese hostilities a highway has been constructed from Kunming (Yunnan) to the Burma border at Lashio to facilitate the transportation of supplies from Rangoon.

Chinese Characteristics

No foreigner can truthfully lay claim to a comprehensive knowledge of the characteristics of the Chinese. There are evident in his character too many obscure nuances, too many contradictions which, to the Occidental mind, lack the element of logic. But there are certain salient points of character which have a direct bearing on the military efficiency of the Chinese.

The average Chinese is unusually intelligent and he readily absorbs instruction. He is resourceful and he possesses initiative. He is traditionally loyal to his family, and he is faithful to the point of death to a leader who treats him with consideration. He responds readily to kindness and justice. Basically he is honest and truthful. He appears to lack nerves. He is inured to privation and physical hardship, and he meets death with the same philosophical realism with which he has faced life.

The vast distances of China and the rugged character of the country are among the important points which favor its defense against invasion. Other major factors are the ability of the people to endure hardship, be content with a meager ration, and to live in relatively self-sufficient economic groups. The prevalence of a philosophy which emphasizes pride in race, love of family and the desire to be revered by their children is another important asset.

The weaknesses which the geography of China suggests are,

the lack of adequate internal communications, the lack of political unity (a condition facilitated by the rugged topography), and the absence of the habit of cooperation. The lack of heavy industries is a decided disadvantage, though this apparent drawback can be converted into an asset by the establishment of a decentralized industry. The devotion to family has tended to breed selfishness which in turn has indirectly led to the widespread "squeeze" system—another weakness. The Confucian philosophy of pacificism has not been conducive to the development of a strong political state in this era of power politics.

Taken as a whole the geography of China favors resistance to invasion, and while the character and habits of the people are not such as to facilitate decisive and united action, they have a substantial quality which suggests the difficulty of foreign domination.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY

For centuries the profession of arms has held a low position in Chinese esteem. When Major-General Emory Upton of the United States Army visited China in 1874 he found that the sole qualifications required of officers at the competitive examinations at Peking were expertness in archery, sword practice, and the ability to lift and swing heavy weights. These questionable indices of leadership were in marked contrast to the high standard of the intelligence tests which candidates for the civil service were required to take.¹ The traditional Chinese attitude toward the profession of arms is aptly expressed in an ancient proverb that runs something like this: "as you would not use good iron to make a nail, so you would not use a good man to make a soldier."² This conception of the social status of the soldier obtained until the Nationalist revolution of 1926-28. Only in the present Sino-Japanese conflict are the vestiges of it being eradicated. General Upton found that the responsibility for the maintenance of an adequate military establishment rested largely on the various provinces. The Governors of the provinces were required to maintain forces not only for the security of the province, but for the defense of the empire as well.³ The policy of provincial armies, which still prevails, was one of the factors which facilitated the growth of military feudalism during the years which followed the revolution of 1911.

Down through the years the foreign military observers who have viewed China's armies are agreed that the apparent ineffectiveness of the army is not due to a lack of intelligence or want of courage on the part of the Chinese soldier. The deficiency has been in training, spiritual indoctrination, and in intelligent leadership. The soldier possesses unusual powers of endurance, subsists on a meager ration of rice or millet, is not

¹ Emory Upton, *The Armies of Asia and Europe*, New York, 1878, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

sensitive to extreme temperatures and endures pain with great aplomb. The qualities of the Chinese soldier are in fact the qualities of the Chinese peasant until he is submitted to a specific course of training and indoctrination. Until the organization of the Nationalist army, which was begun by Chiang Kai-shek at Canton in 1925-26, the Chinese soldier was little more than a piece of merchandise who worked and fought in proportion to his rate of pay. He felt that he fought for the material success of the man who paid him, rather than for an ideal.

The assumption by Chiang Kai-shek of the directorship of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton in 1924 may be taken as the beginning of a new military order in China. Doctor Sun Yat-sen had already accepted Russian orientation as an aid to the unification of the country. Chiang had recently returned from Russia, and had invited General Galen (later to become better known as Marshal Bluecher) to come to Canton as military adviser. Chiang and Galen mapped out a program which provided both military and political training for the cadets. The length of the course was two years. The embryo officers were indoctrinated with the spirit of nationalism, and with a definite sense of responsibility for the mental, moral and physical well being of the men they would command. While the cadets became conscious of their duty to the nation, it was perhaps unavoidable that they should also develop a loyalty for Chiang Kai-shek which was to identify Chiang in their minds with the cause of national salvation.

In 1926 Chiang was named commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army for the duration of the Northern Expedition. The field army which had been organized under his direction consisted of seven armies of three divisions each. A division contained three regiments, each mustering 1,620 rifles.⁴ The Russian system of political commissars had been adopted, and the men of the various armies had received a modicum of political indoctrination. That modicum, however, was sufficient to generate within them the feeling that they were fighting for an ideal—the building of a nation which would govern in the interest of all the people. The change in the character of the army, which had been brought about by ethical indoctrination, was reflected in the co-operative attitude of the people in the theater of operations. No longer were the people abused.

⁴ Tang Leang-li, *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1930, p. 249.

No longer was food taken from them without compensation. The resulting friendliness facilitated the advance of the expedition to the Yangtze river.

In this war of 1926-28 the opponents of the Kuomintang armies were the armies of Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Chang Tsung-chang (henchman of Chang Tso-lin) and Sun Chuan-fang, all self-seeking war lords. The appeal of nationalism brought many of the divisions of the "war lords" over to the Kuomintang side without bloodshed. There were other troops which came over for a consideration. In the civil war days the practice of "selling out" to an opponent was not regarded as dishonorable. War was a business conducted for personal gain by merchant-generals. No moral principle influenced soldiers of this type. Moreover, all were Chinese. If the material condition of the leaders could be improved by changing sides it was a good business deal, and even the troops so regarded it.

The nationalist ideal spread. Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called "Christian" general, brought his army to the side of the Kuomintang, and it became the Second Army Group. The original revolutionary army was re-organized by Chiang Kai-shek as the First Army Group. Yen Hsi-shan came into the fold with his forces of the "model" province of Shansi, which became the Third Army Group. A Fourth Army Group was organized under General Li Tsung-jen, a Kwangsi leader who had commanded the Kwangsi division of the original expeditionary force. When the Northern Expedition was completed in 1928, with the capture of Tientsin and Peking (renamed Peiping), these four army groups represented the four major political sentiments within the Kuomintang Party. They collaborated in the establishment of the new government at Nanking. In the meantime Chiang Kai-shek had become entrenched as the supreme military leader in China, with practically dictatorial power in all matters pertaining to the government.

In 1927, after the arrival of the army at the Yangtze river, Chiang Kai-shek purged the Kuomintang of the Communist elements. Diplomatic relations were broken off with Russia, and the Russian advisers were sent home. The Communist movement in China went underground for a time. However, on the 1st of August, 1927, part of the 4th Kuomintang Army revolted at Nanchang (Kiangsi). The 20th Division of this army became the nucleus for the Chinese Red Army, under Chu

Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting.⁵ Subsequently other Communist groups rose to the surface in the provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Szechwan. A central Soviet was established in the mountainous region of Kiangsi province, with Mao Tse-tung as the political leader, and with Chu Teh as the leader of the army. The Red Army remained in opposition to the Kuomintang until December, 1936. During this period the leaders of this force were compelled to dig deep into their human resources for ways and means to preserve themselves—an experience which was eventually to be of inestimable aid to the cause of Chinese nationalism.

On November 13, 1928 Colonel Max Bauer of the German Army, who had been employed by the Chinese Government as military adviser, arrived in Shanghai. He was accompanied by several assistants. Bauer had made a reputation as a staff officer under General Ludendorff during the Great War. He was the first of a line of German military men who were to exercise a dominant influence on the organization and military efficiency of the Chinese army. Guided by the advice of Colonel Bauer some important military innovations were made. A Central Military Academy, continuing the functions of the old Whampoa Academy, was established at Nanking. A six months refresher course in military tactics and technique was provided for the officers of the combat divisions in an Officers' Training School. Of equal importance was the creation of a "model" division at Nanking, which served as the training unit for other divisions of the National Army. Subsequently schools were established for the training of specialists in staff work, artillery, anti-aircraft, tanks and communications. Thenceforth the training methods of the army approximated those of modern European armies.

It was significant that the units which received the greatest attention under the new system of training were those divisions which came directly under the control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The graduates of the Central Military Academy were alleged to have formed a secret society, fascist in concept, which came to be known as the "Blue Shirts." It was reported that the members were sworn to personal loyalty to Chiang, and that membership in the society was conditioned on being a graduate of the Academy, or being personally nominated by the Gen-

⁵ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938, p. 350.

eralissimo. The society came to wield considerable power, especially in the purging from important government posts of persons whose loyalty to Chiang became questionable. It was also used to provide an espionage system against the Communists. How much Colonel Bauer contributed to the new military order is not known. In the spring of 1929, however, when Li Tsung-jen revolted at Hankow and the Generalissimo moved an army up the Yangtze with such dispatch that Hankow capitulated within a week, foreign observers credited the decisive and well planned moves of the Nanking army to Colonel Bauer's advice. Bauer contracted black smallpox on the expedition, and died shortly after his evacuation to Shanghai. Lieutenant-Colonel Kriebel was the next German adviser, and he was followed in a short time by Lieutenant General Wetzell. The latter is credited with extending and perfecting the system suggested by Bauer. Wetzell remained for three years. He was followed, in 1934, by General von Falkenhausen, a recognized strategist, a master of military detail, and a sympathetic friend of China. Von Falkenhausen was assisted by a staff of instructors who worked in the schools at Nanking and with the divisions in the field. The group remained until it was withdrawn by order of the German government in June, 1938.

It was to be expected that a considerable proportion of the Chinese orders for military supplies should go to Germany during the period when a German military mission was advising the armies. Many of these orders were still in the process of being filled when the mission was withdrawn. Shipments of munitions from Germany continued to arrive in China months thereafter. Some foreign observers regard this fact as inconsistent with the Reich's anti-Comintern pact with Japan. It would appear, however, that the withdrawal of the military mission was in deference to Germany's pact with Japan, and Germany probably had no desire further to jeopardize her interests in China by refusing to honor orders for munitions which had been made at an earlier date.

The National Army was engaged on some front almost continuously from 1926 until December of 1936. In 1930 Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan revolted. In the ensuing campaign the result was uncertain until Chang Hsueh-liang brought his Manchurian army to the aid of Chiang Kai-shek. Chang's absence from Manchuria facilitated the Japanese coup

at Mukden in September of 1931. When the Japanese invasion of Jehol in 1933 spilled over into North China, an ineffectual resistance was made by Chinese troops in Hopei province. The loss of Jehol led to the retirement of Chang Hsueh-liang from his official posts, and he departed for Europe on a health cruise.

A better example of the temper of Chinese troops when opposed to foreign invaders was given at Shanghai in the spring of 1932. Here the 19th Route Army, commanded by General Tsai Ting-kai, later supported by part of the 5th Route Army, resisted for thirty-four days the efforts of the Japanese military and naval forces to dislodge them. The Chinese exhibited marked courage and fortitude in the face of superior fire power, and only retired when the Japanese landed a division at Liuhø, opposite their left flank.

It appears that the decision to resist at Shanghai did not come from the Central Government, but was made by General Tsai. According to Edgar Snow, the war correspondent, Tsai told him that he had orders from Nanking to withdraw his troops, but that the Japanese attacked while he was in the process of executing the order. He could not, he felt, withdraw once he had been attacked.⁶ The magnificent resistance which was made by his army marked an epoch in Chinese military history, for it proved to the people that the Japanese army was not invincible. As T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, remarked in discussing the results of the battle: "Fortunately, if it proved anything, the grim struggle at Shanghai has shown that Chinese soldiers can fight against greatest odds and that for national independence they know how to die."⁷ Another significant fact about the Shanghai contest is that the men of the 19th Route Army had received political training of the type which had inspired the men of the original expeditionary force of the National Army in 1926 with an ideal, and which was the motivating force of the Chinese Red armies.

The moves of the Japanese army into Manchuria and Shanghai, and into Jehol and North China in 1933, aroused the latent patriotism of the Chinese. "Salvation societies" came into being, and compulsory military training was introduced by the Central Government into the schools. Chiang Kai-shek instituted the construction of a strategic system of highways,

⁶ Edgar Snow, *Far Eastern Front*, New York, 1933, p. 221.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

railways and defense works, most of which were south of the Yangtze river. But the costly campaign against the Red Army was continued. The Reds, under the able leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, escaped from the besieging ring of troops and fortresses which Chiang had wrought around them in Kiangsi, and commenced one of the epic marches of history. Fighting innumerable battles, and averaging twenty-four miles a day for over a year, they moved through the provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Sikang, Tsinghai and Kansu into northern Shensi, a distance of about 6,000 miles. In the latter province they established a new Soviet, which later became the home of other independent soviets.⁸ Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been relieved of his posts and sent abroad after the capitulation of Jehol in 1933, had meanwhile returned and resumed command of the former Northeastern army. This force, under-paid and ill-treated by the Central Government, was sent to Shensi and Kansu to inaugurate another campaign against the Reds.

The Northeastern troops had however become intensely anti-Japanese, due to the loss of their homes following the invasion of Manchuria. They were therefore in a receptive mood when the Communist agents moved among them with appeals to their patriotism. As early as February, 1932, the Chinese Communists had declared war against Japan and issued a petition to the Central Government (Kuomintang) to abate the war against them and unite for resistance to the threatened Japanese invasion. It was probably because of this situation, and because he himself had become convinced of the futility of the anti-Red campaign, that Chang Hsueh-liang determined to "persuade" the Generalissimo to stop the civil war and unite the nation. The Sian coup followed.

The Sian coup (December 12 to 24, 1936) was a major turning point in Chinese history, and had a far reaching effect on the army. A united front was formed between the Communist and Kuomintang parties, and the Red Army, in August of 1937, was incorporated in the Chinese National Army as the 8th Route Army. The Kwangsi politico-military group—Li Tsung-jen, Pai Shung-hsi and Li Chi-sen—had been antagonistic to Chiang Kai-shek since the Hankow coup of March, 1929. In June of 1936 Kwangsi joined with Kwangtung in forming an

⁸ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1938, p. 194.

anti-Japanese alliance, in defiance of the Central Government. However, the following month Generalissimo Chiang, by a series of political and military moves, regained control of both of these southern provinces. General Yu Han-mou succeeded General Chen Chi-tang as commander of the Kwangtung military forces, and the Kwangsi troops were organized into the 4th Route Army under the command of Li Tsung-jen. When the Liukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937 precipitated the Sino-Japanese struggle all of the military forces of the Republic were subordinate to the Central Government.

Even in this brief survey of the growth of the modern Chinese army two compelling facts stand out in stark relief: first, the potential greatness of the Chinese soldier; second, the miserable selfishness of most of the high leaders. It is paradoxical that down through the years the Chinese army should have been treated as a step-child, and at the same time should have provided the power which made possible the rise and fall of warlords. And yet, on those rare occasions when leaders have been actuated by lofty and unselfish motives, the response of their followers has manifested a vigor, an exaltation of spirit, and a power of co-operative action which can well cause students of Far Eastern affairs to revise their estimate of China's potential power. Strict adherence to tradition has been the mill stone which has restrained the Chinese people from progressing. Lingering remnants of the feudal system bred the habit of nepotism in government and encouraged the practice of "squeeze" in official fiscal matters. But the younger generation, in an increasing degree, has had the courage to break with tradition and to chart a new course in the direction of a more equitable social order and a more enlightened life. As one studies the permutations of the Chinese army during the past decade there is evidence, amid the confusion, of a clear thread of progress.

There have been great Chinese armies in the past. The last instance during the Manchu dynasty was the army which was organized and led by Tso Tsung-tang. During the years from 1868 to 1878 this army subdued a Mohammedan revolt in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang. Tso was a hard taskmaster, but he was just and honest, and his army had "morale, *esprit de corps*, spirit and something more."⁹ Men were proud to serve in his army, and they trusted him to lead them where he would.

⁹ William L. Bales, *Tso Tsung-tang*, Shanghai, 1937, p. 353.

This army was unique among Chinese armies in that it did not live off the country, but had a well organized train and supply system.

In the development of the Chinese National army the genius of Chiang Kai-shek must be recognized. It is not possible for a contemporary observer to criticize intelligently his methods and motives, or to evaluate his worth. But there remains the fact that he charted a course through a maze of intrigue and animosity, and brought about the unity of all political factions, together with their armies. The failure to organize a military force adequate for the defense of the nation was not the fault of Chiang, but was due to a weakness which was inherent in the Chinese system of social development.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL GROUPING OF SUBORDINATE UNITS

China has not yet reached the stage of development where the armed forces can be considered as a national army whose allegiance to the Central Government is undivided. Since the commencement of hostilities with Japan, the Generalissimo, as Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces, has had greater nominal control than ever before. But the obedience of certain military groups is still subject to the approval of the political leaders to whom they feel they owe a prior allegiance. Consequently, any survey of the military efficiency of the Chinese army must take these regional loyalties into consideration.

The simplest approach is to consider the principal political groups, of which there are now three which have any substantial military following. The strongest is the Kuomintang Party, which established the government at Nanking in 1928, and which has absorbed such minorities as the Kuominchun group (led by Feng Yu-hsiang), the Shansi group (led by Yen Hsi-shan) and the Northeastern group (led by Chang Hsueh-liang). Geographically the Kuomintang holds sway over all of China from the Yellow River south to the borders of Kwangsi-Kwangtung, and from the coast to the Tibetan plateau.

The Communist Party, led by Mao Tse-tung, probably is second in importance today. This group controls North Shensi, and the area between the Yellow River and Inner Mongolia, including part of Shantung. While the Eighth Route Army, which is the military instrument of the Party, is small (only three divisions), the Partisan units which have been recruited and trained by the army exceed its original strength by tenfold. Moreover, many of the units which are ordinarily ear-marked as "Kuomintang," and which have collaborated with the Eighth Route Army during the anti-Japanese conflict, have absorbed its ideology to a degree which would probably bring them into its fold if the present entente between the two parties should

be disturbed. This hypothesis would place Shansi in the Leftist camp, though the province is ostensibly governed by Yen Hsi-shan.

The third major political group is that known as the Kwangsi clique, of which Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Chi-sen are the leaders. After the abortive coup at Hankow in March of 1929 these leaders returned to Kwangsi where they proceeded to establish what is best described as a paternal dictatorship. Li Tsung-jen calls the politico-economic set-up "national-socialism"—though it is quite different from the Nazi brand. Under this benevolent administration Kwangsi became known to foreigners as the "model" province. A well trained and disciplined army of about 1,000,000 men was organized. The provincial leaders remained antagonistic to the government of Chiang Kai-shek until the summer of 1936.

General Pai Chung-hsi is now in command of the Chinese troops in Kwangsi and Kwangtung. In view of the community of interest which has obtained in the past between these two provinces it is probable that their present objectives are closely allied. Under the leadership of General Pai, considered by many to be the keenest of Chinese military men, the training objectives of the Kwangsi-Kwangtung troops will doubtless be the same. Since the Communists relinquished the class struggle in favor of building a strong nationalist state there is much in common between them and the Kwangsi group.

Within the Kuomintang armies there are contrasting loyalties. The German-trained divisions are the crack troops of the army. Sometimes referred to as the personal troops of Chiang Kai-shek, they numbered about 300,000 at the beginning of the war. These troops suffered heavy casualties at the battle of Shanghai. The casualties have been replaced, but efficiency has not been restored to its former high mark. They may, however, still be considered as loyal to the Generalissimo. Other troops of the Kuomintang army are levies from the various provinces. Their efficiency is dependent in large measure on the capabilities of their officers, many of whom are political appointees. Their first loyalty is to their own leaders, but as most of the provincial leaders are themselves loyal to Chiang, the troops can be depended upon by him. Where the provincial leaders are not completely in harmony with the Generalissimo the loyalty of the troops will depend on the whims of the leaders.

Yunnan and Szechwan might be placed in the doubtful class, though there has been no indication of a lack of devotion to the anti-Japanese cause in these provinces.

The Mohammedan troops of Tsinghai, Kansu and Ninghsia remain to be considered. The Mohammedans have no reason to love the Chinese, but they realize that they would fare no better at the hands of the Japanese. They occupy a strategic position athwart the northwest line of communication that extends to Russia, and the Japanese have already attempted to persuade them to revolt. Thus far they have remained loyal to China—largely because of the good offices of General Pai Chung-hsi, who is a Mohammedan.

The ramifications of political groups in China are many and complex. The nuances of political opinion and their relation to economic forces are beyond the range of understanding of the average foreigner observer. Probably the best method of estimating the political trend is to select the outstanding political leaders who have a military following (for political strength is invariably implemented by military power) and study their reactions to important events over a period of years. In the present situation Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung and Li Tsung-jen (or Pai Chung-hsi) represent the three dominant political forces of China. On their continued cooperation rests the ability of the nation to continue resistance.

Chiang Kai-shek has the greatest role to play for on him devolves the responsibility for maintaining unity. He has become the symbol of unity to the people of China. In order to maintain the ship of state on an even keel he must throw his weight first to the right and then to the left—and that is what he is doing. Where his real sympathies lie in respect to political ideologies probably only he himself knows, for he is tight-lipped on matters of personal conviction. This taciturnity is part of his strength for it permits a wishful belief to glow in the minds of each faction that he secretly favors the doctrine of that faction. This advantage has been enhanced by his habit of keeping the few promises he makes. Herein lies the explanation of the profound confidence which such erstwhile enemies as the Chinese Communists have in him, and which they do not extend to other officials of the Kuomintang.

No mention has been made in this chapter of political leaders without a military following, such as Wang Ching-wei. Wang

has had a distinguished revolutionary record in the Kuomintang Party, but he has also strayed from the Party on several previous occasions. In 1926 he went abroad to Europe after a violent disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek. When he returned in 1927 he again disagreed with the Generalissimo, and went to Hankow where the Left Wing of the Party was attempting to maintain a government. In 1930-31 he joined the Yen Hsi-shan-Feng Yu-hsiang coalition against Nanking. Shortly after the present conflict began he advocated a policy of non-resistance and received some support from Generals Chang Chun and Ho Ying-chin. In December, 1938, he left "free" China for the Japanese occupied regions, and he is now preparing to head the Japanese puppet government in China.

Wang has no following in the army, and his former prestige has evaporated since he became a traitor to his country. The Chinese people are in no mood to follow a man who deserted the nation in its hour of need. The present attitude of Generals Ho Ying-chin and Chang Chun is unknown. General Chang Chun is director of the Generalissimo's military headquarters in Szechwan and General Ho is Minister of War, which is an administrative post.

CHAPTER V

ARMY ORGANIZATION

At the top of the army organization is the Military Affairs Commission, composed of the chief military officers, and a few of the political leaders of the nation. It is presided over by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. All matters of military policy are discussed by the members of the Commission, but the decisions are made by Chiang.

The bulk of the work of directing the affairs of the army devolves on the General Staff. General Cheng Chien was the Chief of the General Staff at the beginning of the war, and he is still so carried on the rolls. Actually he has commanded the First War Zone (headquarters at Loyang) since about November, 1937. The Deputy Chief of Staff, General Pai Chung-hsi, is conceded to be the brains of the Staff. Assembled under him are many of the young military officers who have attended military schools abroad. The General Staff prepares the plans and issues the orders for the execution of military operations. Theoretically the General Staff comes under the supervision of the Ministry of War. However, in practice the war ministry has been relegated to the status of a bureau which is charged with the supervision of administrative details of the army. Subsections of the staff deal, respectively, with Operations, Intelligence, Communications, Transportation and Supplies and the Citizens' Military Training Corps.

The field armies are controlled through regional commands which are known as War Zones. A War Zone comprises the geographical area that lies within a major theater of operations. The idea was initiated at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, by the creation of the First War Zone in north China. It included Hopei province and the area along the Peiping-Hankow railway. The first headquarters was established at Chengchow (Honan).

As the war progressed new War Zones were created to meet the spreading Japanese offensives. The following list indicates their location:

<i>War Zone</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Commander</i>
First	Hopei, the Peiping-Hankow R.R., north Honan	General Cheng Chien.
Second	Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan	General Yen Hsi-shan.
Third	Southern Kiangsu, Chekiang, eastern Kiangsi and southern Anhwei	General Ku Chu-tung.
Fourth	Kwangtung and Kwangsi	General Ho Ying-ching.
Fifth	Northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei and southern Shantung	General Li Tsung-jen.
Sixth	Abolished	
Seventh	Abolished	
Eighth	Shensi, eastern Kansu, Honan west of Mienchih	General Chiang Ting-wen.
Ninth	Hupei, western Kiangsi, northern Hunan	General Chen Cheng.

The commander of a War Zone exercises supreme command over all troops which operate within that zone. Thus, Ku Chu-tung directed the operations at Shanghai, Li Tsung-jen was supreme at Hsuehowfu, and Chen Cheng directed the fighting during the defense of Hankow.

The field organization of the troops is as follows:

Army Groups	(<i>Chi Tuan</i>)	Each consists of two or more armies.
Armies	(<i>Chun Tuan</i>)	Each consists of two or more corps.
Corps	(<i>Chun</i>)	Each consists of two or more divisions.
Divisions	(<i>Shih</i>)	Each consists of two or more infantry brigades, plus one artillery battalion or regiment, and contingents of engineers, signal troops, medical units and transport. Total: 10,000.

The division is a tactical and administrative unit, commanded by a Major-General. The two infantry brigades contain two¹ regiments each. An infantry regiment contains three battalions, and each battalion is composed of four rifle companies and one machine gun unit.

The basic unit of the company is the squad, which contains from twelve to fourteen men. Three squads form a platoon,¹ and three platoons compose the company. It is interesting to note that the company is normally formed in line for military exercises, with the three platoons abreast, and with the three squads of each platoon disposed in depth in three successive lines. This formation, with which experiments are now being conducted in the American Army, does away with the necessity for squad drill—a time-consuming operation in the training of recruits. It means that when the company forms column the troops simply face to the right or to the left. Three men abreast constitute the width of the column, instead of four.

Each squad has at least one automatic rifle. These are mostly

of the 30 caliber or 6.5 millimeter types, and come from Germany, Denmark, Great Britain, Czecho-Slovakia, Russia and the United States. Browning automatic rifles of the model of 1937 have been observed on the Chinese front. Machine guns are usually of the 30 caliber or 7.9 millimeter and come from the same sources as do the automatic rifles. Infantry units are also equipped with trench mortars and 37 millimeter guns. Artillery consists of guns and howitzers which range in size from 75 millimeters to 155 millimeters. The artillery organization corresponds to that which is employed in most Western armies. Twenty and thirty-seven millimeter guns are used for anti-tank work, and they are also employed against aircraft. There are a few German five inch anti-aircraft guns. Searchlights were used effectively at Nanking and Hankow for spotting enemy aircraft.

Considerable attention has been devoted to the development of radio communication. Every army has its own radio net, as does each War Zone. In the areas where guerrilla operations are conducted the mobile guerrilla units are usually supplied with radio sending and receiving sets. Tanks have never played an important role in Chinese military operations. The few tanks which were used at Shanghai were not skillfully handled, and most of them were captured. Since then more modern types have been received from abroad. The tank is essentially an offensive weapon, and its effective employment requires considerable mechanical skill.

There are about two hundred divisions in the Chinese Army, and they are organized into fifty armies. The organization is basically sound, but the army is weak in competent commanders and experienced staff officers. Young leaders, who have demonstrated marked ability on the field of battle, are now being moved up to command positions, but the process is impeded by the necessity for avoiding injury to the sensibilities of influential politicians, especially in the provincial armies. The training of competent staff officers, a long slow process, is receiving the earnest attention of the Generalissimo.

In the opinion of the writer the best field commanders which the war has brought to the fore to date are: In the guerrilla style of warfare: General Chu Teh; in the positional style of warfare: Generals Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi, Sun Lien-chung and Tang En-po.

Chu Teh is pre-eminent in his field. Sun Lien-chung and

Tang En-po have no political leanings. Devoting their undivided attention to military matters, their leadership has invariably been of a high quality. General Sun commanded the Second Army Group, which was so successful at Taierhchwang. General Tang conducted the defense of Nankou Pass, and ably supported General Sun on the right at Taierhchwang.

When considering the efficiency of the army it must be noted that the military qualifications of the soldiers vary according to the regions from which they come. Men from the industrial regions usually are best adapted for the handling of artillery and mechanized equipment. The best horsemen come from the northwest. Men from Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Kwangsi excel on the march and in battle. Northern men are usually phlegmatic and conservative; those from the south are more mercurial in temperament.

The lack of an adequate proportion of artillery, in relation to other arms, is responsible for the unbalanced state of the army as regards the quantity and distribution of fire power. However, in considering the potential efficiency of any army the mental level of the personnel must be appreciated. Where the intelligence level is low, the weapons must be simple. The bulk of the Chinese army is made up of peasants who have never had the opportunity to improve their minds. The number who could be quickly trained to manipulate artillery effectively is limited. In the hands of untrained men artillery represents an economic liability to an army.

CHAPTER VI

THE KUOMINTANG ARMIES

"The Generalissimo's Own"

The armies which may be classified as coming directly under the control of the Kuomintang fall into three groups. First, there are those troops which received the benefits of instruction by German military officers, commonly referred to as "The Generalissimo's Own." They number about thirty divisions—300,000 men. Most of the officers of these divisions are graduates of the Whampoa or Central Military Academies. They come from the upper classes, and they have received ethical and political indoctrination of the type favored by the Kuomintang Party. The emphasis of their training has been on loyalty to the Generalissimo. Military instruction has been of the orthodox type, designed to produce sound military technicians and to cultivate the tactical knowledge required for leading troops in the mobile or positional types of warfare. Officers and men are well and regularly paid, the rates of pay ranging from \$7 (Chinese currency) for the Private, to \$800 for the General, per month. Superior technical knowledge, loyalty to the Generalissimo, and the fact that their military equipment is the best that China can secure, combine to make these units the most efficient and reliable of the Kuomintang units.

Provincial Troops

Provincial troops are of a different order, with the exception of one or two provinces. The officers do not come from the high social stratum from which the officers are drawn for the German-trained divisions. Many, particularly in the higher grades, are political appointees, and lack both technical knowledge and spiritual zeal. Corruption is often rife, and money which is intended for the pay of the soldiers is frequently diverted to the pockets of the officers. As a result the troops often prey upon the people in the areas where they are billeted, taking food and other necessities without paying for them. Discipline

is lax in many of the provincial armies. The poor showing which these troops have frequently made on the battle field is due to their low morale, poor equipment, incompetent leadership and inadequate food.

The Kwangsi troops are the best of the provincial forces. These troops were organized and trained by Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, two of the best soldiers in China. The men receive excellent care, their morale is high, and they have given a good account of themselves in battle. The efficiency of the Kwangtung troops is second only to that of their Kwangsi neighbors. Probably the least efficient of the provincial troops are those which come from Szechwan. The higher military leaders are usually opium smokers, and are correspondingly inefficient in military matters.

Mohammedan Troops

The Mohammedan troops of Tsinghai, Kansu and Ninghsia number about 80,000 men. They are good fighting troops, and are well led. The tenets of their religion encourage an idealism and a self-discipline in rank and file which tends to produce high morale. The principal military leader is Ma Pu-fang.

Personnel Procurement

The conscription method is used to provide recruits for the Kuomintang armies. Theoretically conscription is applied impartially to males who are between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight years of age, those men who are performing stipulated civil functions of an essential nature being exempted. In practice the wealthy are able to purchase substitutes, if they are so inclined. Students are exempted because of the Generalissimo's belief that they constitute the embryo leaders on whose shoulders will fall the work of reconstructing the nation after the war. Conscription is enforced by armed parties of soldiers, much as it was in the United States during the Civil War. In China the practice of roping conscripts together when they are moving in a body through the streets enroute to the training depot is frequently employed. From the Occidental point of view this practice is objectionable, and it undoubtedly militates against the development of individual volition; but in China long usage has caused it to be accepted as more or less customary and without stigma. For war-time procurement pur-

poses nine branches of the Central Military Academy have been established at various points in the interior. These provide an annual quota of about 27,000 officers.

Political Training

A political Training Department was established as a branch of the Military Affairs Commission early in 1938. General Chen Cheng is chairman of the Department, and General Chou En-lai (Communist) is its Vice-Chairman. The Department directs the political training, or, to be more exact, the ethical indoctrination, of the members of the forces. General Chou has endeavored to have this indoctrination assume the character of the ethical training which has been so successful in building a high morale in the Eighth Route Army. Progress in this direction has been made, but effective results will not be realized until the leaders themselves accept the indoctrination and adopt a more human and self-sacrificing attitude toward their followers. It is significant that those Kuomintang forces which have been victorious in the present conflict have been those which had received sound ethical indoctrination. Such troops invite the cooperation of the civil populace, and they are sympathetic in their attitude toward them.

The high efficiency of the troops in those divisions known as the Generalissimo's Own is not due to any special ideological indoctrination, but to the emphasis that is placed on obedience and to the fact that provision is made for their material well-being. This is the orthodox manner of building an army, and its effectiveness up to a certain point cannot be denied. The men of such an army become automatons without spiritual convictions. When the men of such an army are pitted, in a long and arduous war, against troops which are fighting for an *ideal*, the spirit of the latter enables them better to endure the strain.

War Area Service Corps

The War Area Service Corps was organized during the latter stages of the Shanghai battle under the leadership of Major General Huang Jen-lin. The Corps is one of the pet institutions of the Generalissimo, and it performs a variety of functions. It is an outgrowth of the New Life Movement and the Officers' Moral Endeavor Society, organizations with which General Huang is prominently identified.

The Corps seeks to improve the morale of the troops by providing recreational facilities such as motion pictures, games, libraries, etc. It is also charged with the distribution of bonuses to wounded officers and soldiers. These bonuses range from \$10 for a private to several hundred dollars for the top-ranking officers (the exact top figure is not known). The manner of presentation is of interest because it is a device which is designed to make the recipient feel that he is brought into personal relationship with the Generalissimo. A representative of the Corps visits the wounded individual, usually in the hospital, and informs him that the bonus is presented to him by the Generalissimo as evidence of his appreciation of the man's sacrifice.

Another important function of the Corps is the operation of guest houses for foreigners who are serving the Chinese army. These are designed to accommodate for the most part the Russian aviators and ground crews. They are directed by men who speak Russian, and every effort is made to make them comfortable and happy in strange surroundings.

Guerrilla Operations

Guerrilla operations were undertaken by troops other than those of the Eighth Route Army even before Hankow fell. Governor Shen Hung-lei, of Shantung, organized 150,000 guerrilla forces in that province. General Cheng Chien, commanding the 1st War Zone, organized guerrilla forces in that part of Honan which lies north of the Yellow River. Other guerrilla units were organized in the area between Shanghai, Hangchow and Nanking. The effectiveness of all such forces depends almost entirely on the amount of ethical indoctrination which they have assimilated. If they are thoroughly disciplined and inspired with a high sense of duty, they are very effective. Without such training they tend to degenerate into bandits.

In summary it may be said that the efficiency of the German-trained Kuomintang troops is of a high order. If the social and economic fabric of the nation were soundly knit so that the army need rely on the civil populace only for regular allotments of war supplies, these troops would constitute an extremely effective fighting unit. But the internal economy is not so integrated. And the army is not in a position to enforce its will on the people while repelling an enemy invasion from

without. The strength of the government in this emergency must flow from the voluntary cooperation of the civil populace. The army must be educated to conciliate the people.

The greatest obstacle to efficiency in the Kuomintang armies is the concept of class privilege which prevails among the officers. This is not a time when the officer group can receive privileges which are denied to the rest of the nation. Probably no other quality of leadership is more effective in inspiring confidence and stimulating the cooperation of followers than the willingness of leaders to share with their followers the material conditions which exigencies of a situation impose. Lack of professional knowledge is, of course, a marked weakness of leaders in the provincial armies because of the fact that many officer appointments are based on political performance. This fault is being corrected by the Generalissimo. As the war progresses he is able to exercise an increasing degree of authority over these troops. Here again the Generalissimo is faced with the necessity for preserving internal unity, and with avoiding the alienation of the loyalty of any important political group. Provincial leaders, like the officials of states in the United States, are jealous of their prerogatives.

While there is ample room for improvement, it is encouraging to note that the leadership in the Kuomintang armies is improving. Officers who have been blatantly inefficient have been summarily removed. Those who have been grossly negligent in positions of great responsibility have been court-martialed and executed. But there is still a crying need for a re-orientation of the mental attitude of military leaders toward their duty, and toward the rights and sensibilities of the civil populace, as well as of the men whom they lead.

CHAPTER VII

THE EIGHTH ROUTE ARMY

Introduction

The armies which have been developed more or less under the guidance of the Kuomintang party have been discussed at some length. The organization and methods of these armies are in a general way familiar to Occidentals because they parallel very closely those of the orthodox armies of the Western Powers. It is important, however, to inspect the character and methods of a section of the Chinese army with which we are less familiar. If it appears that more space is given to this discussion of the Eighth Route Army than was devoted to those units which have been previously considered, it is because of the more unorthodox character of that army. The achievements of this force in stemming the Japanese advance into Shansi province, despite its numerical weakness, warrant a careful inspection of its ethical concepts and its methods.

Political and Ethical Concepts

The Eighth Route Army is the military instrument of the Chinese Communist Party. It has discarded the idea which prevails in Occidental armies that a leader, in order to be effective, must be accorded privileges and be set on a pedestal. Leadership is based entirely on merit. Even the customary labels by which military categories are known in Western armies have been discarded. The group which is customarily known as "officers" is called "leaders." The balance of the men of the army are known as "fighters." Leaders who command a unit the size of a brigade, or larger, are referred to as "commanders."

Both leaders and fighters are indoctrinated with the qualities of honesty, humility, selflessness and truthfulness. There is created in each individual the desire to do what is right. It is right to perform the duties which are assigned by competent authority. Therefore, the desire to perform one's duty becomes almost an obsession.

The word of a leader carries authority because it is universally recognized that it is the duty of those subordinate to him to execute his orders. When a subordinate approaches a leader of higher rank (authority) the manner of the former is formal and he salutes according to the custom which obtains in Western armies. But—when the subordinate is off duty he is on a basis of equality with the leader, and the two may sit down and chat together with the informality of any two human beings who are on an equal social basis. This condition of equality is not abused in practice, though the fact that it exists is of great importance in maintaining the morale of the army. The material condition of the leader is the same as is that of the fighter. The quality of the clothes, food and sleeping accommodations does not differ.

In order that the rank and file of the army may attain political knowledge and a high ethical standard, the system of political commissars is employed. Each unit of the army has a political commissar whose authority is equal to that of the military commander. The commander and the commissar keep themselves informed of each other's professional activities, and they consult with each other before major decisions are made. Training periods for the troops are divided in the ratio of sixty percent military instruction to forty percent political indoctrination. Troops are informed of the reasons why China is fighting Japan. They are taught to be truthful, honest, and selfless. They learn that the patient acceptance of hardship and privation is a form of self-sacrifice, and that self-sacrifice is the price of progress. The illiterate are taught to read and write. They unite in the singing of patriotic songs. Each company has a club in which opportunities are provided individuals to express themselves.

The rules and regulations for the government of the army are as follows, although here again persuasion is the guiding principle:

Major Rules

- (1) Execute the anti-Japanese patriotic principles.
- (2) Execute the instructions of higher leaders.
- (3) Do not take the smallest thing from the people.

Minor Rules

- (1) Ask permission before entering a house. Before leaving thank the occupants for their courtesy, and ask them if they are satisfied with the condition of the house.

- (2) Keep the house clean.
- (3) Speak kindly to the people.
- (4) Pay for everything that you use, at the market price.
- (5) Return all borrowed articles.
- (6) Pay for all articles which the army has broken or destroyed.
- (7) Do not commit a nuisance (dig latrines).
- (8) Do not kill or rob the captives.

Some of these rules would appear to us of the West as unnecessary. It must be remembered, however, that one of the main sources of the unpopularity of armies in China has been the contempt of "war-lord" armies for the rights and property of civilians.

The forms of punishment are mild when compared to the types which obtain in Western armies. They are five in number:

(1) Criticism by leaders. (2) Self-criticism in an open meeting. (3) Confinement to a room. (4) Relief from military duties. (5) Expulsion from the army.

Punishment is imposed in the order named. Usually it is not necessary to proceed beyond the second stage. Men are prone to recognize their mistakes when they inquire into their own attitudes and actions.

The policy of the "rule of reason" requires that leaders devote a considerable amount of time to conferences with their men. That the time is well spent is borne out by the accomplishments of the army. Probably no other military organization in the world is able to accomplish the long distances on foot, for example, that have become routine with these men. The reason lies in the desire which has been created in each individual to perform his duty. The emphasis is on volition.

Another potent force in creating universal good will and tolerance is the emphasis which is placed on the unimportance of material things. The pay of the army ranges from one Chinese dollar per month for the fighter to five dollars per month for Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, Chu Teh's monthly stipend is less than the pay of a private in the Kuomintang armies. Each month a check is received from the Central Government for the pay of the army computed on the scale that is set for the Kuomintang armies. The balance which remains after the army has been paid according to the Eighth Route Army schedule is used to purchase food, medical supplies and other items which are needed by all the units.

Pattern of Resistance

The leaders of the Eighth Route Army feel that China can best offset the superiority which the Japanese enjoy in military equipment and organization by developing what they term "totalitarian resistance." The pattern is composed of three principal factors: The regular army; the Partisans—armed and uniformed volunteers; the People, organized on the *hsien* (county) basis. Partisans are organized from the younger men in the regions in which the army operates. Their training and indoctrination follow that of the army. In time they become equally efficient.

The people are organized into societies within each *hsien* under the supervision of the magistrate, who is the chief civil officer of the *hsien*. Trained political leaders direct the political and ethical education of the societies. The people are taught the necessity for cooperation, and they are inspired with confidence in the ability of the nation to repel the invasion through persistent united action. Each person receives specific instructions as to the nature of the contribution he is to make to the pattern of resistance. Coordination of the activities of the groups is assured through a chain of responsibility which runs from the *hsien* to the district (ten to twelve *hsien*), and thence to the provincial headquarters and the headquarters of the army.

An important element in the scheme is the Village Self-Defense Corps. It is comprised of the older men of each village, and it performs three major functions: (1) gathering information of the enemy; (2) employing measures to prevent the enemy from gaining information of their town troops, which is done by stationing sentries at strategic points on the roads and requiring all travellers to present passports signed by competent authority; (3) relaying the wounded from the battlefield back to the nearest hospital.

A self-sufficient economic system is superimposed on each district of ten or twelve *hsien*. The object is to assure that the people within each district are provided with a standard of living which will enable all to exist during the emergency. A further object is to decentralize the economy of the country so that if the Japanese penetrate one district the economy of the others will not be affected. Within each district production and distribution of essential products are controlled. Military commanders are responsible for providing assistance for the

planting and harvesting of crops. Industrial cooperatives provide the necessary manufactured products. Trade with adjacent districts is controlled, as is that with areas which lie outside the Chinese governed districts behind the Japanese lines.

During the early months of the war there were some irregular bands of Chinese who took advantage of the collapse of civil control in those areas which had been penetrated by the Japanese to molest the people in their own selfish interests. Their actions impaired the confidence of the people in the legitimate Partisans, and they made no contribution to the cause of Chinese resistance. The Eighth Route Army leaders have attempted either to convert or to eliminate these bands. If the leaders of these irregular groups agree to abide by the following conditions, they are accepted by the Army:

- (1) Agree to fight the Japanese to the end.
- (2) Agree to accept orders.
- (3) Agree to accept political training and political leaders.
- (4) Agree not to harm the people.
- (5) Agree to balance their income and expenses.
- (6) Agree to accept the pay schedule of the Army.
- (7) Agree that all members will share the same type of food.
- (8) Agree to prove their sincerity by attacking the Japanese.

During the first year and a half of the war the major emphasis of the effort of the Eighth Route Army was on the broadening and strengthening of the political base which was being built in the people. A sound base now exists in Shansi and Hopei provinces, and in parts of Shensi, Chahar and Shantung. The original army of 45,000 has been increased to about 500,000 through the organization of Partisans. The speed with which this pattern can be extended is in direct ratio to the speed with which political and military leaders can be trained. There are military and political training schools at Yen-an (north Shensi), in north Shansi and in Hopei. The course of instruction varies from four to six months. About 10,000 leaders can be trained annually.

Characteristics of Leaders

The high ranking leaders of the Eighth Route Army are distinguished by their honesty, frankness, humility and intelligence. They are men who have foresworn the comforts and material conveniences of life because of an urge to work for a

better economic and social order for the under-privileged of China. During the ten years of civil war these leaders were compelled by necessity to devise ways and means for preserving themselves and the people they led. They learned to place their reliance in the spontaneous response of human beings to just and kindly treatment. They discovered that an earnest and alert body of men can employ mobility, subterfuge and surprise to gain advantages over a sluggish though materially superior enemy.

Chu Teh, the commander-in-chief of the army, is a master organizer and tactician. His kindliness draws men to him, and he is beloved by every man of the army. Chou En-lai, who represents the army at the headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek, is the scion of a mandarin family, and a man of culture and education. He, too, is imbued with a certain nobility of character and humility of spirit. Peng Teh-hwai, the vice-commander, is gruff in manner, but this is due to a dynamic quality in his character. He loathes procrastination and imperfection, and is forever striving to eliminate them from the men of the army. Liu Pei-cheng, Ho Lung, Hsu Shang-chien and Hsu Hai-tung are earnest and thoughtful men, careful in their planning, and swift and thorough in the execution of plans.

Combat Efficiency

The technical organization of the three divisions of the army corresponds to that of the Kuomintang forces. The guerrilla style of warfare is believed by the leaders to be most effective in neutralizing the superiority which Japan enjoys in modern military equipment and organization. The success of this style of warfare depends in large measure on the possession by the guerrilla forces of superior information regarding the enemy strength and movements. Pitched battles with strong enemy forces are avoided. When a strong Japanese column invades a certain area the guerrilla forces move to the sides of the line of advance, attack the flanks and rear of the enemy, and cut his line of communication. At night the camps of the enemy are subjected to constant rapier-like thrusts, designed to disturb his rest and wear him out. Food is removed from the countryside ahead of his advance. Every device is employed which will reduce his strength and efficiency without undue cost to the guerrillas.

The Eighth Route Army leaders do not contend that these tactics are decisive, or that they will win the war. The purpose is to protract the war and, (1) make it impossible for the Japanese to control the country by political means; (2) make it impossible for Japan to exploit the natural resources of the country, and (3) make it as difficult as possible to move supplies along the Japanese lines of communication. Thus far they have been successful in realizing their aims. In Shansi province, for example, the Japanese have tried for two years to conquer the province, cross the Yellow River and invade Sian. Their effort has been defeated by the pattern of resistance devised and implemented by the Eighth Route Army.

The combat efficiency of the army has been greatly enhanced by the development of strong Partisan groups. When the army entered Shansi in September, 1937, it consisted of three divisions of 15,000 men each. The addition of Partisans has raised the total number of men who are subject to the control of the leaders of the Army to 500,000. The Enemy Works Department is another important factor in the effectiveness of this army. This department endeavors to break down the Japanese fighting power from within the Japanese ranks. Appeals to the enlisted men of the army to arise against their fascist officers are prepared in the Japanese, Korean, Manchurian and Mongolian languages. These tracts and pamphlets are insinuated into the Japanese billets by trained workers. The Enemy Works Department has succeeded in bringing over to the Eighth Route Army about 5,000 Chinese levies who were recruited and trained by the Japanese in Hopei province.

The New Fourth Army

The New Fourth Army came into being in the spring of 1938, the work of organization taking place in eastern Kiangsi and southern Anhwei provinces. Its commander is Yeh Ting who, in the days of 1926-27 when the Nationalist forces were moving north from Canton, commanded the 24th Division of the 4th Route Army (Ironsides Army). Yeh Ting joined with Chu Teh in the Nanchang revolt of October, 1927, but went into retirement after the abortive Canton Commune of December of that year. The field commander of the New Fourth Army is Han Ying, who commanded the small force which the

Red Army left to cover its evacuation of the Soviet areas of Kiangsi when it started on the Long March in 1934. Han Ying had kept his force together after that successful operation, and had continued to resist the Kuomintang forces in eastern Kiangsi and western Fukien until the autumn of 1937. This force, plus former members of the Red Army who had turned to other pursuits after the army left Kiangsi, formed the nucleus of the New Fourth Army. It received its orientation from the leaders who had made guerrilla warfare successful in north China.

The New Fourth Army is now established in the area between Wuhu, Nanking, Chinkiang and Hangchow. Two divisions are north of the Yangtze river. The same system of organizing the people and recruiting partisans is employed that has made the Eighth Route Army successful in the north. Progress has been slow because of the difficulty in securing arms, and because of the poverty-stricken condition of the country. The strength of the army has been raised from the 3,000 men with which it was started to about 70,000.

The extent to which the men of the Eighth Route Army have broken with Chinese tradition is unprecedented. Family ties have been cut. No attempt has been made to salvage pride at the expense of truth or efficiency. Lethargy and procrastination are regarded as cardinal sins. Time honored courtesies have been cast aside. When a new policy is considered, the questions asked are: Is it right? Is it useful? Will it benefit the greatest number? If these answers are in the affirmative the policy is adopted.

The high morale and the high state of physical fitness tend to make this army unique in the military organizations of the Far East. The honesty, selflessness and incorruptibility of the leaders appeal to the patriotism and noble instincts of men and women who are not in accord with the political ideology of the Communist group. The importance of the influence of this group on the cause of national salvation cannot be overestimated. Indeed, the experiments which are being conducted in education, government and economic organization are destined to affect the whole of Chinese society when the present conflict is over. Politically they are developing representative government; economically they are developing a cooperative society; and socially they are developing an equitable social order which

might be termed communal. At a time when large blocs of China's citizens felt that the nation was not sufficiently strong to resist a foreign invasion these leaders of the Eighth Route Army pointed the way. The results of their plans and efforts are now evident to all.

CHAPTER VIII

THE VOLUNTEERS OF MANCHURIA

The Volunteers of Manchuria consist of those patriots who banded themselves together to resist the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which began in September, 1931. They are to be distinguished from the groups of petty bandits which have taken advantage of the unsettled conditions in order to prey on the people in their own selfish interests. The Volunteers have never been a very effective force for resistance because they lacked money, supplies, equipment and strong inspiring leadership. Until the Japanese carried the conflict into China in 1937 the Volunteers had little support from China. No foreigner has penetrated to the camps of the Volunteers in eastern and northeastern Manchuria. Consequently, no direct information of an impartial character is available. From Manchurian leaders who were in China in the summer of 1938 the following information was obtained.

The Volunteers are organized into ten divisions which aggregate about 100,000 men. They are led by Li Tu. The approximate location of the divisions, and the names of the division commanders, are as follows:

	<i>Commander</i>	<i>Location</i>
1st Division.....	Yang Chun-yu	Liaoning
2d Division.....	Wang Teh-tai	Kirin
3d Division.....	Tao Shang-chih	Heilungkiang
4th Division.....	Li Yen-lu	Kirin
5th Division.....	Chow Pao-tsung	Kirin
6th Division.....	Hsieh Wen-tung	Kirin
7th Division.....	Hsia Yun-chieh	Heilungkiang
8th Division.....	Li Shih-fu	Kirin
9th Division.....	Li Hwa-tang	Kirin
10th Division.....	Wa Ya-chun	Kirin

Luan Tien-lin leads a large Partisan group in Jehol.

It would appear to be significant that the direction of expansion which is being followed by the Eighth Route Army is toward the northeast. During the summer of 1938 two Partisan units of the army, each of about 10,000 men, invaded the

area of Hopei northeast of Peiping. In addition to organizing the people of that section, they despatched couriers to the northeast for the purpose of blazing a trail across Jehol to the areas of Manchuria now occupied by the Volunteers.

The fact that an organization of considerable size is still in opposition to the Japanese in Manchuria suggests the possibility of renewed warfare of a more active and energetic character when land communication has been established between this unit and the strong guerrilla organization in China proper. The Manchurians need a strong militant leadership and this can be provided by the Eighth Route Army. If, for example, a strong defensive corridor were established across the Japanese lines of communication which run north through Manchuria, such as now exist across their lines in Shansi and Hopei provinces, the Japanese forces in that area would find themselves seriously embarrassed. An offensive would have been carried to the most sensitive part of the Japanese expansionist framework in eastern Asia.

CHAPTER IX

AVIATION

Early Development

The systematic development of military aviation in China may be said to have begun in 1932 when an aviation mission, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Jouett, was brought from the United States. Colonel Jouett set up an aviation training school at Hangchow, using the system employed by the U. S. Army Air Corps. The mission had the backing of Mr. T. V. Soong, who at that time was Minister of Finance. Most of the planes which were purchased during that period were of American or British manufacture. This mission made steady progress in the training of pilots, but in 1933 Mr. Soong split with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and was succeeded in office by his brother-in-law, Doctor H. H. Kung. Doctor Kung had just returned from a trip around the world during which he had spent considerable time in Italy, and had become interested in Italian planes and training methods. Contracts were made for the purchase of Italian planes, the establishment of an aircraft factory at Nanchang, and for an Italian air mission. The first Italian air mission was headed by Colonel Roberte Lordi. China's experiment with Italian aviation was not successful. The planes proved to be second-rate, the aircraft factory failed to produce planes, and the air mission left China when the conflict with Japan began. A reliable Chinese informant has stated that after the departure of the Italian mission from Nanking none of the elaborate aerial survey mosaics, which the Italians had made of the Nanking-Hangchow-Shanghai triangle, was to be found.

In 1927-28 Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces began the organization of their own air forces. This practice was continued until 1936 when these forces flew north and were amalgamated with the air force of the National Government.

At the beginning of the conflict with Japan, in 1937, China had about 150 competent military pilots, and about 200 pilots

of mediocre ability. While about 400 military airplanes were carried on the records, only half of these were serviceable military aircraft. They consisted mostly of observation and pursuit types, the best being Hawk 75's and Northrops. With the withdrawal of the Italians the task of training the air corps fell entirely to the American mission under Colonel Chennault. The Hangchow school was destroyed early in the war. Training was shifted to Nanchang and Loyang. Then it was decentralized, with branches being established in Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan provinces.

Combat Efficiency

Chinese aviation made its debut against a foreign army at the beginning of the Shanghai conflict in August, 1937. The pilots were nervous, and bombing was so inaccurate that several bombs were accidentally dropped into the foreign settlement areas. However, after the first two weeks the pilots and observers settled down and gave an excellent account of themselves. A system of night raids on the Japanese positions and gunboats at Shanghai was instituted. The damage resulting was considerable, and these raids caused the Japanese to expend an exorbitant amount of anti-aircraft munitions.

At Nanking, Chinese pursuit pilots gave an excellent account of themselves against invading Japanese aircraft. The first Japanese bombing expedition to Nanking consisted of nine twin-motored bombers, which made the trip from Formosa without pursuit protection. The Chinese pursuit planes shot down five of them. Succeeding bombing squadrons brought pursuit protection, and many air battles occurred in which the Chinese more than held their own. However, as time went on the best of the Chinese pilots were gradually eliminated, and Chinese aviation went into temporary eclipse.

In October, 1937, Russia came to China's aid. Planes, pilots and ground crews were sent to Nanking, Hankow, Sian, Lanchow and other points in China. Accurate information regarding the quantity of planes and the number of men which accompanied them is not available. Types of ships ranged from the heavy four-motored bombers to pursuit monoplanes. The pursuit monoplanes proved to be incapable of maneuvering with the flexibility which was demonstrated by the Japanese planes. They were replaced by a biplane with superior qualities

good eyesight and fair judgment. Their native intelligence is a great asset.

Both the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang are working tactfully to remove graft from the procurement process. They have also been successful in destroying most of the espionage system which the Japanese planted in the Chinese air force before the present conflict.

CHAPTER X

THE ARMY MEDICAL SERVICE

Organization

The Medical Service is a step-child of the Chinese army. Until the beginning of the present conflict with Japan, the Army Medical Service was a haphazard affair which was not regarded seriously by the high command of the army, and received little support from line organizations. The fact that officers of the Medical Service have no military authority, even in their own hospitals, places them at a disadvantage with the wounded with whom they work. Any military officer may order the release of a military patient from medical treatment, and the doctor is powerless to prevent it. This situation is resented by members of the medical profession, and it has prevented many competent Chinese doctors from entering the Army Medical Service.

The work of the medical service of the army is divided into three zones, known as the Combat Zone, Communications Zone and Rear Zone. Each zone is administered independently of the others, and there is little coordination between them.

Combat Zone. Theoretically each regiment in the combat zone is served by a Sanitary Company of 9 medical officers and 87 enlisted men. In practice the personnel is greatly reduced. Each division is served by two Sanitary Companies, one of which takes care of the Advanced Collecting Station, while the other operates the Main Dressing Station which is usually some fifteen miles to the rear of the fighting line. The chief medical officer of the division is usually selected by the division commander. Other medical personnel is selected by the chief medical officer, with the approval of the division commander.

First aid treatment is given by the medical units of the combat divisions. The walking wounded make their own way to the rear. An attempt is made to evacuate the severely wounded on stretchers, the services of local civilians being used when they are available. At the collecting and dressing stations the

wounded are sorted. The evacuation service is, however, usually inadequate.

Communication Zone. The medical activities in this zone come under the supervision of the Quartermaster General's office of the Ministry of Transport and Supplies. The wounded are moved to the rear and treatment is provided enroute. The organization consists of Receiving Stations, Field Hospitals and Ambulance Convoys. Receiving Stations are distributed along the line of communication from the battle front to the base hospitals at such distances as to assure shelter, food and medical attention at proper intervals. Each station has a personnel allotment of 18 officers and 182 enlisted men. A Field Hospital is placed at a point about midway between the front line and the Base Hospital. This unit is staffed by 26 officers and 99 enlisted men. It provides temporary treatment and hospitalization for the severely wounded who develop complications while enroute to the rear. The Ambulance Convoy consists of such motor vehicles as may be allotted for evacuation purposes. When the road net permits, this convoy picks up the seriously wounded at the divisional dressing stations. Otherwise it operates from the Field Hospitals.

Rear Zone. The medical service in the Rear Zone comes under the supervision of the Army Medical Administration. The organization consists of Base Hospitals, Severely Wounded Hospitals and Medical Supply Depots. The Base Hospital has a staff of 35 officers and 210 enlisted men. It is designed to serve 1,000 beds. It accommodates only the lighter casualties. The Severely Wounded Hospital accommodates the severely wounded and is staffed by 28 officers and 142 enlisted men. It is designed to accommodate 500 patients. Hospitals for the treatment of special types of wounds and diseases are also established in the rear areas.

Efficiency of the Medical Service

The Army Medical Service is hampered by a lack of equipment and trained personnel. It is further hampered by the lack of co-ordination between the medical units of the three zones. A few individuals such as Doctor Hu Lan-sen, the Surgeon General in charge of the Medical Administration, Doctor Lu Chih-teh, who is in charge of the field work in the Communication Zone, and Doctor Robert Lim, of the Chinese Red Cross

Medical Relief Commission, have succeeded in improving the service in a very marked degree. But their authority is limited. One of the grave weaknesses of the service is its failure to provide for the systematic and expeditious return to the fighting units of the slightly wounded.

Chinese Red Cross Medical Relief Commission

This organization is headed by Doctor Robert Lim who for many years was on the staff of the Peking Union Medical College. It is an exceptionally efficient organization, and it supplements the work of the Army Medical Administration along the lines of communication. It operates medical units, convoys and depots.

The medical units are divided into teams, each consisting of 15 technical and 5 non-technical members. There are Curative, Nursing, Preventive and X-ray teams. The Curative team conducts operations in hospitals and dressing stations. The Nursing team serves as a supplementary nursing staff at hospitals and dressing or receiving stations. The Preventive teams carry on preventive inoculations and general medical relief work. Ambulance units are organized with 120 stretcher bearers to each unit. The unit can accommodate 40 stretchers. By October of 1938 the following teams were in operation: Curative 25, nursing 17, preventive 6, X-ray 1, Total 49. In September of 1938 this Commission inaugurated a school for the training of hospital attendants and stretcher bearers. The plan was to train 200 men per month, the length of the course being one month.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is provided through the medium of mission hospitals. These are subsidized by the International Red Cross Commission, which was established at Hankow in September of 1937. The immediate purpose of the Commission was to deal with the refugee situation. However, the appeals for money were so generously met that it was decided to extend the scope of its work to the mission hospitals throughout the interior. It was provided that a cash subsidy of fifty cents Chinese currency would be paid per day for each wounded soldier or refugee accommodated. A further cash subsidy of fifty cents was paid for each patient treated in the Out Patients Department of the hospital. By the autumn of 1938, 3,700 beds were in

operation at mission hospitals. Both the hospitals and the army benefited, for the cost of maintaining a patient was less than fifty cents (drugs and hospital equipment being provided by the Commission in addition), and the wounded received expert medical attention. Another form of foreign aid was provided by the League of Nations Anti-Epidemic Commission, which sent five units to China. These units were established at strategic points throughout the country, and effectively combated epidemics of relapsing fever, typhus, smallpox and cholera.

The Army Medical Service is still far from satisfactory in its handling of the wounded and diseased soldiers, but tremendous progress has been made by it since the beginning of hostilities at Shanghai. There is need for a unification of the medical work being performed in the army in order to speed up the evacuation and treatment of the wounded. Competent surgeons are needed. Here is a field for those foreign medical men who are free to serve humanity, and who have the urge to do so. While the language is a difficult problem, it is not insurmountable. No language is required by a trained medical man in order to treat a wound. Many foreigners are now in service in China who have no knowledge of the Chinese language.

CHAPTER XI

WAR FINANCE

The state of China's war economy can only be suggested as statistics are difficult to obtain, and those which are available are not reliable. In the first place it is well to point out that China is a country in which the economy is de-centralized. It is essentially an agricultural nation in which the bulk of the people are accustomed to getting along with a minimum of manufactured products. Hence the problem of meeting the needs of the people is not nearly so great as it would be in a more advanced social order. Those industries which existed were light industries. Although about 90% of China's industry has been destroyed, new factories are being established deep in the interior, and small industrial co-operatives are springing up in the villages throughout the interior to supply the people with their meager needs.

Natural Resources

As an aid to the understanding of China's potential wealth a word about her natural resources will not be amiss. All, or the major portion, of the provinces of Shensi, Ninghsia, Kansu, Chinghai, Sikong, Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung are still under Chinese control. This area aggregates 1,435,194 square miles, or about half the size of the United States.¹

In this area lies a reported coal reserve of 15,535,000,000 tons. Metal deposits are reported to be as follows:²

Manganese: 90 per cent of China's total reserve.

Copper: annual production of 480 tons.

Lead: annual production of 6,600 tons.

Zinc: annual production of 13,000 tons.

Tungsten: 300,000 tons of China's total reserve.

Tin: annual production of 7,400 tons.

¹ H. G. W. Woodhead, *The China Year Book*, Shanghai, 1934.

² Lowe Chuan-hua, *T'ien Hsia Monthly Magazine*, April, 1939.

Gold	}	Large supply.
Silver		
Precious stones		
Antimony		

Exports

China's export trade has not been wholly eradicated by the Japanese blockade. Wood oil is one of China's chief exports. In 1937 the export value of wood oil amounted to Ch \$89,-840,000. This figure was increased in 1938. China exported 91,767,000 lbs. of tea in 1938. This was an increase in value of Ch \$6,000,000 over the figure for 1937.³ The export of cotton and silk continues, though figures for 1938 are not available.

China's major problem, with regard to exports, is one of transportation. At present her only connection by rail with the seacoast is via the French railway from Kunming (Yunnan) to Haiphong (Indo-China). A limited amount of trade can be conducted through obscure ports along the southeast seaboard, and over the highway to Burma. But rail communication is needed, and this need is being met by the construction of a railroad from Kunming to Burma, work on which is reported to have been started.

Sources of Revenue

At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese hostilities China's currency reserve amounted to about Ch \$1,200,000,000, and consisted of funds held by the four government banks of issue (Bank of China, Central Bank of China, Bank of Communications and the Farmers Bank) and in the Exchange Equalization Fund account. By May of 1938 Ch \$300,000,000 had been used for the repayment of and for interest on foreign loans. Another Ch \$300,000,000 was used to pay for war supplies imported from abroad. These figures are only approximate, as accurate information is not available.⁴

The following loans have been floated since the commencement of hostilities: 1937 Liberty Loan Ch \$500,000,000; 1938 National Defense Loan Ch \$500,000,000; 1938 Relief Loan Ch \$30,000,000; 1939 U. S. Government US \$25,000,000; 1939

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Kurt Bloch, "Chinese War Finance," *Far Eastern Survey*, May 18, 1938, New York.

British Government £5,000,000—(for currency stabilization) and £500,000.

Other sources of revenue are: Contributions from Overseas Chinese Ch \$600,000,000⁵ (part of this amount doubtless went for the purchase of Liberty bonds); from the sale of opium Ch \$100,000,000;⁶ from Customs receipts Ch \$150,000,000; from Interport taxes Ch \$50,000,000.

The chief new sources of revenue, for which regulations were passed by the Legislative Yuan in December, 1938, are the Inheritance tax and the War Profits tax. The Exchange Equalization Fund has continued to benefit from the purchase of silver by the United States at a price of \$.45 (US) per ounce, which is above the market price.

China's Capacity to Continue Resistance Without Foreign Aid

The importance of foreign aid to China in the present Sino-Japanese conflict is acknowledged by all observers. Many conjectures have been made as to the course the conflict would take if all such aid were withdrawn. Such an eventuality would undoubtedly bring into play many imponderable factors. In so far as finance is concerned, there are still many Chinese who possess large private fortunes. An embargo on foreign financial assistance would compel this group to determine whether national independence is of sufficient concern to them to warrant staking their material possessions on its attainment. The aggregate of such fortunes would probably enable the government to continue the war for another three years.

The deprivation of foreign aid would most severely affect the supply of arms, munitions and transportation facilities. Here again, however, Chinese initiative and resourcefulness would doubtless come to the fore. The raw materials for the manufacture of these essentials lie within China's borders. The necessity for self-preservation would probably provide the dynamic for more intensive development of resources as well as of industrial organization.

The most radical change, however, would probably be along political and social lines. China's leaders have already observed the great potential power of resistance which lies in the organi-

⁵ Lowe Chuan-hua, "Economic Developments in Wartime China," *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, April, 1939.

⁶ *Ibid.*

zation and education of the people. Deprived of foreign aid, the leaders would probably proceed to intensify and extend the development of this potential power. The withdrawal of all foreign aid would serve further to protract the war, but it would by no means assure China's defeat. China has learned how to suffer, and she has learned how to wait. National and racial pride are strong. Two years of resistance have stiffened the will to resist, and during this period many of the long-standing differences which lay in the path of political unification have been ameliorated. The withdrawal of all assistance by those nations which, during the past century, have profited by the extra-territorial conditions they have imposed on China would naturally induce a feeling of enmity, but the time has passed when such action would result in the collapse of the Central Government.

In approaching the problem of dealing with her war finances China has to face two major problems: (1) the problem of balancing her international accounts; and (2) the problem of securing domestic funds for the payment of goods and services claimed by the government from the Chinese people.⁷

In January, 1939, China canceled the interest and amortization payments on debts secured by her customs because the Japanese now collect nearly all the customs.⁸ During 1938 she paid about Ch \$50,000,000 per month for war materials received from abroad.⁹ While the quantity of war materials which is now being received is now less, the higher cost of transportation will probably serve to maintain the total cost at about the old figure. On the other hand, there is the possibility that China is now able to make barter agreements on a larger scale, and thereby reduce the amount of currency needed to liquidate her foreign credits.

China has attempted to solve her economic problems by adopting the following measures: (1) government absorption of foreign exchange, and centralized control of foreign exchange allocations for trade and other legitimate demands; (2) negotiation of credit loans with sympathetic foreign countries on the strength of Chinese cash reserves already deposited abroad; (3) government transactions with foreign firms for the exchange

⁷ Kurt Bloch, "Chinese War Finance," *Far Eastern Survey*, May 18, 1938.

⁸ *Time Magazine*, January 30, 1939, New York.

⁹ Bloch, *loc. cit.*

of staple products or execution of barter agreements; (4) restricting the withdrawal of bank deposits; and, (5) limiting the outflow of Chinese national currencies.¹⁰

The following commissions have been set up for the purpose of developing the wartime economy of the country. The sum indicated opposite each commission is the amount which was appropriated for the purpose of initiating the work:¹¹

Industrial and Mining Readjustment Commission.....	Ch \$10,000,000
Agricultural Readjustment Commission.....	Ch \$30,000,000
Trade Readjustment Commission.....	Ch \$20,000,000

These commissions have proceeded to expand production and to promote trade.

Chinese Industrial Co-operatives

The Industrial Co-operative movement, organized in August 1938 with the authority and assistance of the government, is of great potential importance. The object of this movement is to attempt to re-establish China's industry, 90% of which has been destroyed by the Japanese. A further object is to decentralize industry so as to reduce its vulnerability to attack from the air, and to establish each type of industry near the raw materials which it will utilize. The broad scale of the enterprise assures that opportunities for productive employment are afforded refugees in provinces throughout the interior, from Kwangsi to Shansi and from Kiangsi to Szechwan.

The movement was started with a government appropriation of Ch \$5,000,000. From this capital, loans of amounts ranging from \$500 to \$3,000 have been made to approved producers co-operatives. The loans are used for the purchase of initial equipment. Shares are sold to the members of the co-operative, each member being required to buy at least three shares, and no member being allowed to own more than 20 shares. Shares may be paid for out of wages, on the installment plan.

Members of the co-operative receive wages which are based on the degree of skill which each contributes to the enterprise, and which are supplemented by a further share in the profits of the co-operative, based on the number of shares owned. Loans are repaid out of profits, and a certain per cent of the profits

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ W. H. Donald, letter to H. J. Timperley, Dec. 30, 1938.

is set aside for the expansion of the plant, when considered desirable.

By June of 1939 about 1,300 co-operatives had been established. The co-operative idea appeals to the Chinese peasant, as is evidenced by the fact that many members become so interested in their work that they disregard formal working hours. The variety of types is extensive. They include iron and coal mining, textiles, paper, printing, tobacco, building and building materials, flour and rice milling, pottery and porcelain, dyeing and bleaching and machine work. Popular contributions are solicited both at home and abroad, for the speed with which the movement can be developed depends on the available capital. A goal of 30,000 co-operatives has been set. There is a ready market for everything that can be produced.

CHAPTER XII

SUPPLIES AND SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Probably no army of its size in the world has had to contend with the difficulties of supply which have faced the command and staff of the Chinese army. Lacking any semblance of sea power, China has had to adjust her supply system to an ever increasing blockade of her coast line. Her problem has been ameliorated by the fact that the country is able to produce most of the food products which are required. But practically all of China's war materials have had to come from abroad.

Part of the genius of Chiang Kai-shek has been manifested in the manner in which he has foreseen the necessity for certain interior communications. During the period of 1931-37 he pushed the construction of new highways and railways, especially in the area south of the Yangtze river. He recognized the importance of an adequate highway with which to communicate with Soviet Russia. He foresaw the probability of the eventual retirement of the government to the mountain fastnesses of Szechwan, and projected lines of communication between that province and the provinces to the north and south.

Hundreds of miles of highways were constructed in each major theater of operation such as Shanghai, Hsuehchowfu and Hankow. In the rear of the Chinese front at Shanghai 2,000 kilometers of highways were constructed while the battle was going on. In southwest China four new national highways are now under construction, totaling 2,081 kilometers. In the northwest the highways now under construction total 1,750 kilometers, while three new highways in western China total 2,300 kilometers.¹ The highway from Kunming (Yunnan) to Lashio (Burma) is 964 kilometers in length. The 4,400 kilometer highway from Sian (Shensi) to Tahcheng (Sinkiang) is being constantly improved.²

¹ Chao Ming, "A Survey of China's Wartime Communications," *China Weekly Review*, April 8, 1939, Shanghai. A fuller account of China's wartime communications will appear shortly in Dr. Chao-ting Chi's *Wartime Economic Developments in China* in the I.P.R. Inquiry series.

² Lowe Chuan-hua, *loc. cit.*

Highways cannot adequately supply an army of three million men when it is engaged in positional warfare, and so the work of building new rail lines to the south and southwest is being pressed during this guerrilla phase of the war, in preparation for the Chinese counter-offensive. In December, 1938, work was started on the railroad from Kunming (Yunnan) to Suifu (Szechwan), which stands at the head of navigation on the Yangtze river. This line is 773 kilometers in length. In Szechwan a 523 kilometer railway is being constructed between Chenglu and Chungking.³ All of these new life lines are based on the assumption that supplies will reach China from abroad via Indo-China, Burma or Russia.

The System of Supply

The army supply system is based on the accumulation of supplies at strategically located supply bases, and their distribution from those bases to depots that are established behind the various theaters of operation. From the depots the supplies move by trucks to the Army and Corps distributing points. Movement forward to the divisional distributing points, and to the operating combat units, may be by truck, animal drawn carts, pack animals, camels or human bearers. The bearer is almost universally used in the combat areas. He usually employs the bamboo shoulder pole method. These human bearers are sometimes enlisted in the army, as in the case of those who carry the supplies of smaller units. Others are employed for the purpose as civilians, receiving a few cents a day for their services. On the march the supplies and baggage of companies, battalions and even regiments are usually borne by bearers. They can go places where an animal cannot, and they do not require the attention that an animal does. As they are trained for the work it is not the hardship that it appears to be.

Supplies

Prior to the present conflict China possessed twenty arsenals which turned out about 800,000 rounds of small arms ammunition daily, as well as 3,000 rifles and 200 machine guns monthly.⁴ Only four of these arsenals are still operating in their original

³ Chao Ming, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Far Eastern Survey*, Oct. 20, 1937.

locations, the cities in which the others were located having been occupied by the Japanese. Many of the arsenals were moved prior to the occupation, and they are now being operated in other localities.

The quantity and character of the war materials now being produced in China are not known. Small arms ammunitions, rifles and automatic rifles, and hand grenades are the principal items. It is estimated that 1,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition are now produced daily. The hand grenade is a useful weapon for guerrilla operations, and it is easy to manufacture. The "potato masher" type is used. In the Wu Tai region of north Shansi 30,000 hand grenades were being produced each month by the summer of 1938. Numerous small arsenals for the production of hand grenades are now in operation in guerrilla centers all over the interior, and it is estimated that the aggregate monthly output is close to 1,000,000 grenades.

The quantity of war materials imported from abroad may be deduced from the fact that during the spring and summer of 1938 the Canton-Hankow railway was transporting 600 tons of such materials per day, or 18,000 tons per month.⁵ During the same period the quantity of supplies being received from Russia over the northwest highway was estimated to be 50 tons daily. During November and December, 1938, 60,000 tons of supplies are reported to have reached China by the Burma route.⁶ When it is remembered that in the summer of 1918 General Pershing was requesting 750,000 tons of supplies per month from the United States for his army of 1,000,000 men in France, the figures indicated above for the Chinese army seem far from adequate.⁷ Our armies in the World War used as high as 7,000 tons of artillery ammunition in a single day.

China, however, is fighting a different type of war. She has never been supplied with the amount of artillery which military experts consider to be essential in proportion to the number of infantry troops involved. The need for artillery is now not so urgent since the war passed into the guerrilla stage. The supplies now being received include airplanes (an airplane factory is in operation in Yunnan), motor vehicles, artillery, artil-

⁵ Chao Ming, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *China Weekly Review*, issue of January 21, 1939, Shanghai, p. 243.

⁷ General John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, New York, 1931, Vol. II, p. 309.

lery and small arms munitions, anti-aircraft weapons and munitions, rifles and automatic rifles and aerial bombs.

Commercial Airways as an Aid to Supply

About 10,000 kilometers of airways are at present in operation under the direction of the Chinese Ministry of Communications. Planes of the Sino-American China National Aviation Corporation, the Sino-German Eurasia Aviation Corporation, and of the Ministry itself perform regular flights.⁸ Regular services are maintained between Chungking and Kunming, Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Ichang, Kiating, Kweilin, Kweiyang, Hongkong, Hanoi and Ninghsia. Mails, merchandise and passengers are carried. The Ministry also operates an air service between Chungking and Hami (Sinkiang) and this has been extended in 1940 to the western border of Sinkiang where it connects with a Soviet airline to Moscow. Survey flights have been made between Chungking and Rangoon, and that line will probably go into service during 1940. These commercial airlines have been of outstanding importance to China since the government retired to the rugged areas of the west.

China's almost inexhaustible supply of manpower has been her greatest asset in solving the problem of supply in the present situation. Without the aid of millions of laborers she would not have been able to carve the tens of thousands of miles of highways and railways which have enabled her to protract the war after she lost her seaports and industrial centers.

The long hauls over primitive roads mean that at least half of the capacity of each truck must be devoted to oil and gas for the trip. The one and one half ton truck is being used on the northwest highway from Russia, and it is probably being used on the Burma route. That means that in order to transport fifty tons of supplies a day 67 trucks are required. Eight hundred trucks would be required to bring 600 tons of supplies from Rangoon (which was the amount which reached Wuchang daily during the Hankow battle). At least one third of the total number of trucks required for the transportation of supplies should be added in order to allow for those withdrawn for overhaul. These figures indicate the magnitude of the task of transporting supplies by highway.

However, time and space are on the side of the Chinese.

⁸ Chao Ming, *loc. cit.*

Moreover, their lines of communication are not subject to guerrilla attacks, as are those of the Japanese. They may be attacked from the air, it is true, but when such attacks become too frequent the transportation work can be confined to the hours of darkness. During the guerrilla phase of the war the rifle, automatic rifle, hand grenade and the big sword are the weapons most used. Facilities for manufacturing these weapons in the country are being rapidly increased. Also, these weapons are more easily transported from abroad than are the various types of artillery needed for positional warfare.

CHAPTER XIII

MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

Introduction

A discussion of the causes which led to the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in July, 1937, would require a lengthy thesis. Since the Meiji restoration, Japan has been moving steadily toward the realization of a desire to exercise hegemony in the western Pacific area; and since the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking, in 1928, China has made amazing progress toward the goal of internal unification and the development of a government of sufficient strength to assert the sovereign rights of the nation. The present conflict is the result of the clash of the wills of two growing political powers, Japan seeking to extend her influence through conquest, and China bent on preserving her independence.

Japan's attitude was manifested in the speech which the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, made at the opening of the Imperial Diet on January 21, 1936, in which he formulated the government's policy toward China under three heads: (1) the cessation in China of all unfriendly acts and measures, and active collaboration with Japan; (2) the recognition of Manchoukuo; and, (3) the suppression of all Communist activities in "our part of the globe."¹

Two basic facts should be kept in mind in approaching a study of the Sino-Japanese conflict. First, the persistent intrusion of Japan into Chinese affairs as evidenced by her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the conquest of Jehol in 1933, the establishment of the de-militarized zone in North China in 1933, and the military penetration of Chahar and Suiyuan in 1936. Second, the growing unity of China which culminated in an *entente* between the Central Government and the Kwangtung-Kwangsi

¹ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *China and Japan*, London, 1938, p. 64.

leaders in 1936, and the establishment of a united front with the Communist leaders in the spring of 1937.

The Chinese have divided the war into three phases. They are: the first, or Chinese defensive phase, which ended with the fall of Hankow; the second, or guerilla warfare, phase, which will continue until the Japanese commence a retrograde movement toward the coast; and the third, or Chinese counter-offensive, phase, which will be initiated when the Japanese begin their retrograde movement. It is proposed to deal here with the first phase. In order to simplify the multitude of events of this phase it will be presented in three stages, corresponding to the three major campaigns which occurred. The first stage will deal with the series of events which ended with the fall of Nanking; the second stage ended with the fall of Hsuehowfu; and the events of the third stage ended with the fall of Hankow.

The First Stage of the First Phase

The responsibility for the clash which occurred between Chinese and Japanese armed forces at Liukouchiao (near Peiping) on the night of the 6th-7th of July, 1937, will probably never be definitely known. A Japanese garrison had been maintained at Fengtai, a nearby railway junction, since May, 1936. The Japanese claim that troops from this garrison were fired on by the Chinese while maneuvering near Liukouchiao. The Chinese claim that the Japanese commander asked for permission to enter Liukouchiao for the purpose of making investigations, and that when the request was refused the Japanese attacked the city.

An attempt was made to settle the incident locally, but Japanese troops began pouring into the area from Manchuria almost immediately. By July 16 five Japanese divisions had been sent to China, and train loads of military supplies were arriving in Tientsin.² On July 26 Japanese bombing planes were used against Chinese troops for the first time in this crisis, the place being Lanfang, on the Peiping-Tientsin railway. On July 29th fighting broke out at Tientsin. By the end of July the Peiping-Tientsin area was in the hands of the Japanese, and an expeditionary force was engaged with Chinese troops for the

² *Japan's War in China*, China Weekly Review, Shanghai, 1938, p. 6.

possession of Nankow pass, between Peiping and Kalgan (Chahar).

At this stage of the conflict the objective of the Japanese may be deduced to have been the subjugation of the five northern provinces of China: Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan. An operating base was established at Tangku, down the Hai river from Tientsin. The campaign in the north was inaugurated in three directions: one column was directed to the west along the Peiping-Suiyuan railway; another column was sent in a southwesterly direction down the Peiping-Hankow railway; and a third column was dispatched in a southeasterly direction down the Tientsin-Pukow railway (toward Nanking). The rainy season impeded the early advances of the last two columns.

Chinese resistance in the north was not effective. The 29th Army, which garrisoned the Peiping-Tientsin area, possessed high morale and sound fighting qualities. But it was placed at a disadvantage by the lack of decision which attended the negotiations for the settlement of the first incident. When General Sung Che-yuan, the army commander, decided on July 27 to resist the Japanese invasion, his troops had already suffered serious disorganization and loss of morale as a result of various clashes with the Japanese, and because of the absence of clear instructions as to the line of conduct they should follow. No reinforcements were sent by the Central Government, probably for reasons of strategy. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek preferred to draw the Japanese into the interior, causing them to establish long lines of communication, rather than to extend his own communications. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the Central Government, it was probably considered wise to fight a defensive war from a pivotal position, and the first pivot was to be the national capital at Nanking.

The superiority of Japanese sea power constituted a threat to all of China's sea ports, once hostilities were under way. The most important, as well as the most vulnerable, of China's ports was Shanghai. On August 9, 1937, a Japanese naval officer and one seaman were killed while motoring in the vicinity of a Chinese military airfield at Hungjao, on the western outskirts of Shanghai. The Chinese sentry who challenged them was also killed. Again mystery veils the true facts. The fact remains

that the incident was used by the Japanese to justify the landing of an expeditionary force at Shanghai.

This time the Central Government moved quickly. By the 13th of August five Chinese divisions had been moved into the Shanghai area, and on that day the battle commenced. In their attack at Shanghai the Japanese used exactly the same tactics which had brought them success in 1932. Landings were executed along the left bank of the Whangpoo river from Yantzepoo to Woosung, and thence along the right bank of the Yangtze river to Liuho. The Chinese, however, had extended their left flank to the north of Liuho, and the Japanese were forced to employ frontal attacks in order to gain ground. During the course of the three months battle China brought about 300,000 troops to the Shanghai front. She was deficient in artillery, tanks and aviation. Japan massed about 90,000 troops there. While her army was superior in artillery, tanks and aviation, it demonstrated a lack of offensive power in hand to hand combat.

Chinese heroism and fortitude at Shanghai were a surprise to those Western military observers who had judged China's fighting ability solely on the performance of her armies in civil wars. Now China was fighting a foreign foe, fighting for the integrity of her soil and the preservation of the independence of her people. Her capacity for effective resistance had been under-estimated by Japan and by other foreign nations.

On September 14 the Chinese forces withdrew from the Woosung salient and established a new line from Chapei, on the right, northwest to Tazang, Lotien and Liuho. On October 2 Liuho, an important point in the Chinese defense, was lost. On October 26 the Chinese withdrew from Chapei and established their right flank along the south bank of Soochow Creek. General Chang Fa-kwei had been protecting the Chinese right flank by holding the Hangchow Bay line with troops from Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Early in November he was placed in command of the Chinese right wing, and certain ex-Manchurian troops were directed to relieve his troops. Through a miscarriage of orders the Hangchow coast was temporarily left undefended. The Japanese learned of the weakness through their omnipresent intelligence service. Quickly seizing the opportunity they landed an expeditionary force which threatened the rear of the Chinese right flank, thereby bringing about a

general Chinese retirement on the 9th of November. The lack of experience of Chinese staff officers became apparent during the withdrawal from Shanghai. Because of the absence of planning for priority in the use of roads and waterways the retirement almost became a rout. It was soon evident that a reorganization of the forces could not be accomplished in time to assure an effective defense of Nanking, and that city fell on the 15th of December.

The Chinese field commander at Shanghai was General Ku Chu-tung, a very able man. The commander of the Japanese land forces was General Matsui, while Admiral Hasegawa led the naval forces. During the battle Japan's casualties numbered about 40,000 men. Those of China ran well over 100,000.

In the north Paoto, capital of Suiyuan province, fell on the 16th of October, and Taiyuanfu, capital of Shansi, was entered by Japanese forces on the 6th of November. General Wei Li-huang had conducted an admirable defense of the pass at Hsin-kow, north of Taiyuanfu, but the Chinese forces at Niantzekwan, the eastern entrance to Shansi along the Cheng-Tai railway, had given way. By the end of December the Japanese forces which were advancing south along the Tientsin-Pukow railway were in the vicinity of Taian, in Shantung. Those which were moving south along the Peiping-Hankow railway were a few miles north of the Yellow River. The only Japanese reverses had been administered by the Eighth Route Army at Pinghsing-kwan, in northeast Shansi. This army, using guerrilla methods, had also won a series of small engagements in Shansi and western Hopei.

General Count Terauchi directed Japanese operations in the north.

Second Stage of the First Phase

The battle of Shanghai had served to divide the Japanese effort in China. As the Chinese continued their grim resistance during that battle it became evident to the Japanese high command that if Japan was to achieve her objective of subjugating the five northern provinces the Central Chinese Government would first have to be destroyed. It would appear that the decision to continue the campaign to Nanking was made at some time during the month of October, 1937, in the belief that the fall of that city would bring about the collapse of the

government. It failed to do so, and Japan's objective then became the conquest of China.

Indecision seemed to beset the Japanese military command after the fall of Nanking, and for several weeks there was no large scale military activity. Finally it was decided to occupy the Tientsin-Pukow railway line, in order to establish direct overland communication between the puppet government at Peiping and the one which had been established at Nanking. The contest for the possession of this important rail line centered around the city of Hsuehowfu, where the Tientsin-Pukow line connects with the east-west Lunghai road. The latter extends from the seacoast at Haichow to Paoki, in Shensi province.

In February, 1938, a Japanese thrust from Tsining toward Kweiteh, west of Hsuehowfu, was successfully resisted by the Chinese under General Li Tsung-jen, the very capable Kwangsi leader who had been charged with the defense of Hsuehowfu. In March the Japanese shifted their main effort to the east of Hsuehowfu. One column, moving south along the railway, turned east along a branch line toward Taierhchwang, a walled village which stands at the point where the Grand Canal crosses the railway. Another column, consisting of one division, moved in a southwesterly direction from Weihsien, in eastern Shantung, with the evident object of joining the first column in the vicinity of Taierhchwang. The Chinese forces not only prevented the joining of these two columns, but severely defeated the first column, causing it to retire twenty miles north to Yih sien. In the meantime a Japanese force which had moved north from Pukow toward Hsuehowfu was held in check at Pengpu.

The Taierhchwang defeat was extremely humiliating for the Japanese. They determined to wipe out the disgrace. By combing the northern areas and reducing their forces there to a minimum, they were able to assemble ten divisions (20,000 men each) along the northern Hsuehowfu front. They also increased the force at Pengpu. The Chinese assembled a force of over 400,000 men to meet them. Late in April the Japanese shifted their main effort again to the west of Hsuehowfu. Using a pincers movement from the north and south they brought about the capitulation of Hsuehowfu on the 19th of May. Soon thereafter they occupied the Lunghai railway as far west as Kaifeng (Honan).

In February the Japanese had initiated a drive into Shansi with six divisions. They hoped to establish control over this

province, which is rich in mineral resources, and which is also the strategic key to north China. With Shansi in their possession they could then drive southwestward across the Yellow River and seize Sian, the important distributing point on the highway to Sinkiang. Although they were able to occupy the Tung-Pu railway from Taiyuanfu to Fenglingtu, on the Yellow River opposite Tungkwan, the campaign failed because of the masterly resistance of the Eighth Route Army and troops of General Yen Hsi-shan's forces. The success of the Chinese arms in Shansi was due almost entirely to the effectiveness of the guerrilla tactics employed by the Eighth Route Army, and which were also used by the Shansi provincial forces. During April, 1938, General Ma Chan-san led his cavalry army across the Suiyuan railway and created a diversion by engaging Japanese garrisons in that area.

Third Stage of the First Phase

After the fall of Hsuechowfu the Japanese again procrastinated while the Chinese prepared for a possible attack on Hankow. The booms in the Yangtze river were strengthened, and defense works were erected on both banks of the river. On June 12th the campaign against Hankow was initiated by the Japanese capture of Anking, on the north bank of the Yangtze 200 kilometers east of Hankow. Chinese forces which had been withdrawn from the Hsuechowfu front were poured into defensive positions in eastern Honan, Hupeh and Kiangsi provinces. The Japanese moved in three main columns. The northernmost column was directed toward Sinyang, on the Honan-Hupeh border. The second column moved westward along the north bank of the Yangtze, and the southern column moved in a similar direction along the south bank. Four months were required for the Japanese to push their way to Hankow. So tenacious was the Chinese resistance that their opponents were compelled to use massed aerial bombing in order to blast their way through. The city fell on the 25th of October after the bulk of the Chinese army had been successfully evacuated to the west.

The Chinese forces engaged in the Hankow battle aggregated 148 divisions, containing 1,005,000 men. The largest Japanese force engaged at any one time numbered ten and a half divisions, with about 230,000 men. This land force was supported

by numerous gunboats and cruisers on the river, and by a large air force. During the Hankow battle both armies suffered from cholera and malaria. A lack of adequate medical supplies increased the Chinese difficulties, and at one time 60% of the army was ill with disease. Japanese air superiority was aided by the return of the Russian planes to Russia in August, due to the critical situation that obtained in Europe at that time. Chinese aviation was temporarily in the doldrums, and the Japanese had the air to themselves. Their bombing was more accurate than it had been at Shanghai or Hsuehchowfu, and the Chinese ground forces had little or no defense against it.

The apparent British and French conciliation of Germany at Munich in early October, 1938, was evidently a signal to Japan that the time was ripe for a campaign in South China, for shortly thereafter an expeditionary force was landed at Bias Bay north of Hongkong. Meeting with light resistance this force pushed rapidly inland, and Canton was occupied on the 21st of October. The first reaction to the swift capitulation of Canton was a feeling that the military commander, General Yu Han-mou, had "sold out." Such judgment is not supported by facts. Circumstantial evidence supports the belief that while General Yu may have been negligent in failing to prepare proper defense works, and while even his judgment may have been faulty, he was not guilty of treason.

The best of the Kwangtung troops had been sent to the Hankow front. Those which remained were distributed in a rather thin line along the more probable landing points of the Kwangtung coast. This was an error, for when it became necessary to concentrate the forces to meet the Japanese attack it was impossible to do so with any degree of rapidity. A better plan would have been to maintain a strong centrally located reserve, while the coast line was kept under observation from strategically located outposts. Considerable reliance was apparently placed in the assumption that the Japanese would not attack in the vicinity of the British territory at Hongkong because of fear of provoking the British. Consequently, few defense works were built.

When the attack came General Yu appears to have reasoned that he was faced with two alternatives: (1) he could resist to the best of his ability, with the prospect of losing both Canton and his army; or (2) he could retire, lose Canton, but save

his army. He chose the latter course. But what saved his reputation for patriotism, and probably his head as well, is the fact that he retired along the line which had been previously indicated by the Generalissimo, should a retirement become necessary. The object of such instructions from the Generalissimo to the commanders of outlying districts was to bring the various elements of his army together in the west. General Pai Chung-hsi has now assumed command of all military operations in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the pattern of resistance there is well integrated.

The Chinese casualties for the war, up to the first of November, had reached the enormous total of 2,000,000 men. Japanese casualties were estimated by competent observers to be about 500,000, of which 350,000 were killed and seriously wounded, while 150,000 were slightly wounded.

The Second Phase (Guerrilla Operations)

When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his troops from the Hankow front he sent sixty divisions to the east of the Japanese lines with instructions to carry on guerrilla operations against the Japanese lines of communication. The balance of the army fought delaying actions as it retired to the west. Final defensive positions were established in the hills that abound in the western sections of the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Hunan. At the present writing (June, 1939) the Japanese have done little more than to establish a defensive zone around Hankow that extends south to Yochow, west to Shayang and north to Sinyang. On March 29, 1939, Nanchang fell, thus severing the rail line that extends from Hangchow (south of Shanghai) to the Wuchang-Canton railway at Chuchow.

In May the Japanese attempted to reach Sian (Shensi) by an offensive movement that was directed to the northwest from Hankow. This attempt was defeated by General Li Tsung-jen. It was a desperate endeavor to accomplish a task which, for two years, has been attempted by several Japanese columns in Shansi. Little is known about the operations which have taken place in Shansi during the past year (since July, 1938), except that repeated drives have been made there by the Japanese, and none has succeeded in conquering the province. Defense of the province has been conducted by General Yen Hsi-shan,

who has adopted the military doctrines and methods of the Eighth Route Army, in modified form and by General Chu Teh, who leads the Eighth Route Army. This province is, because of its topographical features, the key to the military control of adjacent provinces in north China. It is also the gateway to those areas of Shensi which lie to the south and west of the Yellow River, of which Sian is the most important.

During this phase of the war China may be said to have three major objectives: (1) to prevent the Japanese from controlling the country by political means; (2) to prevent the Japanese from exploiting the natural resources of the country; and, (3) to prevent the Japanese from moving supplies along their lines of communication.

The Japanese objectives may be described as: (1) to defend the area they now hold; (2) to destroy the guerrilla forces and mop up the areas that lie between their several lines of communication; (3) to harass the Chinese forces by aerial bombing of their bases and lines of communication; (4) to strengthen the puppet governments by bringing into them Chinese of sufficient national prestige to win a large popular support; (5) to tighten the blockade; (6) to discourage foreign governments from providing aid to China; (7) to intensify the development of those natural resources now in her possession so as to make the adventure pay for itself.

Two years have elapsed since the Sino-Japanese conflict began. The very fact that China has been able to resist for this length of time reflects credit on the Chinese army. In summarizing the conduct of the war by the Chinese during these two years it may be said that two patterns of resistance have been followed. South of the Yellow River the Generalissimo has conducted the resistance along the orthodox patterns of positional and mobile warfare. His strategy has been to resist where attacked. When the local situation indicated the advisability of retirement, the retirement was conducted in such a manner as to ultimately bring about the union of his forces along the Kwangsi-Hunan-Hupeh-Honan-Shansi line. After the fall of Hankow he sent a portion of his army to the east to conduct guerrilla operations against the enemy lines of communication.

North of the Yellow River the Eighth Route Army pattern of resistance has obtained for the most part. The essence of this

pattern has been the employment of guerrilla operations by the army, supported by a politically enlightened and spiritually welded civil population. In the far northwest (Suiyuan) a comparatively small force known as the North Route Army, led by General Fu Tso-yi and directed by the Generalissimo, has had the mission of impeding Japanese efforts to extend their control into Ninghsia. It has also provided a base for the rallying of Mongolians for resistance to the invasion.

When the extent of the terrain involved and the character of the communications are taken into consideration, the degree to which the Generalissimo has been able to co-ordinate the operations in all of these theaters is remarkable.

Many readjustments have taken place in the army. Training has become more uniform, and the practice of according all armies equal treatment is increasing. Old and incompetent commanders have been replaced by young and professionally trained leaders. Staff schools have improved the quality and number of staff officers. The economy of the army has become better integrated.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS

In the course of this study we have observed some of the processes by which China's military forces have emerged from semi-feudal conditions and become welded into an effective national army. While war as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes is deplorable, it must be recognized that, with all its horrors, the present Sino-Japanese conflict has brought many benefits to China. Probably no other force could so abruptly have weakened the ancient barriers of tradition, prejudice and class selfishness. The very necessity for self-preservation imposed on the people a social, economic and political re-orientation which would have required years, perhaps centuries, to accomplish by the normal process of evolution. The army has benefited by this regenerative process.

The contest in China presents a classic example of the power of the people of a nation when those people are awakened to a national consciousness, and when they are further stimulated by just and kindly leadership. Chiang Kai-shek is sometimes referred to abroad as a dictator. He is a dictator in the sense that most of the functions of government are centered in him. But he is far from being a dictator when it comes to the manner in which he exercises his power. His function is that of a master co-ordinator who makes concessions first to the right and then to the left in order to keep the ship of state on an even keel. His regime might more appropriately be described as a controlled democracy. Concessions must be made to the people.

A dictator possesses the ability to move swiftly, secure in the knowledge that a regimented population is behind him. But the source of the power of a dictator lies in a regimentation that is based on fear, which in turn is generated by the threat and use of force. Beneath the surface, in a nation so governed, the individual secretly rebels against the violation of his intelligence and of his personal liberties. The strength of a de-

mocracy lies in the equality of opportunity which is afforded the populace. The leaders appeal to the intelligence of the individual. His fundamental rights are recognized and respected, and he is treated as an equal. Consequently, when he is presented with valid reasons why he should make sacrifices for the good of the whole, he responds without reservation. The government is then assured of the willing co-operation of the people. That is what is happening in China today.

It is true that in China the process of government is not wholly democratic. The thought pattern of officials who have been accustomed to wield arbitrary power cannot be changed over night. This is a fact which those foreign observers of the China scene overlook when they point to the continuation of certain obnoxious practices as evidence that China is still primitive and feudal. They fail to observe the process of change. The important question is this: Is progress being made in modifying the attitude of reactionary officials? There is ample evidence to support the opinion that such progress is being made. Otherwise the armies would long ago have ceased to resist the military incursions of the Japanese. Otherwise the Japanese would long since have been able to establish a strong puppet government in China. Otherwise the people in the areas penetrated by the enemy would have acquiesced in the rule of the latter rather than have continued to endure the terrific hardships which the war has imposed on them.

There is some doubt in certain quarters as to the economic stability of China. It is frequently pointed out that she must depend on the importation of war supplies from abroad to a greater degree than does Japan. The experience of the past two years, however, has shown that China finds it easier to secure credits abroad than does her opponent. The foreign democracies have faith in the cause for which China is fighting. The ability of her government to mobilize the people and fuse their will to resist convinces those democracies that she possesses the ability eventually to emerge victorious.

In this connection it would appear that an ultimate Chinese victory will depend on the fulfillment of the following six conditions: (1) The Chinese people must remain united. (2) The forces engaged in positional warfare must continue to be increased in strength and improved in efficiency. (3) The forces engaged in guerrilla warfare must continue to be increased in

strength and improved in efficiency. (4) There must be harmonious co-operation between the people and the military forces. (5) China must continue to receive credits and supplies from abroad until such time as she can manufacture her own war materials. (6) Certain ports of entry into China must be kept open in order to provide avenues for the flow of war materials into the country.

Some apprehension is felt abroad about the course which China will follow in case she is victorious. This apprehension is based on the growing strength of the Chinese Communist Party. When the writer was in Yen-an (Shensi), in May of 1938, he asked Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the Party, to describe the salient points in the plans of the Party for the post-war period. His reply was in effect as follows:

"The Communist Party hopes to continue the present entente with the Kuomintang, looking to the establishment in China of a real democracy with a two party government. We believe that the state should own the banks, mines and communications. We believe that the consumers' and producers' co-operatives should be developed. We favor the encouragement of private enterprise. And we desire that cordial relations be established and maintained between China and those foreign nations which are willing to meet China on a basis of equality."

Some months later this conversation was related to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and he was asked to what extent the ideas expressed agreed with his own. His reply was that his ideas on the subject were "about the same."

One thing is certain: The character of the Chinese people is such that they could never become militaristic so long as they remain the citizens of an independent nation. They are essentially a peace loving people. It is equally certain that the China of the future will be more conscious of her power, and that she will demand that her sovereign rights be respected.

EPILOGUE

Since this study was first drafted, events of marked significance to the Far East have occurred. The repercussions of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, signed on August 23, 1939, extended immediately to Tokyo. Overnight the attitude of the Japanese military in China toward German citizens shifted from one of friendliness to one of violent antagonism. Simultaneously the attitude toward the British became more friendly, though it changed again soon after the European war commenced on September 1.

The war in Europe provided both advantages and disadvantages for the Japanese. It served to divert the attention of France and Britain away from the Orient, a course which suggested that Japan would thereby have a freer hand there. But the war also operated to deny to Japan the aid she had been receiving from Germany, especially in the development of Manchuria. It also served to make her more dependent on the United States for imports of war materials, as both France and Britain now required for their own use the products which they had formerly exported.

On September 15 an armistice was declared between the Mongolian-Russian troops, and the Japanese, who had been fighting along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border. Both Russia and Japan agreed to submit the border-line dispute in that region to an arbitration commission. This development released some additional Japanese troops for the China operations, but the subsequent collapse of the negotiations indicates that the situation is still unstable.

The Japanese were further worried by the announcement of the Secretary of State of the United States, in July, of the intention of this nation to abrogate the 1911 commercial treaty on January 26, 1940. Since the latter date trade between these two nations has been on a day to day basis, and the Japanese have become apprehensive lest an embargo be applied on the shipment of war materials.

In China the Japanese army initiated a campaign against

Changsha (Hunan province, south of Hankow) late in September, but was severely defeated. In south China a Japanese expeditionary force was more successful. Landing in the vicinity of Pakhoi late in November, it moved inland and captured the city of Nanning, located on a highway from Indo-China to Kwangsi province, early in December. This move served to deny to the Chinese the use of this highway, but supplies continue to move from Indo-China into China over the railway to Kunming, despite Japanese bombing, and over the Burma road, the new highway into Indo-China west of Nanning. Efforts of the Japanese to penetrate further to the west from Nanning have failed.

The blockade of the China coast has been tightened as a result of military operations which were carried out along the south coast of Hangchow Bay, and in the area adjacent to Macao, in south China.

In the north successive campaigns have been launched in Shansi province with a view to gaining control of that province and opening the way for an advance across the Yellow River toward Sian. All have failed due to the vigilance of the Eighth Route Army and the troops of Governor Yen Hsi-shan.

General Ma Chan-san, who commands a cavalry army in Suiyuan (Inner Mongolia) conducted several successful raids along the Suiyuan railway line in December, and nearly succeeded in capturing Paoto, the terminus of the line. His actions resulted in a Japanese expedition being sent to Wuyuan, one hundred miles west of Paoto, for the purpose of destroying General Ma's food supply base.

The failure of the Japanese to conduct a successful campaign into the regions west of a north-south line, drawn through Hankow, wherein the Chinese army is strongly entrenched, suggests that the Japanese army has lost its driving power. Over a million Japanese troops are now committed to the mainland of Eastern Asia. But they are distributed over an area two thousand miles in length. As the weeks and months pass the people of China are becoming better organized and more determined to resist the efforts of the Japanese to dominate them. Consequently, more Japanese troops are required to maintain control of those areas which are now occupied, and fewer are available for concentration at any one point.

The area which the army now occupies consists of the rail-

way zones of north China (i. e., a strip about five miles wide on each side of each rail line), the Yangtze valley as far west as Hankow, and the municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin, and of other cities along the China coast. Most of the areas between the railways continue to be controlled by Chinese forces.

Japanese plans for the establishment of a puppet government in the occupied area, under the leadership of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, resulted in the inauguration of the new regime at Nanking on April 1. As Mr. Wang has no troops on which he can depend, the Japanese will be constrained to maintain an army of occupation in order to support the authority of the new government. In January a Chinese puppet army which landed in Fukien proved its impotence, and within three weeks five thousand of these men were reported to have deserted to the Chungking armies. The puppet government represents Japan's attempt to control China by political means. It may prove to be a device by which Japan hopes to withdraw her troops from the interior of China without losing "face."

There are many indications that Japan is in an increasingly difficult economic position. In the Diet there has been considerable criticism to the military program in China. Difficulties have been occasioned by the shortage of electric power, fuel and rice. But the government continues to be dominated by the military, and clings to the hope that the China "incident" may be settled without loss of "face," with Japan retaining control of a major part of the area which the army now occupies.

On the Chinese side resistance is strengthening despite the increasing difficulty of obtaining supplies from abroad. It is true that there have been clashes between troops of the Kuomintang armies and those of the Eighth Route Army, but these were instigated by subordinates of the Kuomintang forces, and do not involve a break between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the leaders of the Communist Party.

The war appears to have reached a stalemate, and henceforth the morale of the people of the two nations will become of increasing importance in determining the final outcome. The fact that the people of China are fighting for the preservation of their nation is a tremendous source of strength to them. While the Japanese people have a tradition of loyalty to the

Emperor, they have manifested in various ways that they have no heart for the war in China.

Also of rising importance at this stage is the attitude of foreign powers. Those nations which are in a position to influence the course of events in the Far East have indicated that their sympathies are on the side of the nation which is being invaded. China is finding it much easier than Japan to obtain assistance from abroad, as is indicated by the second American loan (\$20 million) granted to her in March. The United States in particular, as the most powerful of the neutral states, is uniquely qualified, especially since the European war began, to shape the course of future events in the Far East.

APPENDIX

THE ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL GUERRILLA AREA IN SOUTH SHANTUNG

BY WANG YU-CHUAN

Introductory Note. The following report was submitted to the Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations by a young Chinese historian formerly resident in North China, who served for several months with a guerrilla force in South Shantung and thus was enabled to make a first-hand study of the social and military organization of the region under guerrilla control. The writer is personally known to the Secretariat and the study, though frankly partisan in character, is an accurate and revealing account of a situation which has many parallels in other parts of "occupied China." The report is printed here as a valuable piece of supplementary evidence on the social and political transformation which the war with Japan is bringing about in China. The manuscript has been considerably condensed but an attempt has been made to retain something of the flavor of the original.—*The Editors.*

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF SOUTH SHANTUNG

Geographical Background and Strategic Importance

The region here referred to as South Shantung is not exactly the same as the traditional South Shantung of Chinese geography. It consists of the twenty or more *hsiens* in Shantung Province which lie east of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and south of the Tsinan-Kaochow Railway, and includes several *hsiens* actually located in Eastern Shantung.

This area forms a triangle on the map. It is bounded on the west and north by the two above-mentioned railways, and on the third side by the sea. It is largely plateau country, but includes within its boundaries such famous mountains as Tai Shan, Tsulai Shan, Meng Shan, and Yih Shan. A large part of it is entirely encircled by a chain of mountains so that, even if the Japanese succeeded in occupying the entire plateau area (which is extremely unlikely), Chinese guerrillas would still be able to retire to this mountainous fringe and continue their harassing activities by forays into the plain without much danger of being wiped out. Moreover, in the improbable event of supplies being cut off from the outside, the mountain lands are large enough to yield sufficient food-stuffs for the armed forces. The geographical advantages of South Shantung as a field of guerrilla warfare have been proved not only by the failure of recent Japanese "pacification campaigns" in this locality, but also by the chronic failure of the authorities in the past to root out the flourishing local banditry.

Before the Japanese invasion, there were a number of highways in South Shantung. The most important were the Taian-Shihkiowsuo highway, which leads from Taian through Sintai, Mengyin, Yishui, and Chuhsien to the harbor of Shihkiowsuo in Jihchao *hsien*, and the highway running southward from Yitu and across the Taian-Shihkiowsuo highway to Linyi and Kiangsu. In addition to these two important roads there are highways built from *hsien* to *hsien*. When the Japanese first invaded South Shantung, their plan was to control the two main strategic highways running north to south and east to west, thus getting a grip on the nerve centers of this area. But this plan has signally failed. They have only been able to remain in occupation of the coast line and a few key cities and have been completely driven out of the rest of South Shantung, which is now under the control of the Chinese Government. They have even been forced to withdraw their troops and aircraft carrier from Shihkiowsuo on the coast. As for the highways, they scarcely exist any more. They have been almost completely destroyed and re-

duced to farmland. And so they will remain until Japan is finally defeated.

On the South Shantung plateau there is one important gate through which the enemy can embark on a campaign against the defenders. This gate is the pass along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway from the east of Tawenkow Station to the entrance of Sintai City. If the Chinese guerrillas can hold this pass against the invader, South Shantung will be safe from serious attacks. The Japanese realize this, and it is for this reason that they have been very reluctant to evacuate their military base in Sintai City. Numerous battles have already been fought by the Japanese, with heavy losses every time, to hold this strategic position.

The economic conditions of South Shantung are also of great importance to the military situation. It is a rather backward agricultural area; its peasants are the most hard-working, industrious, and oppressed in the entire country. Because it is an agricultural area, food supplies for the army are comparatively abundant, and because it is a backward agricultural area in which production has not yet reached the stage of full commercialization or industrialization, it is more or less self-sufficient and can be made completely so; for the severing of communication lines with the foreign market would not cause serious shortages. Among the main agricultural products for export in this area are silk, which can be fabricated locally for the use of the inhabitants; flax, which can be sent to the guerrilla areas in North Shantung in exchange for cotton, and peanuts, which can be used as food for cattle. Peanut oil and bean oil can be made into oil for lamps to replace kerosene, and tobacco land can be used to plant other agricultural products. Thus, although the Japanese army has occupied almost the entire coastline and most of the key cities, it has failed to destroy the fundamental structure of Chinese economy, which is based upon the village.

Geographical and economic factors, although important, do not alone determine the military situation. Equally important factors are the strength of the people's movement and the soundness of the political structure. This is true especially of the guerrilla areas.

Social Background¹

Before the war, South Shantung would have seemed a beautiful garden to one who did not look too closely at the lives of its farmers

¹ Note that the picture here given is of South Shantung before the present war began. The war has not yet caused any drastic changes in the modes of production or in the fundamental relations between the exploiters and the exploited. But, as will be seen in succeeding pages, the democratization of the political structure has not only put an end to the arbitrary political power and unbridled corruption of the gentry, but has also laid the foundations for the economic liberation of the peasantry.

and the antagonisms in its social structure. Within its lovely green fields and scenic rivers and hills, South Shantung still preserved the quiet and serenity of the Middle Ages.

Production was predominantly agricultural. Both the hilly land near the mountains and the plains along the river beds had been turned into arable fields and intensively cultivated; for the land was the only means of support.² But not all the beautiful green fields belonged to those who cultivated them; the numerous herds of animals were not necessarily owned by those who fed them. Most of the cultivable lands were owned by a few landlords and rich peasants, who also possessed all the means of production. As in many rural areas of China, much of the land was owned by those who did not cultivate it.³

Naturally conditions varied slightly from *hsien* to *hsien*. In the northern part of South Shantung, there were comparatively few big landlords, while the proportion of rich peasants and middle peasants was comparatively high. Consequently, there was no monopolizing accumulation of the land, which was divided among rich and middle peasants. The rich peasants usually hired labor and supervised the cultivation of their land. Tenant farmers were infrequent, since these rich peasants seldom absented themselves from their farms to live in the cities. For the same reason city life did not flourish in this district.

But in the southern part of South Shantung, landlords possessing more than 500 *mow*⁴ of land were quite common. As a rule, they leased the land to others to cultivate and became absentee landlords. Possessing the main means of production, namely the land, the landlords employed the fruit of their exploitation to engage in trade, and above all, in banking. Almost without exception, proprietors of big stores were at the same time proprietors of banking and money-lending institutions. Furthermore, through their monopoly of economic power, they competed for monopolies in the collection of taxes and the control of local finances.

As a natural result, they were also the bosses in local politics. They were landlords, merchants, bankers, and usurers in the field of economics, and gentry in the field of politics; and there was not a single one of them who did not have close connections with the *hsien* magistrate and the various governmental departments. On the other hand, there was no *hsien* magistrate who did not ally himself with the gentry in order to maintain his position and share

² See K. A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, Leipzig, 1931.

³ See Chen Han-seng, *Landlord and Peasant in China*, New York, 1936.

⁴ One *mow* is about one sixth of an acre in most parts of China, but considerable local variations exist and in parts of eastern Shantung it is as large as half an acre.

II. REACTIONS OF THE VARIOUS CLASSES TO THE JAPANESE INVASION

The Betrayal of Shantung by Han Fu-chu

When the Japanese army crossed the Yellow River into South Shantung at the end of 1937, General Han Fu-chu's troops expeditiously retreated toward the south without firing a single shot. So swiftly did this army of tens of thousands retreat, that it was always a safe hundred *li*⁶ ahead of the Japanese vanguard. Han's infamous example was followed by *hsien* magistrates, local officials, and the various armed forces of the *hsiens*. The scattered armed forces of the people which attempted to resist were promptly disarmed by Han Fu-chu, who thus enabled the Japanese to reach Tsining and Taierhchwang without encountering the least resistance. No one would have been surprised if Han had been unable to block the enemy completely, but his failure to put up even a show of resistance and the uniform desertion of the local military and political leaders, who invariably looted whatever they could lay their hands on before deserting, took even the peasants, who had few illusions about their rulers, completely by surprise.

Before the fall of Tehchow, an important city along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, Han Fu-chu hoped to effect a compromise with the Japanese. With this object, he disobeyed every order of the Central Government to resist and did everything in his power to impede all preparations for resistance. Not until Tehchow was dangerously threatened and the whole situation had become extremely critical, did Han Fu-chu allow the establishment of National Salvation organizations. Even this concession was made only as a superficial gesture in deference to the joint pressure of the orders of the Central Government and the furious resentment of the masses. In actual fact, he was still trying in every way possible to disrupt and destroy the people's movement.

In pursuance of this end, Han's clique decided to turn the Shantung Mobilization Committee into a bureaucracy controlled exclusively by its own henchmen. According to this scheme, a United Front Mobilization Committee of five, composed of "all parties and groups," was established. This committee actively disrupted the mobilization of the people and threw out all sorts of smoke-screens to mislead them.

After the establishment of the Shantung Mobilization Committee, the Shantung Provincial Government and the Headquarters of the Third Route Army (Han's army) continued to hamper the National Salvation work of the people, arresting members of the National Salvation organizations, interfering with the activities of the People's

⁶One *li* is about one third of a mile.

Association for the Support of Anti-Japanese War in various *hsiens*, prohibiting "Down with Japanese Imperialism" posters, and disarming all the people's armed forces.

But the Japanese, failing to appreciate the good-will of Han, continued to advance southwards after the fall of Tehchow. Whereupon, Han, realizing that everything was turning against him, hesitatingly appointed twenty-six *hsien* magistrates to the posts of guerrilla commanders. Fortunately, these twenty-six henchmen of Han Fu-chu did not succeed in organizing any guerrilla forces; if they had done so, the plundering of the people of Shantung would have been unprecedented. The basis of this statement is the behavior of the guerrillas under Liu, who were considered the crack soldiers of Han Fu-chu. Wherever Liu's band went, it plundered the people unmercifully, looting, burning, raping, and confiscating the arms of the peasants in precisely the same manner as the Japanese. When Han Fu-chu was court-martialed, it was revealed that Liu and his men had surrendered to the Japanese and had been incorporated into the Pacification Corps of the puppet régime.

The natural result of Han Fu-chu's treachery was that Shantung was not only unable to resist the invader, but was even unable to preserve social order. Wherever the Japanese army succeeded in capturing territory, the military and political structure was completely destroyed, and the social order became utterly chaotic. Under these conditions of turmoil, the people of South Shantung reacted toward the situation each according to the interests of his class.

First Reactions of the Poor Peasants

The first reaction of the poor peasants and the peasant proletariat was one of relief. They bitterly hated Han Fu-chu's régime, under which, for them, hunger, beating, flogging, blackmailing, and imprisonment were the order of the day. When Han was overthrown by the Japanese, although the invaders' brutality was generally feared, the people of South Shantung nevertheless felt that a big stone had suddenly been removed from their shoulders. They were particularly relieved when they realized that the downfall of Han meant no more collection of land tax and other taxes and no more forced labor.

The main reasons for this negative attitude of the poor peasants in the early stages of the Japanese invasion are as follows:

(1) Since, throughout Chinese history, the peasants have never been allowed to participate in the political affairs of the country, they were naturally, at first, quite devoid of national consciousness.

(2) Since the vast majority of the peasants had never owned any land, they did not feel that the country belonged to them. In their opinion, the invasion of China was not likely to hurt them because they could not possibly imagine anything worse than their existing situation, except, perhaps, the actual loss of life itself. This attitude of fatalistic indifference is expressed in their proverb, "No matter who comes, we have to pay taxes just the same."

(3) Since there had never been any development of an anti-Japanese movement in South Shantung, and since the peasants were entirely ignorant of political and military matters, they would have had no idea how to resist the Japanese even if they had wanted to.

(4) But the main reason why the peasants did not at first put up any resistance was because the invasion directly and immediately threatened the security of the landlords, which, to the peasants, was a matter for secret rejoicing. "Poverty in time of trouble is something which riches cannot buy," says another old proverb. Thus, when the poor peasants witnessed how the landlords were forced to become refugees overnight and to run for their lives, they were not sorry to see their rich oppressors suffer for a change.

However, this was not the attitude of all the peasants. The poor peasants who lived near the cities and along the highways and who had witnessed Japanese brutality with their own eyes took an entirely different view of the invasion. They had seen Japanese soldiers plundering their property, raping their sisters, slaughtering their brothers, and burning down their villages. Those who were lucky enough to escape death still faced the prospect of forced labor for the Japanese army. To these peasants the Japanese were a menace to be resisted with all their might. The invasion destroyed their means of livelihood and turned millions of them into homeless wanderers. Unlike the rich, they had no rich relatives elsewhere to whom they could go, and no savings on which to live. For them the invasion meant starvation and death. They were its first victims.

With the continuation and expansion of the invasion, this outlook became more and more widespread among the peasantry. Moreover, they also began to realize that this was a different kind of war from the civil wars between rival war lords or the dynastic wars of Chinese history. They began to see that the war against Japan was a life and death struggle for the Chinese people. With this realization, they naturally began to remember the plight of their brothers in Manchuria. (The number of natives of Shantung who migrated to Manchuria is particularly large.) They then became frightened and determined to resist Japan's aggression lest they too should fall into the same misery.

Once the real situation was understood, the knowledge passed

from one to the other, and the peasants who lived near the cities and along the communication lines gradually but surely convinced their more backward brothers until the majority of them were awakened and transformed into stalwart and resolute fighters against Japan. As soon as this transformation in the peasant's outlook had taken place, the next step was to organize them; and the result was the rapid development of guerrilla forces in South Shantung in later days.

As we have already seen, the peasants were extremely hostile to the old political régime and were waiting for the opportunity to revenge themselves on the gentry for their arbitrary oppression. Therefore, soon after the Japanese invasion began, for reasons partly of revenge and partly of actual need, the peasants started a widespread Share the Grain Movement in South Shantung.

Before the sharing took place, the poor peasants would elect a leader, collect all the relevant data, conduct preliminary discussions, and finally call a mass meeting for action. The problems discussed in these mass meetings were first, which families' grain should be distributed; second, who should be entitled to participate in the sharing; and third, how much each participant should receive. When decisions on these questions had been reached, those who were to share in the division marched to the doors of the rich peasants or landlords who possessed abundant grain and begged that some of it be lent to the poor peasants. The demand was seldom refused, despite the fact that it gave little pleasure to the rich peasants and landlords. Frequently, the cleverer landlords, realizing that sharing was unavoidable, themselves called a meeting of the rich before the peasants could call their own mass meeting, and declared that they would give "relief to the poor." In the larger cities and in the villages where the landlords actually resided, the Share the Grain Movement was usually carried out in this fashion. This device was to the advantage of the landlords in several respects. First, they were able to appease the poor peasants; second, they could reduce the number of people who came for the sharing; third, they could effect a "reasonable" distribution, which meant, of course, the smallest possible; and lastly, they were able to take the edge off the peasants' desire for political action. But these aims of the landlords were fully understood by the peasants wherever this policy was carried out.

As soon, however, as social order was restored by the guerrillas, the Share the Grain Movement disappeared, and the efforts to improve the economic condition of the peasants were conducted more regularly according to the policy of "Improvement of the People's Livelihood."

First Reactions of the Middle Peasants

Although they did not own as much property as the rich peasants and landlords, the middle peasants clung all the more eagerly to the meager plot of land that separated them so narrowly from the misery of the poor peasants. Not only did the Japanese invasion threaten the normal pursuit of their livelihood, but the resultant disorder also endangered the security of their property. As a result, although they were more anxious to maintain social security than to fight against the Japanese, the middle peasants were the first of all the peasants, rich and poor, to organize spontaneously for self-protection against the invader. Their organizations were usually based on various existing semi-religious societies, such as the Red Spear Society, the Black Flag Society, the Yellow Dust Society, the Wu Chi Tao, the Kang Feng Tao, and others.

Since the members of these various societies were already bound firmly together by their common superstitious beliefs, they were easy to organize; and since their main weapons were spears and knives, they were not difficult to finance. But unfortunately, partly owing to their petty bourgeois outlook, the organizations of the middle peasants frequently became the unconscious tools of the gentry.

Reactions of the Gentry

Under the conditions of turmoil created by the Japanese invasion, the gentry, as a rule ran away from the cities into the villages. They were afraid, on the one hand, of the looting, raping, burning, and killing of the Japanese, and on the other hand they dreaded the Share the Grain Movement of the poor peasants and the possible appearance of bandits. They would, no doubt, have gladly resisted the Japanese in defense of their property if such resistance had not involved granting the peasants a share of their wealth. In face of this dilemma, they decided that their selfish interests could best be served by compromising with the Japanese and concentrating their efforts on restoring social order and planning for self-protection.

Some of the gentry openly became traitors and organized Local Order Preservation Committees for the Japanese. Those who were in a better position to maneuver encouraged others (not landlords or big merchants) to become outright traitors, while they themselves lent their support from behind the scenes. The majority of the gentry generally reckoned that the Japanese army would want social order and food supplies, and that, for this reason, it would help to protect their property. They also hoped that in return the Japanese might treat them at least more gently.

However, the gentry, while cooperating with the Japanese, en-

deavored at the same time to arm themselves so that, in case the Japanese army should prove unable or unwilling to maintain "order" (i.e., protect their property), they could then take the situation into their own hands. As a rule, the big landlords continued to maintain their own armed forces and encampments, both of which could be strengthened in an emergency. They were thus able to rule as princes over the districts in which they resided. Moreover, in addition to their own armed henchman, they were also able to make use of community armed forces, such as the Self-Protection Corps and the Lien Chang Hui.⁷ This situation still exists in Lin Yi, Tenghsien, Yishui, Chowhsien, Mengyin, and Feih sien. Under the rule of the Japanese, the armed forces of the landlords were organized secretly in case the Japanese should misunderstand the reason for their existence. In the districts where there were no big landlords, the rich peasants took over the tasks of the landlords. This is the situation in the northern part of South Shantung around Poshan, Laiwu, and other *hsiens*.

Generally speaking, the behavior of the gentry in the areas occupied by the Japanese has been beneath contempt. They could have put up considerable resistance, but they hoped that their property might be protected by the Japanese army. They did not necessarily want to be outright traitors to their country, but they were afraid that resistance would threaten their property and their lives. Rather than run this risk, they chose to become puppets of the enemy.

A word must be said here about the R Society. This is a superstitious semi-international organization of a partially benevolent nature. In China, where it originated, its chief members consist of landlords, big merchants, rich peasants, and retired officials and officers. It exerts a certain influence on local politics, which increases in time of unrest. When everybody else ran away after the Japanese occupation, the R Society alone remained without being disturbed by the invaders and in many instances redoubled its activities. This is mainly due to the fact that it is a philanthropic organization without much concern with local political and military affairs and is international in spirit in so far as it takes care of both the Chinese and Japanese wounded soldiers and refugees. But although the R Society declares itself to be non-political, this claim in itself makes it political in a certain sense. Furthermore, the leaders of the R Society have not infrequently taken part in directing pro-Japanese activities, though they have not dared to participate openly in the puppet government. Flying its flag in occupied areas, the R Society is considered by the Japanese to be their friend,

⁷ Village Associations for Self-Protection.

and for this reason its members are not only not persecuted, but are allowed to pass through sentry posts freely without being searched. Even when any of its branch offices refuse to serve the enemy in any way, they are still treated with special favor.

Reactions of the Young Intellectuals

In the category of "young intellectuals" are included college, middle school, normal school, and primary school students, and middle school and primary school teachers. Young peasants who have a certain cultural background and all those young people who are engaged in various activities outside the villages also come under this heading.

The young intellectuals come from all ranks of society; they are the sons of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, rich merchants, and other professional people; sometimes one even finds them among the sons of the poor peasants. Although the majority of them come from the upper social strata, their ideology and their activities are by no means similar to those of their parents. They are progressive and possess a considerable amount of social understanding. They fully realize the historical meaning of the imperialist invasion of China and recognize that there can be only two ways out for the Chinese people: to submit and die, or to fight and live. They subordinate their personal gains and interests to those of the nation and recognize that only by first saving China from being dismembered can they hope for any future for themselves. Thus from the very beginning of the war they were determined to throw in their lot with that of their country, and the slogan "To sacrifice for the liberation of China" became their gospel.

This group of young people engaged in national salvation activities long before the actual invasion began. In their previous activities, they met all sorts of oppressive measures from the authorities so that they could only partially achieve their ends. But after the invasion of Shantung and the intensification of the national crisis, they found the door of opportunity for activity opened wide.

On the entrance of the first Japanese soldiers into Shantung, a group of six or seven young men, with three rifles and one round of ammunition between them, took to the mountains and set to work to organize the peasants for guerrilla warfare. With the extension of hostilities throughout the province, they succeeded in rapidly developing the peasant masses into guerrilla units. These units were later organized as the Fourth Brigade of the Shantung Guerrilla Forces of the Eighth Route Army, a well-trained, politically conscious force about twenty thousand strong.

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS

It has been seen that, when the inhabitants of Shantung found themselves abandoned by Han Fu-chu and his army, each class reacted instinctively according to its class interests, organized itself on class lines, and built up its own armed forces. These various armed forces, their composition, function, development, and inter-relations must now be considered in greater detail.

Local Forces of the Ruling Class

There are several complicating factors in a discussion of the local armed forces of the ruling class. First, the conditions in the occupied *hsiens* are different from those in the unoccupied *hsiens*. Second, the elements which constitute the ruling class are far from homogeneous. Third, the organization of the local forces of the *hsiens* that have been reorganized since the Japanese occupation is very different both from that of the *hsiens* under the former ruling class and from that of the *hsiens* that have come under new leadership but have not yet undergone the process of reorganization.

The important elements of the ruling class that possess armed forces are the gentry, and the former local officials and district captains. The nature and organization of the armed forces of the gentry have already been discussed and it has been seen that these forces are formed mainly for the maintenance of local order and the protection of the gentry's own private property, and not for resisting the Japanese.

Even before the invasion, owing to the fact that bandits were prevalent in South Shantung, every large village or town had its own military encampment, and every landlord took sufficient protective measures to guard his own household. Even the middle peasants owned a rifle or two. Thus South Shantung already possessed a considerable quantity of arms. During the disorderly retreat of Han Fu-chu to the south, a large amount of rifles and ammunition was discarded. Some were sold by Han's defeated soldiers, some were picked up by the people, and all eventually fell into the hands of the landowners and the peasants. This store was further added to after the battle of Taierhchwang, when great quantities of arms were abandoned by both sides. Even machine guns were found left in the fields after this great battle.

During the first period of turmoil, as we have seen, the landlords of South Shantung took advantage of the situation to strengthen their existing armed forces, and then gradually succeeded in bringing the Lien Chang Hui under their control. They were then in a

position to restore their political influence and thus again attempt to dominate local politics. The timid middle peasants, who for generations had depended upon others for protection, were only too glad to welcome the activities of the landlords, while the poor peasants filled the ranks of the armed forces of the gentry because, under the circumstances, that was the only way they could earn a living. As to the young guerrilla fighters, they were so anxious to see the population sufficiently armed that in many instances they lent a hand to the landlords in the organization of their armed forces, believing that, in spite of the selfish interests they represented, the forces of the gentry were nevertheless Chinese forces and that therefore there was always the possibility of turning them against the aggressor. It was under these favorable conditions that the armed forces of the landlords were promptly organized. Once this was achieved, the landlords were able to entrench themselves in their own districts and became, to all intents and purposes, local feudal princes. A situation thus arose in South Shantung similar to that of the Period of the Three Kingdoms about fifteen hundred years ago in China's history, when a triple alliance of nobility, gentry, and landlords controlled the government.

In the southern part of South Shantung the guerrilla bands and guerrilla commanders were surprisingly numerous for the first few months after the invasion. The reason was that the self-seeking landlords in this area wanted so much to display their "power" in front of the people that they called themselves guerrilla commanders whenever they could gather five or ten people together. However, notwithstanding the extraordinary number of commanders, the ranks of these officers were carefully distinguished, and property was the basis of rank. On him who possessed the most property was bestowed the title of commander-in-chief, and the rest held office corresponding to the amount of property owned. The discipline of these guerrillas was so lax that they were constantly in conflict with the people of the locality. In several *hsiens* these guerrilla commanders actually went over to the Japanese and became members of the Order Preservation Corps, always excusing themselves, of course, by saying that they were playing for time till the troops of the Central Government should arrive. Most of the armed forces of the landlords in the southern part of South Shantung belonged in this category.

In the northern part of South Shantung, where landlords were few, it happened quite frequently that the small landowners and the rich peasants jointly organized united armed forces and elected their own leaders. The results achieved by this kind of organization were more satisfactory than those obtained by the large landlords.

As has already been noted, the armed forces of the landlords were not organized for the purpose of resisting the Japanese and so should not, strictly speaking, be considered anti-Japanese forces. They are discussed in this chapter because, whatever their real object, they at least claimed to be anti-Japanese. In actual fact, however, their "resistance" took the form of permitting the activities of traitors in their areas, never at any time attacking the Japanese, and harassing the guerrilla bands that were seriously fighting the enemy, such as the Fourth Brigade of the Eighth Route Army Guerrilla Forces.

Besides the above forces there were also quite a number of armed forces organized by local petty bureaucrats who claimed to be anti-Japanese, but who in fact were merely interested in building up influential positions for themselves. This kind of armed force may be divided into two classes: those that were formed by the old members of the petty bureaucracy after the Japanese had destroyed the local political and military organization, and those that were formed by the petty bureaucrats after the genuine guerrillas had restored order in the recaptured areas. Neither class made any serious efforts to resist the Japanese.

In addition to the armed forces of South Shantung already described there are two other kinds of local armed forces belonging to the ruling class: (1) The Pao-an-ta-tui (armed force of the *hsien* sub-districts and of the unoccupied *hsien* governments); (2) the forces under the Special Commissioner of the Third District of Shantung.

The forces of the sub-districts of the various *hsiens* were disbanded even before the arrival of the Japanese army because all the responsible leaders ran away. When the territory was recaptured by the Chinese, the forces of the sub-districts in quite a number of *hsiens* were restored to their activities, the difference being that this time they were attached to the Fifth Column⁸ instead of being strictly local forces.

The armed forces of the *hsien* government were reorganized into Pao-an-ta-tui in compliance with the order of the Central and Provincial Governments. The *hsien* magistrates became commanders of the Pao-an-ta-tui automatically. The effectiveness of these forces varied with the political complexion of the *hsiens*.

The area under the authority of the Special Commissioner of the Third District of Shantung, which was set up by Han Fu-chu, centers around Yishui, Chuhsien, Jihehao, Linyi, Tancheng, Feih-sien, Hih-sien, and Mengyin. The Special Commissioner of the Third District is Chang Li-yuan, who fought with the National troops against the Japanese and stayed behind in South Shantung after

⁸ See below, p. 101.

the National troops withdrew to the south. But Chang was at first not very efficient and his forces remained around two or three thousand men. When the 69th Army arrived in South Shantung, Chang expressed his desire to cooperate with its commander, General Shih. At the same time he set up an Academy for the Training of Political and Military Cadres with the cooperation of the Fourth Brigade of the Guerrilla Forces of the Eighth Route Army. It was also reported that he begged the Fourth Brigade to send officers to his army to train his men. Whether the Fourth Brigade accepted this invitation is not clear, but it is common knowledge to the people in South Shantung that Chang received much assistance from the Fourth Brigade. In October, 1938, the Fourth Brigade sent three hundred experienced fighters, the People's Volunteers of Linyi, to the ranks of Chang Li-yuan's army. Since then Chang's fighting strength has increased considerably. But his close collaboration with the Eighth Route Army incurred the jealousy and suspicion of General Sun, commander of the partisans in South Shantung, who reported to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that Chang Li-yuan and the Eighth Route Army had jointly established a "Red Army University" in Shantung and that they were behaving against the interests of the nation. On receipt of this report, General Chiang Kai-shek ordered the 69th Army to make a thorough investigation into the matter. But General Shih Yu-san, knowing well that the charge was groundless, made no investigation and sent no report to the Generalissimo, who expressed his confidence in Shih by taking no further steps in the matter.

To sum up, the local armed forces of South Shantung that belong to the ruling classes can be divided into four main categories:

1. The armed forces that belong exclusively to the landlords and the gentry, whose main slogan is "self-protection"—protection of their private property, not protection of the Chinese nation. They have made no contribution to the cause of resisting the invader, but have rather placed obstacles in its way.

2. Armed forces that belong to the more progressive elements, who are interested both in protecting their own interests and in resisting the Japanese. Such forces are rare and comparatively weak.

3. Armed forces that belong to the former petty bureaucrats, whose main interest is to restore their own privileged political position. These people are not interested in fighting the Japanese, but only in regaining the power to continue their former corrupt practices.

4. Armed forces that belong to local administrative officers. These are in turn subdivided into (a) the Pao-an-ta-tui, and (b)

the forces under the Special Commissioner for the Third District of Shantung. This last group is the only genuine anti-Japanese force in South Shantung that belongs to the ruling class.

Fortunately, however, as the genuinely anti-Japanese forces continue to expand and the people's movement to grow stronger, and as improvements in the local administration are made, those armed forces that do not serve the purpose of resisting the invader are gradually being eliminated.

The Fifth Column

Mention has already been made of the Fifth Column, originally known as the Chi Lu Border District Guerrilla Forces. Its commander is Sun, a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy, who was formerly a responsible official of the Kuomintang engaged in "anti-Communist" activities in Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province. When Shantung was lost to the Japanese, Sun was immediately appointed commander of the guerrillas with his headquarters in Chowhsien. He was welcomed with open arms by the young guerrilla fighters in Taian, Laiwu, and Hsintai. Although, on account of geographical difficulties, the young guerrillas did not send representatives to Sun for instructions, they were happy to learn of the official recognition of guerrilla fighters, and they all assumed that Sun must have a formidable force at his disposal for carrying on the fight against the Japanese. Unfortunately, however, Sun's troops did not live up to these expectations.

Sun and his troops possessed two great advantages over the other guerrilla forces. They were directly attached to the Central Government, which gave them a prestige not shared by the other guerrillas, and they received material support from the Central Government, which the others did not. Had Sun fully realized his advantageous position and known how to utilize it, he could have been very successful in developing guerrilla warfare in Shantung; for, besides the Fourth Brigade, otherwise known as the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Forces of the People of Shantung, Sun's were the only regularly organized armed forces then in Shantung. But he failed miserably.

In the months of February and March, 1938, Sun's force continued to expand day by day, until by May, according to his own estimate, it had grown to more than 20,000. (This included those who were nominally under his command, but whom actually he could not control.) But from May on, Sun intervened too freely in political affairs, so that his forces dwindled away, some joining the 69th Army and some the Eighth Route Army. But, though the Fifth Column became less and less effective, Sun's personal prestige was

saved by his appointment to the post of Special Commissioner for the Twelfth District of Shantung by Governor Shen Hung-lieh.

There are four main reasons for the failure of Sun's Fifth Column to win the popular support without which it could not hope to offer effective resistance to the Japanese. These mistakes are important object lessons in how not to organize guerrilla forces.

In the first place, Sun recklessly recruited bandits without providing them with proper training. There is no reason why bandits should not be recruited into the army since many of them are eager to fight against the Japanese. Sun's mistake was not that he recruited bandits, but that he was so selfishly ambitious to increase his own personal power that he recruited them without discrimination and then failed to provide them with proper training. As a result, his troops were completely undisciplined and frequently came into conflict with the armed forces of the people (the Red Spear Society) in Taian and Laiwu.

In the second place, by incorporating the local armed forces into his army, Sun not only incurred the opposition of the people, but at the same time alienated the sympathy of the landlords and the gentry. The policy of fostering and helping the people's organizations and the establishment of the people's armed forces is of vital importance during the present war. It is emphasized in detail in the Program of the Kuomintang for National Resistance and Reconstruction. The Provincial Government of Shantung also declared that "Rifle should not be separated from man, and man should not be separated from the village," a policy whose purpose is to strengthen the power of resistance of the individual districts. But General Sun disregarded this policy and reorganized all the local armed forces into the Fifth Column, appointing local sub-district captains as commanders of the various battalions and companies. The local petty officials, admiring their new titles, were jealous of the rapid development of the Fourth Brigade and willingly accepted the new positions, hoping that, through them, they would be able to manipulate political graft. In these circumstances, it was only natural that the people should lose all their respect for and confidence in Sun and his lieutenants.

Thirdly, Sun misused his authority and interfered with *hsien* political affairs. In the recovered *hsiens*, which are accessible to the jurisdiction of the Central and Provincial Governments, the guerrilla forces should only perform the duty of assisting the local authorities. There is no reason whatsoever for the guerrilla forces to intervene in the political affairs of such *hsiens*. Yet it was precisely this inexcusable mistake that Sun committed in South Shantung. Disregarding the orders of the Provincial Government, he frequently

usurped the authority of the Province to appoint *hsien* magistrates. In Taian, Laiwu, Poshan, and other *hsiens*, he appointed magistrates even when the Provincial Government had already done so. As a result, a state of confusion was created which often culminated in violent conflict.

Fourthly, Sun behaved in a manner injurious to the National United Front. It need hardly be repeated that the central policy in the present stage of the struggle for national independence is that of a national united front against the Japanese. Nevertheless, various elements have continually endeavored to break up the united front, and the conduct of General Sun and his subordinates has been a clear cut example of such disruptive tactics.

At one period, he specifically censored, through his news agency, the news broadcast by the Central Government radio station concerning the activities of the People's Political Council in Hankow and the situation of the mass movement. At the same time, he put a stop to the work of the People's General Mobilization Committee in the region where he was stationed, and threatened to place under arrest any local leaders who failed to obey him. He was so much afraid of an awakened people that he even stooped to manufacture rumors condemning the people's armed organizations such as the Red Spear Society, as anti-government or as secret intelligence agencies of the Eighth Route Army.

Sun's attitude towards the Fourth Brigade of the Guerrilla Forces of the Eighth Route Army was even more narrow-minded. He accused the Provincial Committee for *Hsien* Political Affairs, which was supported by the Fourth Brigade, of being a Soviet. The slogans of the Fourth Brigade, "Those who have money contribute money, those who have energy contribute energy," "Improvement of the people's livelihood," "Strengthening the armed force of the people," all of which had been authoritatively endorsed by the Central Government, were denounced as communist propaganda. He even went so far as to proclaim that the only area in which the Eighth Route Army should function was North Shensi, and that it had no business to come to South Shantung. Such a sectarian attitude toward the Eighth Route Army cannot be explained away on superficial grounds. There are several important political reasons for Sun's attitude: first, the Fourth Brigade was received with open arms by the people because of its correct behavior; second, it developed and expanded extremely rapidly; third, it won more battles than any of the other armed forces; fourth, it helped to improve the life of the people; fifth, it fostered a genuine people's movement. All these achievements inevitably incurred the jealousy and hatred of General Sun.

When the 69th Army arrived at South Shantung, a conference of the Fourth Guerrilla District was called. It decided that a general offensive should be launched against the Japanese forces. Since the Fourth Brigade was at that moment stationed at Feihhsien, it was decided that it should move to the west and attack, from that direction, the Japanese army along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. When Sun heard of this, he immediately moved his forces to the mountain region in the west and suddenly fell upon the Fourth Brigade on its way there, inflicting a heavy loss of men. Again, when the leader of the reactionary gentry, Chen of Tenghsien, with a force of about three thousand, was defeated by the Fourth Brigade, Sun went to his aid and helped him launch a new attack on the Fourth Brigade, who promptly retreated and thus avoided a catastrophe.

At the time when General Shih Yu-shan was despatched to South Shantung, the 69th Army was given the authority to straighten out the military and political affairs of that district. After its arrival there, Generalissimo Chiang personally wired to General Shih that he could assume dictatorial power in dealing with local affairs. But General Shih was very cautious in employing this right. He stuck to the united front policy and helped to develop the people's movement whenever he could. Nevertheless, Sun did not approve of the General's discretion and charged him with insubordination. Fortunately, however, the Central Government was not taken in by this. In August, General Shih was promoted to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Tenth Army Corps. Later, he was also made a member of the Committee of the Shantung Government and is now Chairman of the Provincial Government of Chahar.

Failing to inflict any damage on General Shih by charging him with "strange actions" before the Central Government, Sun began to try to strain relations between Shih and the Shantung Government. The Governor of Shantung, Admiral Shen Hung-lich, fell in with Sun's scheme. He appointed Sun to the post of Special Commissioner for the Twelfth District of Shantung with jurisdiction over the long rectangular area stretching from Tenghsien in the south to Poshan in the north and cutting through the base of the Fourth Guerrilla District. This arrangement, the object of which, as has been seen, was to enhance Sun's wavering prestige, was a direct hindrance to efficient political administration and to the smooth working of the united front.

Local Forces of the People

The term "people" here means all those who do not belong to the ruling class, with the exception of the youth, whose armed forces are discussed in the next section. The local forces of the

people are generally led by the middle peasants, but their ranks are filled by the poor. Their form of organization is rather backward and has many medieval traits. They have numerous names and each is independent of the other. Superstition is the bond that all use to bind their members together. The groups are divided according to the different god each worships and the different method each uses to train its members. The particular god each worships and the rituals it performs are as a rule kept secret. The eating of meat and garlic and sexual intercourse are forbidden by all the sects. Such are the peculiar traits of these semimedicval superstitious peasant organizations.

The *Kung* (Palace), where training and the worshipping of the god take place, is the unit of these peasant organizations. Ordinarily, there is only one *Kung* in each village. Whenever ten members are recruited in a village, they have the right to establish a *Kung*. Those villages that have less than ten members are affiliated to a neighboring *Kung*. Before the *Kung* is officially recognized, the members are led to the mother *Kung* by the master, a well-trained veteran member of the sect, to perform an initiation ceremony. The members then elect two *Kung* chairmen, of whom one is the real chief and the other his assistant. Among the rest of the members there are no differences in rank, and they address each other as Brother. Above the *Kung*, there is a General *Kung* in each *hsien* with jurisdiction over all the local *Kungs*. The oldest of all the General *Kungs* acts as the Senior General *Kung* and is placed in charge of relations between *hsiens*.

After a *Kung* is set up, its members gather together every evening to receive training from the master. At dawn, the group is dismissed. This continues until the training is finished. The main activities in which the members are trained are worshipping and boxing, and each sect has its own rules, methods, and specialties. For instance, the Red Spear Society specializes in boxing and the use of the spear, and permits its members to participate in battles only after a month of training; whereas the Kang Feng Tao and others practice rifle shooting in addition, and allow their members to take part in fighting as soon as they join the organization. During the training period, both the Red Spear Society and the Kang Feng Tao absolutely forbid their members to have any contact with women, while the Chung Yang Tao recruits women members.

As to the doctrines of the various sects, both the Red Spear Society and the Kang Feng Tao emphasize resistance to the Japanese. But the Chung Yang Tao still advocates restoration of the emperor and believes that a "Son of Heaven" will descend to save China. It is, in fact, a very reactionary group. In the areas where it has a

stronghold, efforts have been made to resist the government authorities in the collection of taxes for the maintenance of the army.

The above mentioned peasant organizations are of great importance in South Shantung. The most influential are the Red Spear Society and the Chung Yang Tao, both of which are antagonistic to General Sun, but friendly to the Fourth Brigade of the Eighth Route Army and the 69th Army. The Fourth Brigade has, of course, helped them in every way possible. But the best results in the development of the political and military understanding of the Red Spear Society were achieved by the 69th Army. This is shown by the fact that members of the Red Spear Society were not only eager to enlist in the training classes established for them by General Shih, but after receiving some training, had actually learned enough to issue manifestoes and plan for political action. In one of its manifestoes, the Red Spear Society showed its political maturity by condemning the lawlessness of Sun's army and advocating the purging of reactionary forces and opportunist careerists. It proclaimed itself to be the armed force of the people and, therefore, to be willing to do its best to assist other Chinese forces in resisting the Japanese. In another manifesto, the Red Spear Society appealed for the co-operation of other sects and proposed the establishment of a joint office for all the sects to facilitate collaboration. Thanks to its continuous efforts, an Associated Committee of All Sects was formed. This step was of great importance in the development of the anti-Japanese movement in South Shantung.

The rapid development of the peasants' armed forces is the symbol of the awakening of the peasantry in South Shantung. These armed forces of the people have rendered valuable help to the national troops and the guerrillas. They were also, to a certain extent, instrumental in the establishment of the new political authority of the people and the mobilization of the masses. However, the backwardness of the peasants in general still demands increasing efforts to provide them with political and military training before they can really become a bulwark against the Japanese.

Local Forces of the Anti-Japanese Youth and the Eighth Route Army

Immediately after the retreat of Han Fu-chu to the south, the youth of South Shantung started to organize guerrilla warfare under the guidance of the Eighth Route Army. Their original forces were called the Anti-Japanese Guerrillas of the People of Shantung; later, when they had greatly increased in numbers and strength, they were officially incorporated into the Eighth Route Army and were thereafter known as the Fourth Brigade of Guerrilla Forces of the Eighth Route Army in Shantung. (The First

Brigade is in North Shantung, the Second in West Shantung, and the Third in East Shantung.)

When the Japanese army advanced into South Shantung at the end of 1937, armed forces organized by the youth of the locality appeared in Sinfu Shan, Laiwu, Tsulai Shan, and Taian. The group in Tsulai Shan began with a nucleus of six or seven young men, all from Taian, with the exception of the leader, Hung Tao, who came from North Shensi. The group in Sinfu Shan had at first about thirty fighters composed of students, teachers, and a few young peasants from Laiwu Shan. In January, 1938, the Sinfu Shan group joined the Tsulai Shan group and named themselves the Anti-Japanese Guerrillas of the People of Shantung. At that time, the number of young fighters had already increased to a little over a hundred. As their strength grew, they started to strike at the enemy, and after some initial successes their numbers soon increased to more than 700 men. After their participation in the Battle of Taierhchwang, their reputation and popularity increased even more rapidly. In a short while, with the help of the cadres sent by the Eighth Route Army headquarters in Shensi, they had developed their forces into an army of more than 10,000 men.

At the time of the Battle of Taierhchwang there emerged in Linyi a band of young fighters led by a left-wing group called the Youth National Salvation Corps. They too were later incorporated into the Fourth Brigade. The military structure of the Fourth Brigade is similar to that of all the guerrilla units of the Eighth Route Army, the main difference between their form of organization and that of the old regular army being the founding of a strong political department. This political department is in charge of the political training of the soldiers, and attached to it are the propaganda division, the women's division, and the Young Vanguard. As a rule, political training in the Eighth Route Army is taken even more seriously than military training. There is a political commissar in every brigade, battalion, and company. Thanks to this well-designed system, excellent discipline is maintained by the Eighth Route Army, and the morale and political consciousness of its troops are exemplary. The people, who used to be terrified of the soldiers, and with good reason, since they were little better than bandits, are now most friendly and do whatever they can to co-operate with the guerrillas.

Apart from the question of its good discipline, the Eighth Route Army is welcomed by the people on account of its liberal and constructive policy toward them. Its three basic principles are: those who have money contribute money, those who have energy con-

tribute energy; improvement of the people's livelihood; and promotion of the people's movement. According to the first policy, peasants who own less than ten *maos* of land are exempt from the war tax and the landlords are made to pay for the war. To improve the livelihood of the people, exorbitant taxes of all kinds are done away with. The promotion of the people's movement involves the lifting of all oppressive measures and constant readiness to extend a helping hand to the masses. As soon as the peasants discovered that the Fourth Brigade was fighting for the welfare of the people, as well as struggling for the liberation of the country, they were convinced that it was truly the army of the masses.

Besides the Fourth Brigade, the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army in South Shantung formed an Independent Regiment, consisting of 500 men in each *hsien*. The special features of the Independent Regiments are: first, they are composed of local peasants exclusively; second, the men do not leave their productive work; third, they are not dispatched to other places; fourth, they help to maintain the democratic anti-Japanese political organization of the *hsien* and to promote the people's movement; fifth, with the exception of the establishment of the headquarters, all the combatants reside in their homes and actively participate in production.

Such Independent Regiments have been formed in a number of *hsiens*. The strongest, which is located in a certain *hsien* along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, once successfully raided the Japanese in the *hsien* capital and captured eight members of the local puppet government. When the plan of forming Independent Regiments in every *hsien* is completed, South Shantung will be one vast armed fortress. It must be remembered, however, that not all the people are whole-heartedly behind the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army. Not only General Sun, but the gentry and landlords throughout South Shantung are by no means sympathetic toward them. This is due mainly to the fact that the Fourth Brigade assists the youth in their political activities and relieves the small and poor peasants of their heavy tax burdens. However, despite the gentry's sympathy with Sun, they dare not support him openly against the guerrillas, because on the one hand the discipline of Sun's army is so bad that even the landlords cannot trust it, while on the other hand the excellent morale of the guerrillas and the hearty support given to them by the people make the gentry think twice before incurring their hostility. Such frictions arising out of the process of creating a united front against the Japanese and of building a new China are inevitable, but they are bound to diminish with the development of the strength of the people's movement.

Forces of the Central Government Stationed in South Shantung

After the battle of Taierhchwang in April, 1938, the entire force of the Central Government returned to the south, leaving in South Shantung only the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army and the partisans of General Sun. It was not until a month later that the 69th Army was ordered to South Shantung to conduct mobile warfare against the enemy.

General Shih Yu-san, Commander-in-Chief of the 59th Army, took an active part in the defense of Liukouchiao, when he was pacification commander of North Hopei. After the fall of Peiping and Tientsin, he brought his troops to the south, fighting through Hopei to the northwest of Shantung. There General Shih's troops were organized into the 181st Division of the Central Army. When Shantung was occupied by the Japanese, the 181st Division marched into Shansi and later reached Honan, gaining a number of victories in its encounters with the enemy. Thereupon, the military affairs commission enlarged the division into the 69th Army and promoted Shih to the position of Army Commander. When it arrived in South Shantung, the 69th Army consisted of three divisions, one special brigade, and two vanguard formations.

The moment General Shih reached South Shantung, he promptly formed the Anti-Japanese Working Corps of South Shantung and summoned a conference of all guerrilla forces. His most important first steps in the reorganization of local, political, and military affairs were: (1) the determined carrying out of the policy of a national united front; (2) the improvement of *hsien* administration and the development of democratic, anti-Japanese political institutions; (3) the strengthening of the guerrilla areas of South Shantung, and the systematic planning of attacks against the enemy; (4) the unification of the form and the command of the guerrilla forces; (5) the establishment of a legalized standard of war taxes; (6) the promotion of the people's movement and the reinforcement of the local armed forces.

The achievements of the 69th Army were, of course, due to the loyalty of General Shih in carrying out the united front policy. But it is the political department of the army that must receive the greatest credit for the effective execution of this policy. The chairman of the political department is Professor Chan Yu-yu, formerly of Peiping National University. Attached to the department are some three hundred people, consisting of returned students from Europe and America, students from Peiping National University, the Anti-Japanese Political and Military Academy of North Shensi and the North Shensi Academy, and some local intellectuals.

In August, 1938, General Shih was once more promoted, this

time to Commander-in-Chief of the Tenth Army Corps, with jurisdiction over all the forces in the Fourth Guerrilla District (South Shantung). He was also given dictatorial power over local political affairs by order of the Generalissimo. Not long after, he became a member of the Shantung Provincial Government.

On October 5, 1938, General Shih received a telegram ordering him to lead his troops to Hankow and to arrive there not later than the 15th. In compliance with this order, General Shih hurriedly led the 181st Division and the students and staff of the Military Academy to the south, arriving in Anhwei Province on October 20. It is believed that the recall of General Shih was due to political reasons, since neither Admiral Shen Hung-lich, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government, nor General Sun enjoyed having the 69th Army stationed in South Shantung.

IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ANTI-JAPANESE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GUERRILLA DISTRICTS

The Japanese invasion of South Shantung destroyed the old political and military organization and threw the old superstructure of Chinese society into chaos. However, in a very short time, the people of Shantung emerged from this chaotic situation with a new government, a new armed force, and a new social structure. The destruction of South Shantung by the Japanese seems to have been a necessary prerequisite for its re-birth.

Anti-Japanese Political Organization

Only after the arrival of the 69th Army did the local political situation return to complete normality and the work of reorganization begin. Before this, it is true, the Fourth Brigade had done something in the way of building up popular anti-Japanese organizations, but owing to the disruptive work of General Sun, lack of time, and its limited strength, its aim was not fully realized. Under these circumstances, the political scene in the various *hsiens* was extremely confusing. In some *hsiens* new magistrates had been appointed while the former magistrates were still in office. In addition, excessive appointments of *hsien* magistrates had been made by General Sun, so that it frequently happened that there were two magistrates in a *hsien*. Sometimes there were even three or four, and, in the worst case of all, in Taian, there were six. In this connection Admiral Shen is reported as once saying, "Anyway, it is better to have many magistrates than none." The situation was further complicated by the antagonisms existing between the various armed forces and social groups.

In places such as Chichwang, Taian, and Weih sien, where the

Japanese had occupied the railway which cuts through this area, it was impossible for the *hsien* authority to extend through the Japanese lines to those parts of the *hsiens* that were on the other side of the railway. Moreover, in other *hsiens* the authority of the magistrate could not reach all the *hsien* territory on account of the conflicts arising out of the local political and social situation. With this lack of unity within each *hsien* and lack of co-ordination between *hsiens*, South Shantung had actually become a medieval feudal empire divided into numerous independent states, the fate of which depended entirely on the individual who controlled the executive. Under these circumstances, the Provincial Government could only issue vain orders and could not effectively govern the province.

When the 69th Army arrived in South Shantung, it immediately embarked on the task of setting up in this area a guerrilla base against the Japanese, but it realized that this could not be done unless it first attacked the problems of building a new democratic, anti-Japanese political organization, and of reorganizing *hsien* politics.

In order to achieve these ends, the headquarters of the 69th Army formed the Anti-Japanese Working Corps of South Shantung (later called The Fourth Guerrilla District's Anti-Japanese Working Corps) and invited the magistrates of the *hsiens*, the Special Commissioner of the Third District, the Special Commissioner of the Twelfth District, the anti-Japanese youth, and the progressive leaders of South Shantung to discuss ways and means of pushing this program forward. The first conference of this sort was held in June, 1938, somewhere in Hsintai. More than fifty people attended, and the Anti-Japanese Working Corps was officially established. Five members were elected to form a standing committee, and a program for the reorganization of *hsien* administration was adopted. The following are some of the main points in this program:

1. Organization of the Hsien Government

- (a) The organization of *hsien* governments should be based upon the principles of simplicity and the increase of administrative efficiency.
- (b) There should be four departments under the *hsien* government: (1) Department of People's Affairs; (2) Department of Finance; (3) Department of Construction and Army Supplies; (4) Department of Education and of the Mass Movement.
- (c) The judiciary should be independent. All sub-districts under the *hsien* should set up arbitration committees. All civil cases should first be brought for arbitration.

2. *Local Finance*

- (a) The people's burdens should be reduced and all exorbitant taxes abolished.
- (b) Taxes should be imposed according to the principle of "those who have money contribute money" so that the burden of taxation may be distributed equally and the livelihood of the people may be improved.
- (c) Land taxes should be collected more in the form of crops and less in the form of cash.

3. *Local Education*

- (a) The operation of primary schools and free schools should be resumed immediately.
- (b) Training schools for the purpose of developing anti-Japanese cadres should be set up.
- (c) Textbooks should be improved—the Working Corps to be entrusted with this task.
- (d) A South Shantung United Middle School should be organized and a daily newspaper published.

4. *People's Participation in Political Affairs*

- (a) Every *hsien* should set up a *Hsien* Political Council, whose approval of important *hsien* matters must be given.
- (b) The *Hsien* Political Council must be organized by delegates of the people and of the mass organizations. The *hsien* magistrate has the right to appoint a certain number of councilors, but the appointed councilors should not exceed 30% of the entire council membership.
- (c) No sub-district leaders can become members of the *Hsien* Political Council.
- (d) A Sub-District Political Council should be formed in every sub-district to assist and supervise the sub-district leader.
- (e) The Sub-District Political Council should consist of two kinds of delegates, those who represent the mass organizations and those who represent the people in general. The people's delegates are to be elected by the people.
- (f) No village chief can be elected to the Sub-District Political Council.

5. *Local Administration Organization*

The system of sub-district captains must be abolished and changed into a system of sub-district leaders.

After the adoption of the above program it was arranged that the standing committee of the Anti-Japanese Working Corps should

call a meeting every six weeks to discuss whatever problems might arise. Other tasks, such as the organizing of the People's General Mobilization Committee of South Shantung, the unification of the people's movements, the organization of peasant unions, the strengthening of the peasant armed forces, the establishment of local economic co-operatives, and the betterment of local economic conditions were also to be considered by the committee, and some elaborate plans have been mapped out.

All the above mentioned decisions were ratified by the 69th Army and put into execution. They were also reported to the Central Government and commended by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who issued an order that the 69th Army and the Anti-Japanese Working Corps immediately proceed with the program.

At the time when the 69th Army was working on this reorganization, the Provincial Government also made a declaration of plans for the reorganization of *hsien* governments and the organization of the People's General Mobilization Committee. However, except for the provision that the *hsiens* should consist of three departments instead of the four suggested by the 69th Army, the reorganization scheme of the Provincial Government did not seem to be an efficient measure. Furthermore, it did not provide for the setting up of an organization through which the people might participate in the government. According to the scheme of the Provincial Government, the Mobilization Committee was to be organized by the *hsien* magistrate and the landlords and gentry only, which is fundamentally different from the principle followed by the 69th Army. In view of these differences it is not surprising that the Provincial Government later disagreed with the 69th Army on many problems concerning the improvement of local government.

The reorganization work carried out by the 69th Army achieved different results in different *hsiens*, depending on the situation in each particular locality. In some cases, the plan was carried out quickly and fully, whereas, in other cases, its operation was rather slow. But the following general conclusions may be drawn in regard to the new political organization in South Shantung.

First, it is definitely anti-Japanese. All the new measures adopted by the new local governments are designed for the sole purpose of eradicating the old bureaucracy and facilitating the execution of the program of resisting the Japanese and building a new China. Various measures, such as the reduction of taxation (in Laiwu they even went so far as to adopt the system of progressive taxation) and the drastic cutting of the salaries of local government officials (Ch. \$40.00 a month for a *hsien* magistrate, Ch. \$25.00 a month for a *hsien* department chairman) show that the new authorities are de-

terminated to adhere to the anti-Japanese program. Although it is not explained in black and white how *hsien* magistrates are selected, nevertheless, it is obvious from those who are appointed that the *hsien* governments are in the hands of the anti-Japanese youth.

Second, the new political organization is democratic. Both in the *hsiens* and in the districts the people take part in the government. (Since the people have greater authority in the Sub-District Political Council, it is called the Committee for Sub-District Political Affairs.) Unlike American legislative bodies, both the *Hsien* and the Sub-District Political Councils can also participate in the executive branch of the government. Moreover, as a further democratic safeguard, it is clearly stipulated that no sub-district leader may become a member of the *Hsien* Political Council and that no village chairman may become a member of the Sub-District Political Council.

Third, the new political organization will eventually eradicate the decadent practice of the gentry in their control of the *hsien* politics. The gentry themselves realize this, and for this reason they are doing everything in their power to sabotage the reorganization. At first they do not dare to fight against it openly, but try in every way possible to establish themselves in the various councils. They do not care who is the *hsien* magistrate so long as they can themselves control the local government. In order to achieve their purpose, they pretend to welcome the reorganization heartily. But as soon as they discover that the policy of the new government is against their interests, they try to sabotage its work. When they fail to gain entry into the new government, as a last resort they begin to fight against it, but even then, as secretly as possible. The effectiveness of this anti-democratic sabotage on the part of the gentry will depend, of course, on the vigilance of the newly awakened masses.

Fourth, the carrying out of the policies of the new organization raises the political level of the peasantry, increases their will to fight, and paves the way for a further development of democracy. Since the Japanese invasion of South Shantung, the people have gradually become aware of the fact that it was the corruption of the old bureaucracy which made the invasion possible and that the only hope of saving the situation is to organize armed resistance themselves. As soon as they reached this conclusion, the people of South Shantung began to take charge of their own affairs and organize their own defensive forces.

The interest in the election of sub-district leaders and of the *hsien* and district political councils is intense, and the struggle between the rival parties is bitter. There are usually two rival parties in the elections: the party of the people, which includes the peasantry, the anti-Japanese youth, the guerrillas of the Eighth

Route Army, and members of the various mass organizations; and the party of the former ruling class, which includes the members of the old bureaucracy, the gentry, the landlords, and those who have connections with General Sun. The party of the ruling class possesses the advantage of being in control of the election machine and is wealthy enough to spend a lot of money on the election campaign and practice bribery where necessary and possible. The gentry usually map out an effective election campaign and give elaborate banquets for the important people in the community. Since the election machine is in their hands, they deliberately mail far more election notices to their associates than to their rivals. Besides, the notices mailed to their rivals are usually late, often sent out a day before the meeting in the hope of making it impossible for them to attend. In view of this, the progressives have to find out the dates of the meetings in advance and secretly notify their colleagues so that they will be sure to attend. Moreover, in order to prevent the ruling class from other manipulations, the *hsien* government decreed that all village chairmen, well-known local leaders, and every member of the anti-Japanese youth should be eligible to vote. Thus, the number of voters of the people's party is often two or three times greater than that of their rivals. Thus the "backward" peasants of South Shantung are not only capable of being interested in politics; they are actually beginning to govern themselves.

Fifth, the efficiency of the local governments has been greatly increased. It is to be expected that the youth, who now occupy powerful positions in the *hsien* governments, are not yet well acquainted with the routine of government; but their enthusiasm, their devotion to the people, their spirit when confronted with hardship, and their complete lack of bureaucratic tendencies have made them the best servants of the masses.

The Organization and Training of the Armed Forces

Organization of the Army. The regular army in South Shantung (the 69th Army) maintains its original formation. The only forces whose organization is different from the regular army are the guerrillas. According to the system adopted by the Fourth Brigade of the Eighth Route Army, the brigade is divided into regiments, each regiment into battalions, each battalion into companies, each company into squads. There is a commander and a vice-commander for each of these sub-divisions, except that there is only a corporal (and no vice-corporal) for the squad. In command of the brigade is the commander, under whom there is a vice-commander. The equipment of the guerrillas is not very different from that of the regular

troops. A novel feature of both the regular army and the guerrillas is the establishment of a political department.

At the head of the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army there is a political commissar, and both the political commissar and the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Brigade are appointed by the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army.

In charge of the political department of the regular army is the chairman, who is appointed by the Central Government and is responsible for the political training of the army, the mass movement, local political problems, supplies for the army, and propaganda work. The political department has three divisions, political, mass movement, and propaganda. There is a chairman for each regiment and a director for each company, all appointed by the political department of the brigade. The guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army devote additional attention to political work, and besides the commissar and the various departmental chairmen and directors, there are also "political workers" who are sent into the company to mix with the rank and file soldiers and help to develop them.

Those who work in the various political departments are almost exclusively young men recruited from the ranks of former professors, college students, returned students, teachers, middle school students, and graduates from the anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in North Shensi and from North Shensi Academy. Most of them came originally from Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking and North Shensi. The appearance of a number of girls in the army is another novelty. The position of the political workers in the army is high, yet their pay is very low. The chairman of the Political Department of the 69th Army, Professor Chang Yu-Yu, has the rank of Colonel (formerly carrying the pay of at least Ch. \$1,000 per month), but receives only Ch. \$15 per month for working eighteen hours a day. The reason for such low payment for political workers is to set a good example to the soldiers.

The Training of the Army. In addition to the regular military training the present army is given political training which takes the following forms:

(a) Routine Political Training. This kind of training usually takes the form of lectures or discussions. The training unit in the 69th Army is the company while in the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army it is the squad. The topics for lectures and discussions are: the National United Front against Japan, Political Problems, History of Japanese Aggression in China, The Mass Movement, Chinese Social Structure and Problems of the Chinese Revolution, National Salvation Songs, etc. There are also reading and writing

classes conducted for illiterates. Latinized Chinese is quite popular in the army.

(b) The National Salvation Hall. The system of providing a National Salvation Hall for the army was initiated by the Eighth Route Army and is now uniformly adopted by all the troops in South Shantung. The National Salvation Hall is similar to a clubroom, except that it is also the library and school of the army. There are games, war cartoons, war maps, war plans, war slogans, photographs of famous people (Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Karl Marx, Lenin), publications of the army, books on the anti-Japanese war and the tactics of guerrilla warfare, the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tze-tung, etc. Most interesting of all are the exhibitions of work of the soldiers, diaries, essays, songs and poems. There is a National Salvation Hall for every company in the 69th Army, and the Eighth Route Army has a still greater number. The young soldiers are very much interested in educating themselves, and their cultural level has been raised enormously of late.

The Military Academy and the Academy for the Training of Political and Military Cadres. Both of these institutions are the training schools for guerrillas of the 69th Army and the Eighth Route Army. Their enrollment consists of college students, secondary school students, exceptional primary school students, and those youths who are willing to devote their lives to the liberation of China. The purpose of the training is to educate a group of dependable cadres for the work of resisting the Japanese and building a new China.

In addition to their regular military training, all members of the Military Academy of the 69th Army and the Academy of the Eighth Route Army study the following subjects: The National United Front against Japan, Philosophy (with emphasis on Dialectics), Historical Materialism, Political Science, Political Economy, International Politics and Economy, Social Evolution, Chinese Social Structure and the Chinese Revolution, Political Problems (current problems of domestic and international politics), Guerrilla Warfare Tactics, The People's Movement, Political Work in the Army, Map Making, Latinized Chinese, War Art, etc. Extra-curricular activities include National Salvation Hall study groups and discussions. The instructors are well trained in their particular fields, many possessing practical experience in political struggles. The training period is three months.

The Military Academy of the 69th Army admits 500 men every quarter. More than half the number admitted are officers of low rank, for General Shih is determined to re-educate his officers and build up a well-developed modern army. He is beginning with cor-

porals, lieutenants, and captains, and later the training will extend to officers of higher rank. These officers are not ashamed to study with young students fresh from school but are delighted to have an opportunity to study, and are eager to enroll in the Military Academy.

The Academy for the Training of Political and Military Cadres was established by the Fourth Brigade and at first accompanied the guerrillas wherever they went. Later it was conducted jointly by the Fourth Brigade and the Third Special Commissioner of Shantung, Chang Li-yuan. The president of the Academy is the Chairman of the Political Department of the guerrillas, Sun Tao-lin, a graduate of Peking National University, known as "Sun the Cannon" because he is such a good orator. Two or three hundred students, many of them girls, enter the Academy every quarter. The students in the Academy are on the whole more developed politically than those of the Military Academy of the 69th Army although the training in the two schools is much the same, since both get their instructors from the Eighth Route Army.

The Organization of Transport and Supply. Before the 69th Army was sent to South Shantung there was practically no regular organization of transport and supply except in the case of the Fourth Brigade of the Eighth Route Army, and consequently there was much confusion and unlawful confiscation in the old style. Wherever the troops were stationed they demanded everything they wanted from the people, not only *Man-tao*,⁹ but such things as oil, salt, vegetables, meat, utensils, dishes, anything they could lay their hands on. The number of soldiers that the people were supposed to support was never given correctly. As a result, supplies raised among the people often greatly exceeded the needs of the army, and the soldiers would then either waste them, send them to their homes, sell them, or just give them away. The village heads were frequently forced to make complaints to headquarters about the bad behavior of the soldiers and to request that they leave the villages.

The Fourth Brigade, on the contrary, behaved extraordinarily well. It laid down three principles concerning the collection from the people of supplies for the army. First, it does not care what sort of food it gets. Second, it does not take from the poor peasants. As a rule, before soldiers were sent to the villages for supplies, political workers would precede them to make a thorough investigation of the situation, and the burden of taxation would be imposed according to the ability to give. Third, the Fourth Brigade never collected more than enough for its immediate needs. If anything was left over when the guerrillas moved on, it was distributed among the poor.

⁹ Chinese bread.

For these reasons the Fourth Brigade won the goodwill of the poor people and incurred the jealousy and hatred of the landlords and gentry.

When the 69th Army arrived in South Shantung, in addition to forming the South Shantung Anti-Japanese Working Corps and re-organizing the guerrillas, it also attempted to provide a regular system of transport and supply for the troops. At a conference of all guerrilla forces the headquarters of the 69th Army issued an order covering the departments of transport and supply which contained the following important points:

(1) Food, supplies, and other necessities of the guerrillas in all the *hsiens* and of the entire army are to be provided by one general organization.

(2) A triplicate note must be given to the people in return for whatever they give in support of the forces, and the government is prepared to pay back whatever it takes.

(3) Poor peasants are to be exempted from all impositions.

(4) The army will do its best not to collect anything directly, but will rather let the civil authorities, the *hsien* government, or any other popular agencies, be responsible.

In addition, the regulations also provide detailed measures for collecting, and say how much is to be collected per month. It was to be expected that it would be exceedingly difficult to carry out these rules consistently in view of the chaotic situation in South Shantung. But after the first three months, from July to October, 1938, they were already being generally observed.

After the regulations concerning transport and supply are established and carried out, it is possible to achieve a reasonable and equal distribution of responsibility. Not only do the peasants know beforehand exactly what they have to give, but the army finds it easier to conform to its budget, to check up on its supplies, and to discover where corruption exists. The system is of real benefit both to the army and to the people.

Communications and Ammunition Supplies. The supply of ammunition is the most serious problem facing the army in South Shantung. The Chinese forces have rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, and small field guns, but they are very short of ammunition. Although there are small-scale arsenals in the Fourth Brigade and the areas under the Third Special Commissioner, they can only manufacture rifles and cartridge cases and cannot manufacture bullets for the rifles.

However, this difficulty is being overcome in three ways; first, by capturing ammunition from the enemy; second, by collecting all arms and ammunition in the hands of the people; and third, by re-

ceiving supplies from the Central Government. Lest anyone should question the possibility of transporting supplies from the Central Government, the following example should remove such skepticism. In September, 1938, the regiment commanded by General Chu of the 69th Army was ordered to carry a large quantity of ammunition and two million dollars in cash from Loyang, Honan, through North Shantung to South Shantung. The Chu regiment, with more than a thousand men and several hundred horses, succeeded in arriving in West Shantung during the early part of October. From West Shantung, it proceeded northward to Taian and then turned eastward to Laiwu, slipping through the Japanese-controlled Tientsin-Pukow Railway, and finally marched south until it reached the main headquarters of the 69th Army with all the ammunition and supplies intact. In the course of a march of more than a thousand *li*, the regiment did not encounter a single Japanese soldier. Again, it is common knowledge that the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army are continually passing back and forth across the railways controlled by the Japanese. If Chinese forces can do this in the heavily guarded areas, one can imagine what can be done in the villages far removed from the communication lines. For in the so-called occupied areas the Japanese only hold the main communication lines and a few strategic areas; they have not sufficient forces to guard every point along the railways, let alone the vast hinterland. It is therefore possible for Chinese troops to cross the railways and to pass through the Japanese lines at will. Under such circumstances it is not difficult for the Chinese forces to receive supplies from the Central Government.

Communication facilities are also available. At the present time all telephone and telegraph lines connecting the various *hsiens* are once again functioning normally. There are radio transmitters in the 69th Army and the Fourth Brigade, and among General Sun's troops, while radio receiving apparatus is found almost everywhere Chinese are found. (Incidentally, radio supplies and parts are almost without exception brought from the Japanese-controlled cities and are all made of Japanese materials.) By means of such facilities, the activities of the Chinese armed forces and civilians in South Shantung are directed by radio by the Military Affairs Commission, and news bulletins and speeches are brought to them from the broadcasting stations of the Central Government. Furthermore, communication stations operated and maintained by the people are organized in every important place for the conduct of military intelligence. The best network of stations is maintained and operated by the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army.

Relations Between the Army and the People. The Japanese in-

vasion of China has caused a drastic change, not only in the organization of the Chinese Army, but in its very nature. It has changed it from a mercenary army, an instrument of the war lords, to a national revolutionary army of the people. Accompanying this fundamental change is an equally significant change in the relations between the army and the people. There are still, unfortunately, a small number of armed forces in South Shantung that have not yet broken away completely from the tradition of the old style army; but the situation is improving daily. This hopeful tendency is due to several factors:

(1) The present war is a life and death struggle for national independence against an imperialist aggressor, not a civil war between rival Chinese militarists.

(2) The political training conducted in the army has greatly raised its political understanding, its morale, and its discipline.

(3) The interests of the army and those of the people are now in complete accord.

(4) As long as the war is being fought, the army and the people are dependent on each other and cannot afford to be separated.

(5) The army has won the sympathy of the people because it is fighting for their interests.

(6) As a result of the above factors, the attitude of the people toward the army has fundamentally changed and the people themselves are enthusiastically enlisting.

In the minds of the people, the armed forces in South Shantung are, generally speaking, divided into three groups: the 69th Army, the Fourth Brigade, and the Fifth Column. Toward the first two groups, the people act with complete confidence; but they are unsympathetic to the third group, for obvious reasons.

When troops whom the people trust are stationed anywhere, they are allowed to live in the public buildings, such as temples, sub-district army headquarters, police stations, tax bureaus, and the buildings of benevolent societies. If these are not sufficient, they seek the permission of the merchants to use their vacant storehouses, or of the peasants to use their vacant huts. As soon as the troops settle down, discipline and order are strictly maintained, and there is never any trouble with the people. During their spare time, they help to keep the streets clean or assist the peasants in their farm work. Harmonious friendship is thus assured. It is interesting to note, also, how freely and naturally the peasant women, who used to be so afraid of soldiers, behave in the presence of these troops. When a Chinese peasant woman is not afraid of the soldiers, it is a sure sign that they have won the complete confidence of the people. Before the troops leave for their next destination, they clean their

quarters thoroughly, put everything back in order, return whatever they have borrowed, and pay for whatever they have broken.

Relations Between the Army and the Local Government. Superficially speaking, there seems to be no change in the relations between the Army and the government, since the army is still the dominating element in politics. However, there has been a transformation in the nature of the present army control. When one spoke of military domination in the old days, one meant the selfish rule of the militarists; whereas today army control is necessary for the duration of the war in the interests of the nation. Army control in the past meant interference by the military in the civil administration; today it is essential to the successful conduct of the war. Moreover, according to the administrative system, the Provincial Government is the highest governing body of South Shantung. But in view of the military situation, the Provincial Government is unable to control the whole of this area. The function of co-ordinating the twenty or more *hsiens*, all of which are of equal status, is therefore taken over by the army on the authority of the Generalissimo. However, General Shih is always careful to consult the Provincial Government before acting, or, when that is impossible, to seek its subsequent approval.

The Mass Movement

For the purpose of resisting the Japanese, a people's movement has the greatest significance. It is not too much to say that the possibility of final victory and the rebirth of a new China will depend largely upon the success of the mass movement. Consequently, since the outbreak of the war, not only has the Eighth Route Army insisted that the mass movement be encouraged, but the progressive members of the Kuomintang have acknowledged that the previous defeats were mostly due to the lack of support from the people. The youths, the statesmen, and the military strategists who are loyal to the national emancipation movement, also vigorously fight the suppression of the mass movement. Before the fall of Hankow, one of the important reasons for incomplete realization of the national united front was the lack of agreement about the mass movement between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

The mass movement is particularly important in the guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines. There are two chief factors in the successful building of a guerrilla base. One is geographical, the other political. In the broad sense, the political factor means the establishment of a democratic, anti-Japanese political organization; in the narrow sense, it means the success of the mass movement. If there is no such organization, there is no real mass movement. If

there is no healthy mass movement, there can be no hope of a successful democratic organization. The Fifth Column of General Sun was often opposed by the people because it suppressed the mass movement. On the other hand, the Eighth Route Army and the 69th Army were welcomed by the people because they helped to develop the mass movement. The men who established the Fourth Guerrilla District not only emphasized political reforms and military developments; they also realized that the most powerful force in winning the final victory is the full development of the people's power.

After Han's army retreated southward, the Commander of the Fifth War District, General Li Tsung-jen, immediately started the mass movement in that region. He organized The General Mobilization of the Fifth War District in Hsuehchow and appointed a director of general mobilization in every *hsien* to carry out the work of mobilizing the people.

When the 69th Army arrived in South Shantung, it immediately co-operated with the guerrillas of the Eighth Route Army, actively developing the mass movement. Orders were given to every *hsien* that those which had not organized a General Mobilization Committee should do so immediately, and that if the Committee already existed, the work should be accelerated. In addition, the Political Department of the 69th Army sent out two or three directors to every *hsien* to direct the mass movement. The Eighth Route Army also sent their politically trained personnel from South Shantung back to their native *hsiens* to push forward the mass movement and to establish Independent Battalions, to set up political training classes in the farmers' self-defense organizations, and thus to expand the work of general mobilization. Later, a proposal was made by the Anti-Japanese Working Corps of the Fourth Guerrilla District that a People's General Mobilization Committee should be established in the district for the purpose of giving guidance to the mass movement of all the *hsiens*, and that this committee should be stationed at the headquarters of the 69th Army. The committee came into existence in October, 1938, under the leadership of the 69th Army's Political Department. This gave the mass movement in South Shantung a central organization.

The officers of the People's General Mobilization Committee of the Fourth Guerrilla District consist of a chairman and a secretary. All the mass organizations are brought under the leadership of the Committee. Its regulations are almost the same as those announced by the Headquarters of the Fifth War District except for one or two small points of difference. The Shantung Provincial Government also issued a series of regulations governing the organization of the

mass movement, but as they were entirely undemocratic, they were not accepted by the Fourth Guerrilla District.

The organization of the People's General Mobilization Committee in each *hsien* follows the same lines as the People's General Mobilization Committee of the Fourth Guerrilla District. There are five departments in each committee and there are sub-district branches and town branches in every district and town.

At present the important work of the *hsien* general mobilization committees is propaganda and organizing. Besides organizing the district and town branches, they also organize and train the town self-defense corps which have been established in almost every town. It is the duty of every able-bodied adult farmer to join the corps. There are two-week training classes emphasizing political as well as military knowledge. Classes are held when the farmers are free.

However, the *hsien* general mobilization committee has had little success in organization. As to its propaganda work, it depends mostly on the help of the Propaganda Departments of the Fourth Brigade and the 69th Army. These propaganda departments have divisions for dramatics, singing, speaking, and cartoons. The people who participate in this work are students from Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanghai, and among them are some well-known cartoonists and writers. Cities, towns, and market places are used as meeting centers for propaganda activities. Wherever these young propagandists go they arouse tremendous enthusiasm.

Home visits by girl students are one of the most successful types of propaganda. They visit and converse with the farmers' wives and try to convince them that they should participate in anti-Japanese activities. Great efforts are made to persuade them to unbind their feet, to attend the reading classes conducted by the women's division, to encourage their husbands to join the armed forces, and to struggle for feminine emancipation. Women's mass meetings are now held even in the most secluded villages of South Shantung, and peasant women themselves take part in the speech-making. Farmers' daughters give speeches on the same platform as high-ranking army officers, *hsien* magistrates, and other officials, and all the women feel that it is something to be proud of. This is a truly revolutionary change. Only a few months previously the women of South Shantung had still believed in the old idea that women should "never get out of the front door, or even the inner door" and that "women without ability are virtuous." But today they are speaking from the platform and learning to read. The Japanese invasion has driven the women of Shantung out of the kitchen and forced them to join the fight for the liberation of their sex and their country.

In addition to the organization of Women's Corps and women's

reading classes, the girl students also organize Children's National Salvation Corps, in which they teach children National Salvation songs and how to do propaganda work. This is a most effective kind of education; for after two or three months all children who have joined the children's corps become good propagandists and frequently win over the hearts of their parents by their songs.

Not only the women and children, but the farmers also have benefited from this political education. They now have opportunities to participate in propaganda meetings—soldiers' and people's joint meetings, celebration, welcome, and farewell meetings—and cartoon exhibitions. The women and peasants of South Shantung are gaining precious knowledge and are taking advantage of splendid opportunities which did not exist even for the average college student a short time ago. As has already been said, the final defeat of Japan can only be accomplished when general mobilization has been achieved, and general mobilization is only possible when the peasants give their whole-hearted, voluntary support. Already, as a result of the successful development of the mass movement, the peasants are organizing themselves for intelligence service, transporting the wounded, and rendering all other services within their power. Such behavior on the part of the peasants is unprecedented in Chinese history.

But not only have the peasants realized their responsibility in defeating the Japanese; they have also become aware of their new political strength and social status. In the past, none of them dared to walk close to the doors of the *hsien* government, but now they not only step into the *hsien* magistrate's building, but actually demand that the *hsien* magistrate suppress the reactionary forces. In the past they dared not approach the high officials, but now they shake hands and sit down at a play with Shih Yu-san himself. They do not feel that the *hsien* magistrate or Commander Shih are much higher than they are. In the past they did not dare to resist Han Fu-chu's suppression, but now they even dare to oppose General Sun, who bears the title of Commander of the Partisans. Naturally, the reforms in the political field are largely responsible for this change, but the most important factor is the awakening of the peasants themselves. The mass movement has given the peasants a new sense of self-reliance.

New Education

In the educational, as in the political field, a new system has emerged in South Shantung from the ruins of the old. However, it has been less carefully planned than the political system, but has

been developed empirically to meet the day to day needs of the community.

The School System. Before the war, none of the schools in South Shantung were under the control of the Province, except the Secondary School of Taian and the Second Normal School in Chufu. The rest of the secondary, professional, and normal schools were all run by the *hsiens*. In addition to these schools there were a number of primary schools. They were run either by the *hsien*, the sub-district, or the village, and were free. Japan's invasion of South Shantung did not do much harm to the primary schools. Most of them continued to operate throughout the war, and those that were forced to close resumed their activities after a short time. There has also been practically no change in the administration of the primary schools; the only important change has been in the curriculum and in the content of the text books. But there have been three distinct changes in the secondary schools: a change in the organization, improvement in the treatment of the students, and changes in the curriculum.

Almost all the secondary, normal, and professional schools have been closed since the war and replaced by Training Schools for Young Political and Military Cadres. These training schools are established in order to meet the urgent necessity of educating new cadres for the war. They consist as a rule of three departments: the educational department—for the training of new primary school teachers; the department of the mass movement—for the training of leaders of the movement; and the political department—for the training of civil servants.

Whether they were under the Province or the *hsien*, the secondary schools all used to charge for tuition, writing materials, and rooms, so that the poor were excluded, but now, not only is there no charge of any kind, but the students who enroll in the training schools are even given free board and lodging. In other words, whereas education was a privilege of the comparatively rich in former days, it is now open to all. Moreover, under the new nationally conscious democracy, to educate oneself is considered a duty which every patriotic citizen is obliged to perform.

In addition to the training schools of the various *hsiens*, the anti-Japanese Working Corps of the Fourth Guerrilla District has put forward a plan for the formation of a South Shantung United School, which is to be affiliated with the Higher Institute for the Training of Political and Military Cadres. So far, however, the Provincial Government has not given its consent to this plan.

The Military Academy of the 69th Army and the Academy for the Training of Political and Military Cadres of the Fourth Brigade,

which have already been described, are, of course, under the military and not the local authorities. It should be remembered, however, in any discussion of education in South Shantung, that the educational work of these institutions is of the greatest importance.

Curriculum. The spirit of the new education in South Shantung is illustrated by its new curriculum. Unnecessary courses have been dropped and subjects related to the war of liberation have been added. The History of China has been replaced by the History of the Japanese Invasion of China, World History by World Politics and World Economy, Art and Music by War Arts and National Salvation Songs. The new additional subjects are: the National United Front Against Japan, Philosophy, Political Science, Political Economy, History of Social Evolution, Current Political Problems, Chinese Social Structure and the Chinese Revolution, the Mass Movement, Rural Economic Cooperatives, and Guerrilla Warfare Tactics. Courses in natural science remain unchanged. The whole emphasis in education is now placed upon the training and development of leaders for the carrying on of the war. As to text books, some schools use those that are edited by the Academy of the Fourth Brigade, some those that are edited by the Military Academy of the 69th Army, and some edit their own. For primary schools, there are well-printed text books furnished both by the Province and by the *hsiens*. General Feng Yu-hsiang's *Resist Japan*, written in rhymed sentences of three characters, is also widely used in the lower primary schools. There are also special booklets illustrated and written for women's study classes and children's national salvation corps. Besides these, there are many other kinds of texts published by the *hsien* committees for the editing of primary school text books.

Publications. Mention may here be made of the various publications in South Shantung, since all have some educational value.

Despite the most adverse circumstances, the leaders and the youth of Shantung never for a moment neglect the importance of war-time literature. There are no large modern printing presses in South Shantung. The Third Special Commissioner and the Fourth Brigade each has a press with lead type, but apart from these, there are only old-style stone printing presses and mimeograph machines. Of the mimeograph machines, only a small number are Chinese-made, the great majority of them being made in Japan, whence the auxiliary parts also come. There are now in South Shantung two lead printing sets, thirty stone printing presses, and more than 300 mimeograph machines. All these machines are working twenty-four hours a day.

The following are the chief publications:

Newspapers

Tsing Nien Pao (The Youth), published by the youth of Hisien.
Sheng Li Sin Wen (New Forces), published in Laiwu, an independent popular paper.

Tung Yuan Hsiao Hsi (Mobilization News), organ of the People's General Mobilization Committee of Taian.

Tsan Hsun (War News), organ of the Political Department of the 69th Army.

Kang Tsan Tsin Pao (Anti-Japanese Despatch), organ of the Political Department of the Fourth Brigade of the Eighth Route Army.

Tsun Di Sin Wen (News of the War Area), published by the Tai Kwong News Agency in Hsintai.

Tung Pao (The Record), organ of the Chief-of-Staff Headquarters of the 69th Army.

Periodicals

Ghien Di Chow Pao (War Area Weekly), edited by the Political Department of the 69th Army. Its contents consist of theoretical essays, reports, dispatches, short commentaries, literature, reports on political work and the mass movement in various localities. Free.

Yiu Gi (The Guerrillas), edited by the Political Department of the Fourth Brigade. Contents similar to those of the *War Area Weekly*. Free.

Kang Chian Tsing Nien (Anti-Japanese Youth), edited by the Youth National Salvation Corps of Laiwu. Free.

The following books have also been published:

National United Front Against Japan, edited by the Academy for the Training of Political and Military Cadres of the Fourth Brigade. 300 pages.

Collected Papers and Speeches of Chiang Kai-shek on the War, edited by the Youth Training Corps of Laiwu. 105 pages.

On Protracted Warfare Against Japan, by Mao Tze-tung, reprinted by the Youth Training Corps of Laiwu. 130 pages.

Collected Papers and Speeches of Mao Tze-tung. 300 pages.

Common Sense on Politics, Political Economy, History of Social Evolution, Political Science, Philosophical Problems, all edited by the Military Academy of the 69th Army.

National Salvation Series, seven booklets edited and published by the National Salvation Series Committee of the Political Department of the 69th Army.

Before the war there was not a single newspaper, book, or magazine published in South Shantung.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The rottenness underlying South Shantung's apparently calm and peaceful surface during the régime of Han Fu-chu caused it to collapse into complete chaos in the early stages of the Japanese invasion. But from the ruins of the old régime has arisen a new people's army, determined to drive the enemy from their land. At present, the total number of men in the peasant self-defense organizations is more than 30,000. True, they are armed only with discarded and obsolete weapons, but even so, they have played a vitally important part in disrupting the rear of the Japanese army. Their courage and resourcefulness have made a deep impression on the Japanese soldiers, who call them the "iron men." In addition to the guerrillas and armed peasants, there are about 40,000 regular troops in South Shantung (the 69th Army), who are not only well-armed and well-developed politically, but also whole-heartedly supported by the people.

In the political field, South Shantung's achievement has been even more striking. Previously, the people were ruled by an oppressive and corrupt oligarchy composed of the bureaucrats and the gentry. Now they are well on the way to real democracy with a number of capable and progressive young men holding key government positions. While the active participation of young men in politics is not in itself a guarantee of democracy, it is nevertheless a revolutionary development in the political history of South Shantung.

Whereas formerly the government was a monopoly of the gentry, and the peasants had neither the opportunity nor the ability to take part in it, they now have direct representation in the government through the various political councils. They not only have the right to criticize and make suggestions to the executive, but also to supervise its activities.

Under the old régime, the government was merely an instrument through which the militarists, bureaucrats, and gentry exploited the people. Now it has become a weapon of the people in their fight for freedom and for the building of a new China, in which all the old social evils and injustices will have been wiped out. The record of the achievements of the peasants of South Shantung is the best answer to those enemies of democracy who claim that the Chinese peasant is incapable of self-government.

A necessary accompaniment of the successful building of democracy has been the development of the mass movement. The

awakening of the masses has not only made possible the growth of democratic institutions, but has also greatly strengthened the effectiveness of the armed forces. Military success is, in fact, only possible in China if the armed forces are wholeheartedly supported by a politically awakened and emancipated people who can truly feel that the land they are fighting for is their land and the government their government.

Such a unity of interests and ideals between the army, the people, and their leaders is only possible in a true democracy. This unity exists in South Shantung today, and its people are facing the future with confidence in China's final victory.

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